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A Critique of Everett W. Hall
Everett W. Hall writes:
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"I perceive this sheet of paper as white,
rectangular, and spotted with disfiguring
black marks. Why not make the bold assumption
that the only thing possessing the congeries
of properties I perceive is the sheet of
paper? Why look into our brains for them,
or invent some unobservable mental events
that display them? The answer of course is
that I perceive them; this is an activity
on my part now going on and is not in any
sense part of the paper.... the occurrence
of the seeing (in the sense of a referring
in direct perceptual fashion to the sheet
characterized as I have intimated), is a
complex neurological 'act'- an act of intention."
--Everett W. Hall
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I comment directly regarding Hall's claim,
but obliquely to anyone else interested or
concerned. The paper in the Everett W. Hall
quote is an object, a matergic unity. From
a human perspective it has been flattened
into what we call a sheet of material having
a relatively broad surface in relation to
depth or thickness formed by a community
of atoms/particles in a certain configuration
- or - if you wish a force field.
The *disfiguring black marks* may be inherently
present as an outcome of the manufacturing
process (he does not say.) For the purposes
of my commentary I am going to assume that
they are *foreign* objects, possibly the
residue of dried print ink, perhaps black
greasy fingermarks, maybe flecks of black
shoe polish, or simply airborne detritus
which has settled on the page.
If the "disfiguring objects" are
indeed *foreign,* it is just as ridiculous
to characterise such objects as *possessing*
the *property* of a rectangular piece of
paper stuck to them, as it is to characterise
the paper as *possessing* the *property*
of them by virtue of them being stuck to
it.
That Hall makes this mereological mistake
is obvious, for his *bold assumption* is
a mereological and ontological step too far.
In describing the sheet of paper as possessing
transcendental *congeries of properties,*
rather than (in a serious dialogue) characterising
the objects in analytically scientific terms
as: *flattened dehydrated cellulose pulp,
dried ink particles, grease smears and detritus,
*he demonstrates the ontologically flawed,
subjective, attributive psychologically agenderised,
function of designating a relational hierarchy
in such a manner which complies with his
antecedally internalised pre- conception.
By assigning immaterial proprietorial *qualities*
to objects that have no actual *proprietorial*
vis a vis *possessed* affinities, he is simply
manipulating the description of contiguous
objects into HUMANLY EFFICACIOUS associative
patterns which suit HIS proprietorially biased,
internalised kaleidoscopic melange of metaphysical
conventions.
In other words he is playing ontological
checkers (see: The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam ) by proprietorially assigning: reality-disconnected
affiliations:
*this
belongs to that and that belongs to this.*
in order to suit the utilitarian vagaries
of human identification-manque.
At this stage I wish to emphasise that my
comments are aimed at discerning *what actually
exists* and NOT what sort of abstract classification
system of attribution proves most useful
for humans to existentialise and reify abstractions
into objects which are not objects, or even
quasi objects, or even worse the fallacious
*mental objects* of the ontologically insane.
Scientifically he makes assumptions that
have no basis in reality, for the objects
involved are insensate objects which simply
lie there before him and exist in the way
that they exist, completely remote and inviolate
from his transcendentalist tinkering and
human reifico-categorial whimsy.
In other words though his descriptions are
sufficient for the natural language of the
streets and bar rooms and the staff rooms
of traditionalist *It'll do - that'll do
- doesn't matter* philosophy departments
- they are useless for serious onto-mereological
investigation.
Hall is quite correct in asking why we look
to our brains, but he does not go far enough
in his analysis. He is in fact incapable
of doing so, being trapped up to the cerebellar
hemisphere in a quagmire of antecedally acquired
cognitive reifico-impedimenta and supernatural
sludge.
His answer does however include the commonplace
that because we perceive objects we invent
unobservable *mental events* that display
them. The invention of primitive *properties*
like: *mind* and qualia* (redolent of spirits
in trees, woods and rocks imagined by bare-assed
savages) are as asinine as the *properties*
we attribute to objects that cannot answer
back.
It is useless attempting to conduct serious
scientific ontological investigation using
the primitive concepts and corrupted language
of the philosophical tradition. Such language
is only suitable for the opinionated chatter
which they call *ethics* and *morality* -
a bandwagon, or rather a judgemental juggernaut
which (in the absence of being taken seriously
in any other cognitive domain) lumbers along
the corridors of shame in universities all
over the world - its wheels squeaking a wheedling:
*Jobs for the boys - jobs for the boys!*
However for all his ontological and mereological
handicaps Hall does realise one salient point
- a point that makes what he has to say worth
reading, for it provides an insight to an
understanding of the arrogance of the individualistic
homocentric view of the world. Apart from
his neurological malfunction (in true Cartesian
manner) of unnecessary object-action reification
by dualistically pimping his perceiving brain
with an onto-neurologically illegitimately
thingified *act of intention,* as a cranially
transpory trannie-partner/passenger, he did
at least grasp that his reificative fantasies
were not in any sense part of the paper.
At least we can be grateful for small mercies
and that as taxpayers we are at least being
provided with the occasional half-truth for
our money.
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