Copyright © 2007 Jud Evans. permission granted
to distribute in any medium, commercial
or non - commercial, provided author attribution
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THE COGITO PHILOSOPHY'S PRIVATE PANTOMIME
Jud Evans
|
| The pseudo-verb BE and its conjugates: "was,
were, am, is, are,"etc., NEVER EVER
address pure entitative existence (existing bereft of any existential
properties/modalities.) |
|
Nothing can be more detectable to our human
sensorium than the material objects which
spatially surround us. We know them as being
existentially extant, environmentally present,
matergic objects (matter+energy) which inhabit
the world in which we find ourselves. The
inspirational source for the employment of
the language we use is survivalist. Language
is a modalic communicative tool we use to
describe both ourselves and "the other"
objects of the environment - that which share
our world.
|
METAPHYSICAL PSEUDO-OBJECTS |
The existence of metaphysical "Pseudo-objects"
lacking any property (pure existence) is
a primitive myth. Primitive beliefs in inmaterial disembodied
spirits date back into pre-history long before
the later weirdness of Platonic realism
and the useful fictions of mathematics in
which number are often considered as
being realistic in the sense that
some hold that mathematical objects (rather than the objects they apply to
- if that is the case)
are really present in the world and
exist, transcendentally, physically, or mentally.
| THE SENTENTIAL PREVENIENCE OF PREDICATION |
Members of a given human group have usually
internalised sufficient anticipatory data
ready to attribute some form of predicative
description to known spatio-physical objects.
Such prevenient description is neurologically
stored in order to cognitively instantiate
a given ontologically appropriate subject
with an antecedently internalised "ready-made"
neurologically available predication.
Remembered predication which maps to a descriptive
feature considered to be important to an
addressor or an addressee is automatically
triggered following any mention of a known
subject name.
You can try this out for yourself by thinking
of the word *cat.*
Whatever springs to your mind is either your
own, unique prevenient predication with regard
to the subject-name "cat," or it
is an alternative name which replaces or
adds more information to the generic word
"cat."
Thus, if the first thing you think of is
"Tiddles," it is usually because
you have, or had a cat of this name, or that
is/was the name of the cat next door, etc.
and in doing so you have also instantiated
a complete neurological compendium of all
the properties of *catness* or *cathood*
because you have individualised the generalised
or universal properties or basic or essential
attributes as shared by all members of the
class of living entities known as cats -
and Tiddles is the nominatum ( The nominatum of a proper name is the object itself which
is designated thereby) which has enabled
you do provide such a comprehensive predication.
If instead of thinking of Tiddles,
the first image you think of is a vague idea
of a small, black, furry four-legged creature
that meows - then your unique predicative
prevenient data for the concept "cat"
generates the sentence:
" A cat is a small, black, furry, four-legged
creature that meows."
| ILL-FORMED SENTENCES WITH A HANGING COPULA |
Retrievable and mapable predication is often
typical of that spontaneously generated by
other members of your human group -
if not - it is some unique personal description
of their own.
Thus the ill-formed utterances of truncated,
predicationless sentences that end with a
terminal: *is* which are purported to be
sentences which speak of the simple fact
that a given subject simply exists, such
as:
1. "God is"...
... triggers the retrieved internalised prevenient
predicate... "the creator of the universe."
Thus: "God is the creator of the universe."
or
2. You have triggered and neurologically
instantiated and managed to recall selected
data from a complete neurologically memorised
compendium of all the properties of *Godhood*
that you have experientially internalised
psychologically incorporated within yourself;
and made subjective regarding the word "God."
It is useless for me to attempt to guess
the nature of your prevenient predication.
The activity of your brain is not only inaccessible
to me, your unique prevenient predication
is also too long and too complicated for
me to guess at anyway.
Only YOU have access to this information
and that is why it is unique - because you
(like all of us) are a unique human being.
God has so many prevenient predicative modalities
that to enumerate them would be impossible
and unnecessary - that is why so many snappy
axioms like; "God is Love" or "God
is Good" are created as ready-made"
selected predicates - such predicative truths
are assumed to be axiomatic and self-evident.
Similarily:
3. "Barack Obama is"
... triggers the retrieved internalised predicate
... "the current President of the United
States."
Thus: "Barack Obama is the current President
of the United States."
or
4. You have triggered and neurologically
instantiated and managed to recall selected
data from a complete neurologically memorised
compendium of all the properties of *Barack
Obama* that you have experientially internalised
regarding the word "Barack Obama"
Only YOU have access to this information
and that is why it is unique - because you
(like all of us) are a unique human being.
If a subject name is encountered which does
not engender a ready-made predicate - then
the subject is an unknown one to the addressee,
then a veil of ontological ignorance remains
in place, which usually generates a response
such as:
"Sorry, what does that mean? Never heard
of him/her/it," etc.
| ONOMATODOXICALLY NAMED OBJECTS |
To be a spatially situated, measurable materio-energetic
object in the world does not depend on having
a human-attributed name.
Nor is it true that just because somebody
assigned a name to something they imagined
exists that is automatically existentialised into the world
or instantiated into world as an instance
of such a thing. A words only maps to the
object it denotes if such an object (denotatum)
exists to be denoted or labelled by the word.
Through the ages matheticians have done the
same by abstracting the signs that man originally
created to signify various collectives of
objects (3 goats, 7 camels, 37 bags of grain,
etc) which were originally invented to avoid
attributing a name to each individual object
during personal, mensural, social, inheritance,
and trading purposes.
Later even more sophisticated mathematical
paraphernalia was invented such as sets,
plus additional mathematical signage in addition
to the ordinary numeral in order to cater
for the concept of quantity involving zero
and singularity, or the plurality of units.
Even today, many mathematicians believe that
numbers were NOT invented by man - but "discovered"
by man and that number already existed and
were (perhaps) stored in some great emporeum
of Platonic abstraction in the sky.
There is a curious Russian religious sect
called the Imiaslavie whose beliefs are also referred
to as onomatodoxy - it is a splinter-group
of the Russian Orthodox Church. The
sect is called: the Name Worshippers: (the Imiaslavie) The Russian
theo-mathematicians Egorov, Luzin and Florensky were members and they maintained that any
mathematical objects invented (they would
say "discovered") by them automatically
existed. They dreamed up the set for infinity and pronounced that it now automatically
existed. (see bibliography).
Florensky was a pupil of Egorov and a classmate
of Luzin, and they published together. Florensky
published works on the parallels between
abstract mathematics and religion: he stated
that the mathematics of continuous functions
is like rationalism while some concepts,
such as transfinite numbers, can be explained
only in the framework of the Imiaslavie philosophy,
where the Name of God is God Himself. The
historians of mathematics Loren Graham and
Jean-Michel Kantor have stated that the work
of the Russian Mathematics School is still filled with this mysticism while
the French Mathematics School is considered to be based on rationalism.(see bibliography).
In order for a name to correctly identify
a real, concrete, spatio-temporal object
and to be accepted as such, the name must
map to something that is entiative, meaning
it has a real existence as a corporeal entity.
The name of a named object is a name capable
of being the concrete attributant of such
an identificatory label. If such a name does
NOT map to a concrete, spatially-present
object, then the name fails to map to a real-world
object and maps instead to a useful fiction.
| THE PREVENIENT PREDICATIVE PROFUNDITY
OF I AND ME |
What is the real name you attribute to yourself
when you are in conversation with others?
I do not know, and there is no reason why I need to know
- but I DO know the pronominal terms you
use to self-refer when you talk
or write to other people - they are the subjective
form *I* and the objective form: *me.*
The pronouns *I* and *me* are both self-referential
- they map back to their nominatum - which
is the utterer YOU.
You are the unique neurological archiver
of all that is predicationally possible about
you. You know more about yourself than anyone
else on earth. You could write millions of
sententially prevenient predicational
accounts of yourself based apon your life-long
experiential autobiographical knowledge.
The very mention of the words *I* or *me*
immediately triggers a heightened awareness
of yourself and opens neurological pathways
to a HUGE compendium of memorised data concerning
everthing you have self-learned concerning
what you have deemed worth remembering about
yourself and the people and the world around
you during your life. You are the conceptual curator of a wealth
of self-knowledge to which the key
trigger-words *I* and *me* map
What does this tell us? It provides proof
that that if we encounter a noun or a pronoun
of which we have a priori knowledge then
we immediately and automatically provide
such a sentential subject with a predicate
of some sort which adds to its instantiation
as a viable subject of discourse.
| THE CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION OF "COGITO
ERGO SUM" |
What does this tell us about the Cartesean:
"Cogito ergo sum."?

It tells us that the whole pseudo-logical
rendition of "I think therefore I am"
is an unscientific ontological redundancy
- for the simple neuro-cognitive generation
or utterance of the pronoun *I* (or its semantic
equivalent in French or Latin) is sufficient
(never mind the "ergo sum" predicate)
to automatically instantiate the thinker/utterer
as a living, educated Latin speaking human
capable of generating and correctly parsing
a complicated philosophical statement which
(unneccessarily, spuriously and tautologically)
confirms him as a a living member of the
human race who ALREADY KNEW THAT BEFORE HE UTTERED THE STATEMENT!

If the utterance of the personal pronoun
"I" does not automatically map
to any known existential concrete English,
French or Latin speaking denotatum as the
generator of such self-referential pronoun,
then nothing further can be said, other than
that the utterer is either a brain-damaged
human, or the sound is produced by a
parrot or an insentient instrument which
mechanically records and reproduces the sound
of the human voice
Predicatationally truncated, sententially
orphanic verbalisms are meaningless UNLESS
the addressor is already in possession, and
prior to a specified or implied time be aware
of a compendium (however large or small)
of biographic, experiential, existential
modes which map to the statement "I experience."
One DOES NOT employ such a term unless one
is aware of its meaning and the fact that
it can be successfully mapped to the state
of existing and being alive. This is the
ontological lynch-pin which, when withdrawn
sends the whole of Descartes' curious assemblage
crashing to the ground.
Would anybody meanfully say
"I do not think - therefore I am not."
The contorted dualistic logic of Descartes
forces us to believe that it would be a possible
sentence for him to construct - for to form
the utterance "I think" to a Platonist
presupposes that there exists an
opposite version (or as Plato would say a
heteron) of "to think", which is,
"not to think."
It is quite possible to remain ignorant of
the scientific rejection of Platonic
nonsense. Indeed such is the experience of
us all as the grow up in the company of adults.
Such is the veil of nescience that follows
us into society and into school, college
and university. It is a life-long imprintation
that we will experience until we die. But
such a condition holds only insofar as we
may be subjective listeners to such conversational
topics and not lateral thinking contributors.
It would make no difference whatsoever as
to which existential modality Descartes had
chosen to use in order to confirm the fact
that he existed.
"I think, I experience, I have a painful
blister on my bottom, I am thirsty therefore
I am, I think I am thinking therefore I am, or even the single first person pronoun
- "I".
Any uttered words confirm and carry the same
implicature - and what does that implicature
delimit? What does the utterance of a human
tongue imply? Could it for example be the
utterance of a parrot? A computer? A tape
recorder? Would a statement "I think
therefore I exist" be made by a parrot?
Parrots DON'T MAKE STATEMENTS. They imitate
sounds - a parrot is incapable of stating
a fact or making an assertion which is offered
as evidence for any thing at all - never
mind that something is true. So, to get back
to my question, What does that implicature
delimit?
What does the linguistic utterance of a human
tongue imply? Well it goes much further than
implicature or entailment IT GUARANTEES that
whatever makes a existential statement is
a human being. We may not know in other words
the name of that human being - we may not
know WHO that human being is - but we can
say with absolute surety and without ANY
fear of contradiction that the entity - that
English, Latin or French speaking entity
is a HUMAN BEING speaking a complicated human
language that took millennia to develop and
which sets humans apart from parrots and
other imitative creatures as well as it separates
us from mechanical technology which repeats
recorded messages. Souls don't have tongues,
mouths or brains wherewith to generated language
- unless that is YOU HAVE CONVINCING PROOF
THAT THERE ARE SUCH THINGS - AND THEY DO?
We have to assume that Descartes was not
moronic and that when he made his ridiculous
statement I think therefore I am, that not only was he aware of the (quite
complicated intricacies of Latin grammar,
that he was educated to a sufficiently informative
standard to be able to select the correct
first person pronoun I, which presupposes
a knowledge of the other pronouns which he
deselected in favour of the first person
version, that he understood the significance
of the word think, together with a general,
or at least a sufficient seventeenth century
knowledge of the fact that thinking went
on in people's heads, and that peoples' heads
were normally perched atop a pair of human
shoulders, and these shoulders were part
of a human body that had two arms and hands,
that he would have already used those hands
to hold the books that he had studied whilst
he was learning French and Latin in order
that one day he might learn sufficient of
human biology to know what thinking was and
where in the soma it took place, so that
eventually he would be able to mouth the
infamous sentence:
"I think therefore I am."
And make a laughing stock of the cognitively
challenged - possibly as an act of revenge
against his Jesuit tormentors.
The seemingly obvious, undoubtably concise
and (considering the palsied hand of the
church on thinking at the time) pertinent
statement: I think therefore I am reveals
it, on closer examination to be posited on
such an unacceptable counterfactual craziness
as to render it in many way similar to Wittgenstein's
Colourless green ideas sleep furiously which, though it makes grammatical sense,
is utterly meaningless and admits of no sense.
Any human demonstrating such linguistic capabilities,
would, like any other, have in train a host
of intellectual connections, references,
relationships both private and personal,
not to mention the wealth of emotional a la recherche du temps perdu etc. The whole thing is such a mess of transcendentalist
triviality that I am in a state of absolute
awe that nobody amongst the transcendentalist
hordes has ever figured this spurious ontological
obviousness out before.
Is possible to know that I am without knowing
enough about the properties of the referent
of 'I' to say what I am. hence, it must be
possible to assert that I am without also asserting what I am.
ABSOLUTELY AND DEFINITELY NOT! Even if you
were the unknown victim of an alpine climbing
accident with dreadful head injuries and
had been lying in a coma in a Zurich hospital
for thirty years and had suddenly changed
to a conscious rather than an unconscious
patient. The first question asked of you
would probably be: Who are you? (not by the
way WHAT are you?) As soon as you opened
your lips and answered - (or if you simply
lay there and thought out your reply) I am Pierre Blancot or, I do not know, then you would have made it obvious to yourself
and every body else concerned that you were
the possessor of a sufficient knowledge of
Swiss French, or English, or Latin to blow
your ontological cover.
Such a revelation would usher in all the
other multitudinous properties (existential
modalities) which are part and parcel of,
concomitant with, and form the essential
pre-conditional neurological and physiological
structural modes necessary, either to merely
think such a complicated thought, or even
more so to be capable of physically initialising
the existential modes of lung compression,
lip, tongue and jaw movement necessary for
understanding and communicating such an advanced
understanding of the grammar, semantic import
and syntax of ANY human language - whatever
that language happened to be.
It might be said that someone taking the
via negativa may eventually conclude that nothing can
be predicated of god (or tao or self or whatever);
but, at the end of the road, some will conclude
'and, yet, god is'.
The fact that Descartes speaks excellent
English, French, Latin (whatever) and because
of all the physio-neurological underpinning
that goes with such an extraordinary intellectual
feat, it is impossible for you NOT to be
aware of the properties, which provide the
key to who and what your are, for the employment
of the term and yet as a qualifier obviously
refers to additional covert information,
knowledge about God, Tao or Self or whatever, which satisfies him that indeed
in spite of the fact that nothing is known
about what are virtually just meaningless
names he still believes they exist?
C'mon! If such a person concluded that nothing
can be predicated of God in addition to the
his/her awareness of the term GOD then he
would not (even if he/she were a cretin)
be in a position to acknowledge the existence
of some thing (a flower, an insect, a drain
cover, a sexual disease, a dumpling etc.)
for in his ignorance of any modality being
attributed to such an unknown term he would
be bereft of any existential or instantiational
modes to map to any meaningless putative
noun.
If such statements are said not to be claims
and that there is a property-free-state of
some entity; but, are claims that I, this
experiencer, can be unaware of those properties
--- at least until I acquire more knowledge
(which, of course, may or may not happen
anytime soon, if at all). are they valid
claims?
C'mon, this is outrageous sophistry. What
kind of claim is that, that there are people
around who, though they admit complete ignorance
of some unknown, of which they have only
been given a name, and are bereft of any
further information, description, category,
form, location, or whether it (if it is an it) be animal, vegetable or mineral, is animate
or inanimately dead, red, green, or decorated
like a barber's pole, sweet, sour or tasting
of Cadbury's milk chocolate?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Seifrid. Thomas.The Word Made Self. Russian
Writings on Language 1860 - 1930. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca and London, 2005.
2. Graham. Loren and Kantor. Jean-Michel.
Naming Infinity. A True Story of Religious
Mysticism and Mathematical Creativity the
Belknap Press of Harvard University Cambridge,
Massachusetts, London, England.
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