For me [and eliminative determinists like me] appellatives, such as John, or if I don't know his name, The chap by the reception desk, are merely useful labels or deictic linguistic devices.

In keeping with my strict eliminative determinist ontology, for me: [1] John's John-ness or [2] The condition called John's Down's syndrome or if John has the flu - [3] The condition called John's influenza does not exist.

By that I mean [1] to [3] cannot be found in the world.

What can be found in the world is my loving friend John. What exists is John.

We can find John, and with medical help we could perhaps identify and confirm the existence of the extra copy on the third chromosome 21, the one which, because of its presence and chemical interference, several of John's physiological systems have flipped and the finely-tuned biochemical mechanisms which regulate the development and function of his vital organs [including the brain] have been thrown into apparent disarray.

Downs syndrome itself could not be found in John's body, although a certain person said to have physical a morphological appearance characteristic of what we call the properties of Down's syndrome would be noticed. But appearances do not exist either - only the physical person that appears exists.

The properties of Downs syndrome do not exist in themselves - they are merely reificational abstractions. I exist the way I am, you exist the way you are and just as the tree exists the way it is - so John also exists in the way he is. Indeed it is doubtful whether John could be said to be the proprietor of his own existential modalities at all - for how is it possible for a human to own the compendium of abstract existential constructs whereby he as an individual can be distinguished? If so, which part of John's body has the status of proprietorship, or functions as the titular holder of the body rights to himself?

Leaving aside the question of whether John, or anybody else unfamiliar with ontology would be capable of construing such a concept of bodily ownership, and in accord with the approach of Professors Paul and Patricia Churchland, I deny the existence of the mind and memory too. So if after being told of his unexpected windfall of active biomass the memorising John can't understand the concept or even remember it - can his - or for that matter anybody else's proprietorship over his properties be said to exist at all anyway?

We could describe John by attaching some classificatory adjectival phrase such as: John's appearance of having Downs syndrome that expresses an attribute of something, but that would not mean that John's Down's Syndrome really existed, never mind that he has it - but simply that the human attributant we call John exists in a mode of to which we attribute the condition we call: Down's Syndrome to John.

Such attribution bespeaks of the existential modality of the observer - not the observed.

Ontologically the notion of appearance is a useful fiction. All acts of noticing or paying attention to inanimate or insensate objects, which lack the capacity (intention) to disclose themselves, are observational discoveries of the observer. The observer's experience of the encountered object is undergone as one of the observer's existential modes. An observer can either subjectively encounter an object, by chance, or by habit born of familiarity, or by seeking it out and deliberately confronting it. An insensate object does not intentionally disclose itself and decide to appear - it simply exists as it is, devoid of feeling, interest, participation, consciousness and animation.

A sensate object such as me, you or John may or may not purposely show himself or be accidentally revealed to others. Some living organisms may unconsciously modify their forms (a flower opening its petals or turning its leaves towards the stimulus of the sunlight etc.) The observer's evaluative physical response to the stimulative photonic bombardment of his or her retina is produced by the incoming quanta of electromagnetic energy as it impacts the eyeball and the appraisal of that neurologically processed energy into an image is engendered by the observing entity.

The observer's sensorium discerns and differentiates the incoming photonic quanta which has been reflected off the surface of the observed object as it arrives (appears) and is presented to the eyes. The brain compares it with templates of previously experienced phenomena.

To make this quite clear - the act of apprehending or comprehending that which is deliberately or unintentionally encountered, is a function of the visual and neurological apparatus and experience of the observer whilst he or she distinguishes the physical characteristics of the encountered object as arriving (detectable) photonic data. The abstract noun appearance is a reification of the experience undergone by he who encounters and senses me, you or John - not of that which is encountered.

With suitable optical equipment no doubt we could also view and confirm the existence of the viruses (of the family orthomyxoviridae) in the mucus lodged in John's nasal passages and lungs. The common symptoms of influenza virus for the infected are fever, sore throat, muscle pains, severe headache, coughing, weakness and general discomfort but such qualia do not exist either.

What exists is the influenza-virus infected, feverish, pained, weak, coughing John and the viruses together with the extraneous material causing John to exist in that way which we charcterise as: Having the flu, or having a cold.

The Bottom Line? Having the flu or having a cold and having Down's syndrome doesn't exist - only my loving friend John exists.