The question of the BE-mechanism doesn't
appear to have occurred to the Nazi
Trickster of Todtnauberg.
As for his academic thurifers— they just
accept Heidegger's con-trick uncritically.
But then of course — they wouldn't
be transcendentalists if they were in any
way critical of the basic assumptions of
Heideggerian tranniedom.
As for the monotonous substitution
of the infinitive verb "to
exist"
with the term "to be" so
beloved of
the trannies [because it is so useful
for
obfuscation] - and the risible ontological
double-take "the ontological difference"
this will get you nowhere fast.
"I think therefore I am"
implies
or connotes and involves an inbuilt
ontological
redundancy, an unnecessary condition
or consequence.
The very mention of the subject
"I"
is in itself enough to ideationally
instantiate so-called existential presence, (another primitive concept) without any
unnecessary spurious modalic bolt-ons such
as "thinking" or "breathing"
or any other Cartesian existential
modalic afterthoughts.
Heidegger failed to pick up on the
BE-mechanism,
which he should have done, as Being and Time, the book he wrote purports to be an examination
of the question of "Being."
I am perfectly aware of the intransitivity
and transitivity of the infinitive
TO BE
in this discussion, my ontological
point
is that the intransitivity of
"to
be" is a philosophical, ontological
and semantic absurdity because:
(A) When used intransitively there
is a hidden
predicational transitive assumption.
For
example let's examine the few occasions
when
it is used [usually in religious tracts,
poetry or transcendentalist literature]
Take Shakespeare's famous line: "To
be or not to be." Here the underlying
predication expressed by the would-be
suicide
[which every reader instinctively understands]
is: "To be [alive] or not to be
[alive.]"
Take Disney's Popeye and his: "I
am
what I am." The cartoon sailorman's
assertion also has an implied predicate:
"I am [the person] I am."
Descartes'
"I think therefore I am"
actually
includes the tacit predicational meaning:
"I think therefore I am [me/Descartes]."
As I said in my last post, it
is physically
and ontologically impossible for any
entity
to exist in a pure propertyless state.
The
moment one utters the words: "I
am"
the subject "I" is instantiated
as a mirrored predicate — it immediately
exists as an entity which exists in
the state
of being "I." The imagined
ontological
existential 'purity" is dissolved.
(B) The use of "to be," without
an apparent predicate is entirely contextual.
The public are aware of this with varying
degrees of consciousness. Try it for
yourself.
Approach anyone you know and say to
them...
...see what they say. Inevitably they will
respond;
In fact bearing in mind my earlier
remarks
concerning ontological redundancy,
you might
well approach you friends and simply
say
the first person pronoun: "I"
—
you don't need the "am" to
establish
your existential actuality.
They will of course respond: "I
- what?"
or some similar acceptance of your
reflexive
acknowledgement of yourself as an existential
reality. If ever, in reply to a question or remark
we answer: "I am," we are
simply
not bothering to repeat the predication
posed
in some antecedal question or remark,
such
as:
| "Who is going to the dance tonight?"
|
If we answer: "I am," it
is a similar
instance of the predicate being understood
and dropped as being implied
[ for
speed and convenience] but with the
verb
retaining its transitivity.
(1) "I am what I am" DOES have a predicate and the predicate
is: "... what I am."
(2) "I think therefore I am," DOES have a predicate and the predicate
is..."think therefore I am."
(3) "I am" DOES have a predicate,
and the predicate is objective form
of "I":
the omitted "me" ["I am me."]
Heidegger was always chunnering on
about
language being this and language being
that
— but in effect he had no real understanding
or respect for its workings. He claimed
that
his philosophical purpose was to create,
or allow, recognition of the pre-predictive
ground of "Being," to recognise
the primacy of context, of relevance,
of
subjective-in-objective, and of the
mystery
of the matrix. BUT IN THE EVENT HE
DIDN'T!
He even publicly admitted that he was ignorant
of the third person continuous form of be
- /is/. In the sentence *The leaf is green* he was more or less examining the leaf to
see if the /is/ was underneath or hiding
inside.
See: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/gesprachmittheidegger.htm
for the whole dreadful business
Heidegger wasn't rigorous enough (or educated enough)
in his examination of BE/IS and it suited
his bizarre notions of the so called "ontological
difference" to leave BE unexamined,
for if he had done a proper semantic and
ontological examination of the non- "Question of Being" his clumsy fantasies would have been apparent
to all [even to him.]
For years I have been challenging the
whole
concept of BE being a "verb"
at all, for although if carries a temporal
cargo [was —were - is — are
will be etc.,] It does not bespeak of the
entititive action of giving objective
existence to something, nor does
it
instantiate pure presence (sometimes
called
entiative in any other way to all the other
English verbs do — it is not a "Doing Word" there is no "Action" involved - BE in its various conjugational
forms allows, introduces, attributes,
indicates
the action or states of the subject
by pointing
to OTHER (real) verbs or adjectives,
etc.
The bottom line for /BE/?
/BE/? in all its conjugations only
ever refers
to the existential modality of an object
and NEVER to its *pure presence.*
Footnote:
[1] (a) Entititive: which means to be considered as a pure entity;
abstracted from all circumstances.
Commonsense
informs us it is physically impossible
to
exist purely or entitively - bereft
of any
existential modality or property at
all.
It is infeasible to be here in the
world
and be physically propertyless at the
same
time, in the absence of a single characteristic,
attribute, essence or state. Considered
as
pure entity; abstracted from all circumstances.
Source: Webster's Revised Unabridged
Dictionary
(1913) Note: Entitative \En"ti*ta*tive\,
adjective. [See Entity.]. (Websters
1913)
compare with ...
(b) Entiative: something that has a real existence; a thing;
a corporeal entity. Random House Unabridged
Dictionary.
|
Evans Experientialism 
