Disclaimer:
Dear Patron of the Existentialist Theatre of the Absurd
The title of this piece does not refer to,
or insinuate that anyone who reads this is
a *dummy,* but is meant as an allusion to
those ubiquitous introductory yellow books
to be found on the shelves of most bookshops
–*Windows for Dummies* or *Excel for Dummies* etc. Whereas those worthy yellow books
are targeted to further an understanding
of the computer and other matters. This
piece addresses the equally fascinating area
of linguistic semiotics and how Heidegger*s
misunderstanding of a certain vital component
of this communicative coding led him in such
a disastrous direction.
We must however face up to the sad fact that
there exist in western society at
large, and in academia in particular, many
people in positions of some
influence and power, who, in
the word*s of Lewis Carroll's Red Queen, could believe: *as many as six impossible things before
breakfast time.* In order to be able to combat the
metaphysical metastasising of this cognitive
cancer in our society we must make an effort
to understand this transcendentalist drivel
in order to oppose it. The publishers of
the: *For Dummies...* books are in no way connected with
this posting, for [as yet] there is no book
with the title *Dasein for Dummies.*
*Existence* or *Being* can never be a predicate – never a so-called
*property* or the existential mode of an entity's presence.
The key to an understanding of Being or Existence is an understanding of the *attributive of modality* of the word *BE* in its many conjugational
forms (was, were, am, is, are, being, etc.)
The Daseinic mechanism is Heidegger's
attempt at a grammatical
and semantic transcendentalist trick in order
to improperly elevate existence or BEING to the ontological status of a predicate
via the gerundial phrase being there.
Annabelle is the sum of her total existential fleshy
bodily agglomerate. Heidegger attempts to drive in a wedge and
distinguish a dichotomy or duality
between
the named *ontic* entity Annabelle,
(which he characterises wrongly as:
*anything
that is*) and the existentially modalic denotatum (that which is named
and referenced by the word
Annabelle)
Like most other things regarding the
sentential, syntactic and semantic aspects
of *BE* the grammatically-challenged
Heidegger failed to grasp that in all Indo
European languages the words *IS* and *BE*
and *BEING* help provide (introduce
or point to) ontological modal
individuation and are chronological secenators
which allow us to separate and tease out
individual or multiple existential modalities
(*Annabelle is a student* for example) singled out from the
matrix of the total existential states and
activities of Annabelle.
Putting it bluntly - it is the meaty human
object known as Annabelle that exists - not the fact that she exists. Annabelle
exists - not her *Being Anabelle.*
In theory a sentence containing the multitude
of existential modalities of an entity could
be strung out until the fingers of the typist
making a list of them were bloodied, for
one could never record a fraction of
the existential modalities that comprise
the existential totality of the living, active
Annabelle.
The expression *Annabelle is beautiful* presents an individual characterisation
of a particular existential modality of Annabelle*s.
This ontological individuation is carried
out in most European languages in the form
of the well known paradigm of: Subject - Verb - Predicate or some other such combination, and although
certain languages [German for example] display
variant systematic word-order arrangements
and inflected forms of the key words, these
variants are easily explained by any trained
linguist or grammarian.
Why Choose the Name
Dasein?
It is very important for students of Heidegger
to enquire: *Why did he choose the name Dasein for his universal metaphysical mannikin?
* John Bunyan chose the name Christian for his religious everyman as his protagonist journeyed through the
world on his particular comportment towards
death for obvious reasons. Our first reaction
is that Heidegger, being a German speaker
was perhaps forced to use this construction
for his existential everyman because of some
hidden grammatical obligation imposed upon
him by the contingencies of German grammar?
Next we wonder why, if he was anxious to
universalise the human condition with a neutral
name for his illegitimate representation
of *Being* that he did not create a name
along the lines of the one created by Bunyan
in his masterpiece: *The Pilgrim's Progress.* After all he could, had he so chosen,
have employed the German word for *Everyman*
[Jedermann] or, failing that, he might well have chosen
*somebody* [ Jemand] or *anybody** [Irgendjemand?]]
Why on earth did he reject all these universalistic
alternatives and insist on naming his protagonist
with the gerundial construction *Das-sein*
(being there) which is the continuous present form of
BE and employ the obsessional
words which were to become his ontological
nemesis –*BE – IS – BEING the semantic nature
of which, in perhaps the most breathtaking
confession in all of philosophy, he confessed
he did not understand?
What onto-grammatical skullduggery is afoot
in the mind of the cunning Nazi? Why,
when he was dealing with words which he had
already admitted in writing that he didn*t
understand, (he admitted publicly
in his *Basic Concepts* that he never discovered
what IS meant, and admitted getting the meanings
of *being* confused) did he go ahead and play around
with the 3rd-person continuous-tense version of the
BE word (being,) even going to the extent of wrapping it
up with the locative *there* word to form
a fake *noun* which he called *Dasein?* The answer is Yes!
For a deeper
understanding of Heideggers admitted ignorance
of the 3rd person continuent word *is* see
my:
EIN GESPRÄCH MIT PROFESSOR HEIDEGGER
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/gesprachmittheidegger.htm
Heidegger gambled [correctly] that the average
reader, not expecting to be bamboozled,
would, after a while forget the real underlying
meaning of the 3rd-person continuous present
fragment –*being* and gradually internalise *Being*
and the gerundial *being there* as legitimate names for his human everyman's
existence. *Dasein* also means *Existence* in German) so bingo, the fact that existence is unpredicable would be forgotten by most the readers of
*Being and Time,* after a chapter or two and for the purposes
of his occult agenda it would be accepted
into the philosophical lexicon as a fully
fledged noun, which is the way he boldly
treats it in his writings.
Labouring under the same misaprehension of
the Russian Name Worshipping Cult which holds that that if one names something it psychologically instantiates
it, he smuggled *IS* and *Being* into his
nominological vocabulary in the form of the
gerundial noun phrase *being there* in order to avoid the more obvious existential
Cartesian-style duality that the word
*Being* implies* if it is bereft of an existential
modality or modification to indicate, such
as: *Adolf is being silly.*etc.
 Dasein (Being-There or Existence) is presented
as a verbal noun – as a pseudo-entity which,
as a noun, might be expected to have an existence
– but it is an illusion, for it is no more
than a BE word in drag – a 3rd-person conjugation
or continuous *being* word in metaphysical
sheep*s clothing. It must be remembered therefore
that when he uses the word Dasein, he is misapplying it to substantiate or
cognitively instantiate the verb being as a noun and thus when he talks of the:
*Being of Dasein* he is really saying the
*Being of Being.* [compare *the dancing of dancing.*]
Ask yourself... "Is it the dancing Annabelle that exists - or *dancing?* Is it the being called Annabelle that exists,
or the *Being* of the being called Annabelle?"
(see: Being There and Other Jiggery - Pokery.
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/being_there.htm
The*being in the world* (*dasein* or the 3rd-person continuous present metaphysical
manoeuvre) may assist Heidegger to escape from the
ambuscade of his own somewhat bizarrely named
*Ontological Difference,* but of course he
remains as dependent as he ever was upon
the BE mechanism. Heidegger*s employment
of the Daseinic device as a disclosive mechanism
with which to reveal *Being* is a transcendentalist turkey,
for it is only those aspects of the existential
Gesamtsumme which are observed visually, [either actually
or representationally] or singled out by
a speaker or writer for exposure by the semiotic
communication of language through the factorisation
of the modal introductants [is, are or being etc.] which are available to initiate modalic disclosure.
It is only with our own physical senses and
with the help of BE that we can lift the
ontological curtain and glimpse a selected,
occasional, ephemeral coup d*oeil of the existential human singleton that
lies beneath. The Daseinic 3rd-person continuous
con-trick completely ignores this multitudinous
seething molecular mass of existential modalities
that wriggle and writhe upon and beneath
the surfaces of the entities it purports
to address. What few existential modalities
it does manage to strip away and expose with
the help of BE, it packages and labels as
exhibiting the *Being* of the entity in question.
The answer of course is that the the existing
entity IS the entity in the first place,
and its *existing* cannot be separated
out from its material actuality. Thus we have
the farcicality of Heidegger*s *Ontological difference.*
Heidegger*s casuistical dichotomy between
*the ontic and the ontological* therefore is one and the same thing – two
sides of the same dud coin. Cast in Heideggerian
terms:
The being of the entity is the entity, and
the entity is the sum its own being.
*An apple exists as an apple.*There is of course a physical difference
between the word *apple* and the object referred
to by the word apple, but who would argue
that there is a difference between the communicative
meaning of the the word-sign we use to reference
the denotatum of the word*apple* and the
denoted object towards which the sign points?
But the entity and the in-toto modalities
that comprise the entity are not separate
of different things - they are the same thing,
the only difference involved is the human
descriptive methodologies.
In the same way, nobody would contend that
there is a difference between the way an
apple exists and the apple - would they?
When we decide to single out a specific existential
modality of an apple however, we are forced
to employ a mechanism, which makes it perfectly
clear that it is not the simple presence
of the apple that is being addressed, but
one of its existential modalities. That mechanism
is the BE mechanism. Hence: *The apple is red.*
So we can see that whilst a specific existential
characteristic of the apple has been disclosed,(its
redness) the infinite multitudinous modalic
makeup of the apple, which is the apple,
remains undisclosed.
Heidegger was so confused that he believed
that the being of an apple was in someway
separate or different from the apple itself
- and for him whilst the apple itself was
an*ontic* entity, the phenomenological fact
of its cosmic presence was a separate*ontological*
physicality he called by the mysterious name
*Being.* There is no difference at all between
Heidegger*s ontic and ontological, the name
of an entity is no more than a convenient
specified epithet for the purpose of both
individuating it from other entities, and
substituting a simple name for the plethora
of infinite and undisclosed and un-disclosive
existential modalities which form the entity
itself.
Aristotle in his *Categories* classifies all existential modalities into
ten ultimate types, and in the*Topics* introduces
the as different kinds of predication that
can be predicated of subjects. AITism claims
that there is only ONE category to which
all existential modality*belongs* and that
category is named with the name of the entity
itself. Thus the Gesamtsumme of Annabelle's
existential modalities is Annabelle, and
Annabelle is the Gesamtsumme of Annabelle*s
existential modalities
*Existence is the link of a being as one
with itself as a multiplication.*
*Schelling. Naturphilosophie. 1801.
The Semantic Nitty- Gritty
A Quick Colour Coded Trip Through the Ontological Inauthenticity of
Dasein.
(A) BEING AND EXISTENCE AS VERBAL SHELL NOUNS OR GERUNDS:
(A) *Being*
This version of *Being* is indicated in blue. It means: The state or fact of an object existing. It is used to refer to *Being* as the being of a being or beings (compare: Existence as the existing of existents.)
Remember (and this is the semantic trap that
Heidegger fell into ) for it is
not the state or fact that an object can be found in the world that exists - it is the object and only the object concerned that exists.
The imagined dualism or so-called *Being* or *Existence* of an object is just a recursive neurological
acknowledgement or confirmation by the brain
of the observed fact that there is such an object in the world
that corresponds to that which has already
been perceived in the first place.
To speak of the fact , or to silently internalise
and confirm that an object exists, or to
report the worldlypresence of an entity as its *Being* or *Existence* - is not to constitute or instantiate the
actual object of the ontological reference (called by linguists its nominatum) of its existential modality.
Dasein (*being there* or *human existence*)
is a non-existent gerund or verbal noun.
Patently we humans occur here and there in
the world - not our *Existence' or *Being.* Human beings exist, (as do other spatially-continuant
objects) as concrete entities or matergic (matter-energy) substances and their parts.
The fact itself that objects exist - including human objects,
does not exist or cannot be found in the
world. Ask yourself whether *dancing* or *stamp-collecting* exists, or is it only the dancers who execute
the stylised movement and the stamp-collector
and his stamps and albums that actually exist
and can be found in the world?
Both *Being* and *Existence* are non-existent dualised ontological reifications
or content-less shell-nouns in which the fact of occurring in the world is considered as (an extra)
pure transcendentally instantiated
entity; abstracted from all circumstances.
They are wholly imaginary conceptualised
instantiations of a sham worldly presence
retailed by Heidegger as the pure or entitative
conception of the fact that the entity exists
as a being. For a definition of being see (B) below.
************************************************************************************************************
(B) BEING AS A COMMON NOUN:
This version of being is picked out in red.
This different version of the word being (note lower case) means a noun that denotes
any or all members of a class. As in - an
alien being, a human being, Angela was a being of absolute beauty, etc., having the meaning
of a res extensa, or an object, a material entity, a living
thing that has (or can develop) the ability
to act or function independently.
***************************************************************************************************************
(C) *BEING* OR *EXISTING* AS A "VERB":
VERB: (INDICANT)
Being. This is the third-person continuous version
of the indicant */be/ which indicates or points to the existential
modality (the way or manner or mode in which
an entity occurs) example: *Billy is being naughty again.* Much of the linguistic tradition
calls this the property of a entity being in an existential state or modality. This
is the version which is improperly ontologically
appropriated and gerundialised into the verbal
noun or gerund we know as *Being* which refers to the pure state or bald fact
of existing (as described in (A)
But when /be/ is used sententially
in the present continuous third person sense
as in: *The cat is black* it uses the conjugate /is/ rather than being which is the simple present form it presents
in the gerundialised examples which follow.
We can state a a xxx that *BE* in any of
its forms can only ontologically refer to
an existential modality of an object - and
NOT ever to the (simple Heideggerian) fact
Consider:
*Just being there with Dorothy was happiness enough for
Stanley.
Bill was blamed for being there at the time of the accident.*
Nurse Williams, being there at the time of the crash, was able
to offer immediate medical help.
Here are some copuletic examples of *is* where the word acts as a device signalling
the present tense and for indicating a predicate
of the subject of a sentence. In the sentence
that follows being refers (points to) to predicate which informs
us that Alice exists in the mode of being or existing as short-sighted and refers us to some antecedent
situation in which her bad eyesight proved
unhelpful.
*Alice being short sighted did not help.*
*Birmingham being a hundred miles from London made transport
difficult. *
Da sein (*there being* or *human existence*) is a gerundial phrase which is confused
with and is represented as a common or proper
noun. *Being there* obviously falls under the semantic and
grammatical category of a gerund, abstract
noun or verbal noun, originally derived from
the third person continuous conjugation of being there.
Consider the quotation from Being and Time below.
Martin Heidegger:
Dasein revealed itself to be that being [1] which must first be elaborated in a
sufficiently ontological manner if the inquiry
is to become a lucid one. But now it has
become evident that the ontological analysis
of Dasein in general constitutes fundamental ontology,
that Dasein consequently functions as the being [2] that is to be interrogated fundamentally
in advance with respect to its *Being.* [3] If the interpretation of the meaning
of *Being* [4] is to become a task, Dasein [5] is not only the primary being [6] to be interrogated; in addition to this
it is the being [7] that always already in its *Being* [8] is related to what is sought in this
question. But then the question of *Being* [9] is nothing else than the radicalisation
of an essential tendency of *Being* [10] that belongs to Dasein itself, namely, of the pre-ontological understanding
of *Being.* [11]
NOTES
[1] Notice Heidegger reifies Dasein (human existence) as a concrete being in the sense of a common noun as in (B)
[2] Again Heidegger crudely reifies (thingifies)
*Being* and thingifies and maps Dasein (the gerund *being there* or *human existence*) as a member of putative a class of beings called Dasein. From the manner in which it is employed here
and elsewhere is obviously a word that remains
the same in the plural as the singular.
[3] Here Heidegger attaches the so-called
*Being* (*human existence* or the state or fact of existing) to the gerundial *being there* of Dasein (human existence) as a property (existential modality) of
a existential or locative behaviour which
is the gerund *being there*. Thus Dasein (human existence) is ridiculously
characterised here as: THE BEHAVIOUR OF A BEHAVIOR.
[4] At this point Heidegger reverts to *Being* (the state or fact of existing,) which it is important to remember is not
a (B) and does not exist in itself.
[5] Here Dasein (*being there* or *human existence*) is blatantly concretised again, Heidegger
thingifies human existential behaviour as
a primary common being as per (B)
(6) An outrageous reification and conspicuously
pseudo-academic thingification of *act* as *fact* - and *fact* as a res extensa as the nominatum of a common noun.
[7] We finally arrive in a fantasy Munchhausen
world, where the concretised experience of *being there* or *being here* (*human existence* ) which, by virtue of its falsely attributed
concrecity in [5] and [6] is said to relate
to...yes...wait for it...*its *Being* in...
[8] ...which it is being what it already is in... [5].
[9] Heidegger now reintroduces the verbal
noun version of (A) which is now characterised
(in [10] as...
[10] ...the tendency or pre-dispositional
desire of the class of cognoscenti of beings known both collectively and individually
as Dasein to uncover, reveal and return to an understanding
of *Being* by *Being* before it was made the muddle it now is
by people who lack the Heideggerian genius
of correct ontological/ontic discernment.
Heidegger's fantastical gerundial phrase
Dasein is a concept which, due to its obfuscational
ontological character, can only be clarified
as to its meaning with patience and a good
understanding of the subtle semantic interchange
between the various meanings of the word
being.
Perseverance pays dividends, for it reveals
the essential absurdity and danger
of using Dasein as a tool for ontological understanding
Jud Evans.
|
Evans Experientialism 
