FUSIBLE CRICKET BALLS AND INSTANCING GOD'S PROPERTIES.


Encountering, abstracting and instantiating the term *cricket ball* includes reducing it to the generic term *ball* so as to render it nominally admissible and applicable to the entire class or group of *balls.* In doing so the brain calls up information on the general attributes and behaviour of balls.

Our neuro-sensorial encounters with nouns (as with all other parts of speech) trigger automatic search, match and mapping processes. The reduction of complex ideas to a simpler concept inclusive of a general domain is a felicitous feature of abstraction. Abstracting allows the understanding of a variety of specific scenarios in terms of certain basic ideas. The brain instantiates coalesced or compounded adjective/nouns combinations in such a way that *cricket ball* is represented as a fused instance of a nominal singularity. Sometimes the lexical unity formed by the two words are joined together – tooth + paste = toothpaste. Sometimes they are joined using a hyphen- check-in, and sometimes they appear as two separate words – full moon and cricket ball.

Does there exist an authoritative list of these examples? If so what authority is such that it has access to the private cognitive behaviour of others' brains? Are these nomino-adjectival combinations the result of repetitive usage? Is *cricket* to be cognized of as a *property* of *ball?* Is *ball* to be cognized of as a *property* of *cricket?* In what way is the term: *blue ball* combinatorially and propertorially different from *cricket ball?* Why is coalescence favoured for some combinatory lexical hybrids and not others? Why is *cricket ball* considered a singularity and *blue ball* treated with the prenominal adjective *blue* continuing to be considered as a *property of *ball?*

If all attributed adjectival/noun relationships are actually fusibly perceived, where does this leave the ancient folk beliefs of the existence of *properties* and what is the difference (other than syntactical) between attributive and predicative sentences? The answer is none. Such attribution whether it be in the form of lexical unity or propertorial transcendentalist flummery is an existential modality not of the way that the attributee nominata of such referenda are said to exist - but the human-centred classificatory manner in which the human attributionariate exists.

Instantiating God.
My researches and analysis of the copuletic *is* shows that the orphanic copular is NEVER EVER involved in mapping to entitic (property-vacuous) pure or propertyless entities. In my view it is humanly impossible (psychologically infeasible) to neurologically map to a existential nullity – whether it be a spirituous nihility or otherwise. In other words humans would/could never attribute meaningful names to entities either factual of fictional that are property-bereft, otherwise they would be meaningless. The mention of ANY NOUN automatically initialises a neurological search for a hit. Such a referential retrieval throws up associated semantic associations – whichever colligate data presents first is a property-based allusion to the subject noun. The neuro-linguistic reflexive cross-referential search-response to any nominal stimulant can be characterised as privately covert, opinionatively predicative implicature. If a noun which refers to a designatum or nominatum is mentioned which is unknown to the addressee no such connection is made and watch the discussant’s lips moisten, his eyes glaze over in abortifaciental post *search, match n' map* mode of incomprehension.