The BE-Mechanism

The question of the BE-mechanism (as a neurological macro) doesn't appear to have occurred to the Nazi Trickster of Todtnauberg. As for his academic thurifers- they just accept Heidegger's con-trick uncritically. But then of course - they wouldn't be transcendentalists if they were in any way critical of the basic assumptions of Heideggerian tranniedom.

As for the monotonous substitution of the infinitive verb "to exist" with the term "to be" so beloved of the trannies [because it is so useful for obfuscation] - and the risible ontological double-take "the ontological difference" this will get you nowhere fast.

"I think therefore I am" implies or connotes and involves an inbuilt ontological redundancy, an unnecessary condition or consequence. The very mention of the subject "I" is in itself enough to ideationally instantiate so-called existential presence, (another primitive concept) without any unnecessary spurious modalic bolt-ons such as "thinking" or "breathing" or any other Cartesian existential modalic afterthoughts.

Heidegger failed to pick up on the BE-mechanism, which he should have done, as Being and Time, the book he wrote purports to be an examination of the question of "Being." I am perfectly aware of the intransitivity and transitivity of the infinitive TO BE in this discussion, my ontological point is that the intransitivity of "to be" is a philosophical, ontological and semantic absurdity because:

(A) When used intransitively there is a hidden predicational transitive assumption. For example let's examine the few occasions when it is used [usually in religious tracts, poetry or transcendentalist literature]

Take Shakespeare's famous line: "To be or not to be." Here the underlying predication expressed by the would-be suicide [which every reader instinctively understands] is: "To be [alive] or not to be [alive.]"

Take Disney's Popeye and his: "I am what I am." The cartoon sailorman's assertion also has an implied predicate: "I am [the person] I am." Descartes' "I think therefore I am" actually includes the tacit predicational meaning: "I think therefore I am [me/Descartes]." As I said in my last post, it is physically and ontologically impossible for any entity to exist in a pure propertyless state. The moment one utters the words: "I am" the subject "I" is instantiated as a mirrored predicate - it immediately exists as an entity which exists in the state of being "I." The imagined ontological existential 'purity" is dissolved.

(B) The use of "to be," without an apparent predicate is entirely contextual. The public are aware of this with varying degrees of consciousness. Try it for yourself. Approach anyone you know and say to them...

"I am."

... see what they say. Inevitably they will respond;

"You are what ?"

In fact bearing in mind my earlier remarks concerning ontological redundancy, you might well approach you friends and simply say the first person pronoun: "I" - you don't need the "am" to establish your existential actuality.

They will of course respond: "I - what?" or some similar acceptance of your reflexive acknowledgement of yourself as an existential reality. If ever, in reply to a question or remark we answer: "I am," we are simply not bothering to repeat the predication posed in some antecedal question or remark, such as:

"Who is going to the dance tonight?"

If we answer: "I am," it is a similar instance of the predicate being understood and dropped as being implied [ for speed and convenience] but with the verb retaining its transitivity.

(1) "I am what I am" DOES have a predicate and the predicate is: "... what I am."

(2) "I think therefore I am," DOES have a predicate and the predicate is..."think therefore I am."

(3) "I am" DOES have a predicate, and the predicate is objective form of "I": the omitted "me" ["I am me."]

Heidegger was always chunnering on about language being this and language being that - but in effect he had no real understanding or respect for its workings. He claimed that his philosophical purpose was to create, or allow, recognition of the pre-predictive ground of "Being," to recognise the primacy of context, of relevance, of subjective-in-objective, and of the mystery of the matrix. BUT IN THE EVENT HE DIDN'T!

He even publicly admitted that he was ignorant of the third person continuous form of be - /is/. In the sentence *The leaf is green* he was more or less examining the leaf to see if the /is/ was underneath or hiding inside.

See: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/gesprachmittheidegger.htm

for the whole dreadful business

Heidegger wasn't rigorous enough (or educated enough) in his examination of BE/IS and it suited his bizarre notions of the so called "ontological difference" to leave BE unexamined, for if he had done a proper semantic and ontological examination of the non- "Question of Being" his clumsy fantasies would have been apparent to all [even to him.]

For years I have been challenging the whole concept of BE being a "verb" at all, for although if carries a temporal cargo [was -were - is - are will be etc.,] It does not bespeak of the entititive action of giving objective existence to something, nor does it instantiate pure presence (sometimes called entiative in any other way to all the other English verbs do - it is not a "Doing Word" there is no "Action" involved - BE in its various conjugational forms allows, introduces, attributes, indicates the action or states of the subject by pointing to OTHER (real) verbs or adjectives, etc.

The bottom line for /BE/?

/BE/? in all its conjugations only ever refers to the existential modality of an object and NEVER to its *pure presence.*

Footnote:

[1] (a) Entititive: which means to be considered as a pure entity; abstracted from all circumstances. Commonsense informs us it is physically impossible to exist purely or entitively - bereft of any existential modality or property at all. It is infeasible to be here in the world and be physically propertyless at the same time, in the absence of a single characteristic, attribute, essence or state. Considered as pure entity; abstracted from all circumstances. Source: Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) Note: Entitative \En"ti*ta*tive\, adjective. [See Entity.]. (Websters 1913)

compare with ...

(b) Entiative: something that has a real existence; a thing; a corporeal entity. Random House Unabridged Dictionary.