| COULD A ROBOT EVER EXPERIENCE QUALIA? |
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(1) INTRODUCTION |
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(2) FIRST A DEFINITION OF QUALIA. |
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(3) QUALIA DOES IT EXIST? |
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(4) ROBOTS AND QUALIA |
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(5) CONCLUSION. |
INTRODUCTION |
After an initial definition of the meaning
of qualia, the first section of this essay will address
Churchland's pertinent observation that it
would be irresponsible to ignore those who
understandably insist that they experience
pleasurable feelings and suffer pain.
Any serious exploration of qualia would be
equally negligent if it refused to acknowledge
those who claim that the actual qualia or
feelings do not exist, and that only the
affected painful areas of the human body
and the brain which registers such phenomena.
exists. An ironist or a harassed family practitioner
might correctly point out that whichever
theory regarding the origin and ontological
analysis of such experiences is correct -
we all suffer pain or enjoy pleasure despite
what anybody thinks. I will then move on
to address the question directly and consider
if 'qualia' might be experienced by advanced
androids, and in line with Gwaltney's suggestion,
employ humanoid artificial intelligence as
a device to explore what the term 'human
being' actually means and whether non-biologic
matter could feel pain. Consideration will
be given to how a robotic sensory system
might be engendered, incorporated and made
operative. [2. Gwaltney. 32.] A brief outline
of my own position will be provided in the
conclusion.
DEFINITION OF QUALIA.
The properties of sensory experiences by
virtue of which there is something it is
like to have them. These properties are,
by definition, epistemically unknowable in
the absence of direct experience of them;
as a result, they are also incommunicable.
The existence or lack of these properties
is a hotly debated topic in contemporary
philosophy of mind. [3. classes. colgate. edu]
QUALIA DOES IT EXIST?
What follows has been inspired by Nagel's
bat-question in which he asks if there is: 'something it is like' to be that animal organism?' [4. Nagel 1974.]
Whether these epistemically intractable phenomena
exist as abstruse mentalisations or are explicable
conditions of the tangible flesh to be experienced
by humans, bats or any other organically
constituted being, is a fascinating speculation
based upon incomplete evidence and supposition.
We now consider the same question concerning
inorganically composed robots. Such an essay
in the consideration of whether a non-biologic
entity could feel pain, provides a portal
through which we can examine the possibility
of androidal feeling in particular and qualia
in general.
Alternative physicalist
views to the historical Folk Philosophy version can be described briefly as:
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(A) The Identity Theory which is an intertheoretic reduction in
that states and processes of the mind are
identical to states and processes of the
brain.
(B) Functionalism. Denies that mental states are reducible
to or identical to physical states and describes
mental activity as isomorphically functional
in terms of their abstract operational (or
computational) relationships to one another,
and to sensory inputs and motor outputs.
(C) Eliminative Materialism. The position that the account of the mind
in terms of emotions, beliefs, thoughts,
(folk psychology) should be eliminated and
superseded by scientifically accurate ways
of describing the modalic brain.
(D) Eliminative Determinism. A complete rejection of all dualistic traditional
folk philosophy and the pseudo-ontological
twofold (Cartesian mind and body or otherwise) in favour of a
philosophy of the catenulate impingement
of causally enchained objects undergoing
matergic existential modalities in a material
cosmological imperium.
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Eliminative Materialism
depicts what is called 'qualia' in terms of the existential modalic states
of the experiencer and is essentially descriptively
adjectival - and identifies the participant
in the experiential feeling, the sensing
human, the suffering bat, or the rusting
robot, etc., as that which really exists,
rather than that which accounts for 'qualia' in terms of metaphysical properties. In
an ontological nutshell, does a human nociceptive
system ( a reflex caused by or in response
to pain) register a 'pain in the toe,' or 'a painful toe?' Does an android's main processor chip feel
'an unpleasant feeling of compression ' within
the innards of its plastic solar plexus'
when it bumps into a table, or does it sense
'an unpleasantly compressed metal and plastic
solar plexus?' (for more information on Eliminative
Determinism see:
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/evans_eliminative_determinism.htm
Frank Jackson (who describes himself as a
'Qualia freak,') wrote the following powerful paragraph:
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" I think that there are certain features
of the bodily sensations especially, but
also of certain perceptual experiences, which
no amount of purely physical information
includes. Tell me everything physical there
is to tell about what is going on in a living
brain, the kind of states, their functional
role, their relation to what goes on at other
times and in other brains, and so on and
so forth, and be I as clever as can be in
fitting it all together, you won't have told
me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness
of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the
characteristic experience of tasting a lemon,
smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or
seeing the sky. " [6. Jackson. 1982]
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If we analyse the phrase
‘something it is like’ what does it mean? What are we being asked
to describe? A hasty eliminativist answer
would be to respond loftily that ‘qualia’ do not exist, and the *something that it
is like' to feel qualia is nothing more than
the human, bat or robot that exists in that
state of feeling, and that the designatum ‘something,’ which is referred to by the linguistic
expression – ‘‘something it is like’ does not refer to anything other than the
entity which feels the pain. Does pain-qualia continue to exist after analgesics have
zapped the pain impulses before they reach
the brain? How could a chemical kill, mask
or eliminate something which didn't exist
to be extinguished in the first place? Surely
that which is chemically suppressed is the
damaged toe tissue and the electro-chemical
carrier-nerve cells which can be observed
microscopically in vivo as they facilitate
the communication of the action potential
that notify the local damage for registration
in the central nervous system which is the
brain? From a folk psychology point of view,
if pain does exist, does it retire into a
'lurking mode' whilst there are sufficient
aspirin or morphine chemicals present to
temporarily suppress it 'out of existence'
ontologically? Are we not entitled to ask
ourselves if it is the human tissue damage-control
system and the nervous pipelines which are
being chemically inhibited, rather than some
modern-day metaphysical phlogiston which
has been pro tempore anaesthetised?
Many find such a physicalist
response counter-intuitive. Qualia they claim are the manifestations of experiential
properties of sensations, feelings - more
controversially, thoughts and desires as
well. Such uncomprehending dualists often
seem to think that the physicalist denier
of the existence of qualia either meanspiritedly
disbelieves that they experience such pain
or pleasure, They seem not to realise that
the eliminativist is not accusing them of
malingering, but simply agreeing with them,
and where appropriate sympathising with their
discomfort, and rejoicing in their pleasure,
but is merely pointing out that it is the painful toe that exists - and not the toe-pain.
Bearing this in mind, if knowing you have
an aching tooth I ask:
‘What is it like to be you with toothache,
and is there something it is like?’ I shouldn't be surprised if you answer irritably
with the logical tautology:
‘Being me is like being me, and 'something
it is like,' is if you imagine what it is
like being like me with an aching tooth.'
But enough of this ontological
quibbling. Members of both sides of the discussion
undergo painful experiences and have their
own definition of qualia and feeling. It
is time to turn to the thing that really
intrigues us - the question of whether humanoids
can experience qualia.
Arguing here against
the 'Identity theory of mind' Patricia Churchland has this to say:
An intractable problem confronting substance
dualism concerns the nature of the interaction
between two radically different kinds of
substance. Soul-stuff allegedly has none
of the properties of material-stuff and is
not spatially extended and the question therefore
concerns how and where the two substances
interact.' [7. Patricia Churchland. 1986]
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QUALIA, ROBOTS AND SCIENCE FICTION.
For me the most outstanding, interesting
and thoughtful account of what it could feel
like to be an android is Asimov's 'Bicentennial Man.' Here we enjoy a first person narrative which
movingly documents the transition from a
crude household robot to a fully recognised
and acknowledged human being. The robot Andrew
wishes to become a human being; which in
effect means with the help of human technology
and robotic surgeons operating that technology
he gradually upgrades his robotic systemic
version of qualia to that of a human's experiential
states and modalities. Struggling for the
right to enjoy human qualia is his ultimate
goal and is the whole point of the story.
[Asimov 23]
A nice comparison with
the Asimov's would-be human robot is Dennet's
tale of the human disembodied brain in the
bath, and its robotically controlled underground
android-like -like headless body working
on a hazardous government recovery project.
Here the severed and rewired brain Yorick
experiences the bodily qualia which the biological
underground fleshy automaton Hamlet undergoes
during the dangerous physical exposure which
engenders the pain. [8. Dennett 236]
To respond to the question
yet again - it is my belief that an ability
and propensity to experience 'feeling' will
be undergone by imitative, experiential,
feeling androids, and it will come about
much quicker than we think. The science of
robotics and artificial intelligence has
advanced to a stage where such sophisticated
artificially equivalent mass-produced versions
of human receptors, microprocessors, sensors
and inorganic neural pathways are within
our grasp. It is my belief that there will
be such a time when such devices can be installed
into such entities in order to mimic the
body's own conveyance mechanisms within nerves
- known as axonal transport, or the way that
human brains consciously computationally
ideate.
Will robots be developed
which artificially simulate the way in which
our sensing elements mediate and control
intrinsic or extrinsically introduced reactive
chemical antibodies to combat invasive chemical
agents and pathogens that act on our tissue
sensing-elements with the resultant physiological
response? I believe that they will. I am
convinced that it will come about that we
will create robots with the non-biological
equivalent of the networked human brain.
It is a tall order, for the human brain comprises
of 100 billion neurons and 100 to 500 trillion
synapses on average with 7,000 synaptic connections
to other neurons and according to a recent
publication, the number of categorisation
of random spatio-temporal patterns that a
neuron can implement is several times larger
than the number of its synapses. [9. Gütig.-Sompolinsky.
2006] I feel confident that human ingenuity
will rise to the occasion in this respect
and super-robotic androids almost indistinguishable
from human beings will be a commonplace before
the end of this century
As to what a robotic
form of qualia might be like and what technical equipment
and methodology would be necessary to kit
out an android with a sensorial system, I
envisage a highly elaborate systema nervosum
of advanced microprocessors, receptors, servomechanisms,
thermostats, baroreceptors, nipple-shaped
electronic protuberances or villi - microscopic
finger-like projections - to detect taste,
touch, or smell all of which wired to the
robotic equivalent of axonal pathways to
transport the data to a super-powerful electronic
brain which would stimulate most of the unit's
behaviour as a result of the detection of
existential modalic divergences from an established
factory default norm or the latest scan of
an acceptable system-state.
And the function of qualia feedback? The central brain would need to
detect errors in the sensory performance
of the components and initiate any necessary
re-routing adjustments to maintain the integrity
of the system.. The sensorial detection schema
would incorporate a 'self-learning' facility
with regard to these errors and a 'data-
awareness mode. In this way what we call
'qualia feedback' will constitute a necessary provider
and precondition for existential continuance
and it is THIS existential monitor that is
actually referred to when we employ the term;
'qualia'.
Conclusion.
Are we to believe then that there IS 'something
that it is 'like' for a human to experience
toothache or smell a rose? Or is that 'something'
the sufferer himself or another flesh and
blood rose-smelling or tooth-ache suffering
human 'other,' who, sharing many or most
of the other existential modalities of the
tooth-ache sufferer, is able to comprehend
something of what it feels like to exist
as the tooth-ache sufferer is existing at
that moment, because he or she has experienced
a painful jaw at some previous time?
Will it be physically
possible, desirable or ontologically feasible
for humans to design or allow a robot ever
to experience the joy of smelling a rose
or feeling toothache? One might ask why it
is necessary for robots to be incorporated
with this facility? If a robot were to employed
in a commercial horticultural capacity as
a rose-grower then it might be a sensible
thing to fit him out with such a sensor-pack?
But what is to be gained otherwise? I realise
that I am entering into the field of anthropocentric
ethics here and am in danger of being accused
of speciesism, which whilst is a prime subject
for another fascinating essay, is not really
the subject which I have been called upon
to address so I will change the subject and
consider Mary for a change.
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| Mary in her black and white room |
Jackson's famous 'thought experiment' goes
something like this: There is a girl called
Mary who is a brilliant scientist and she
is confined to a room completely painted
and furnished down to the last detail in
black and those are the only colours she
gets to see - just plain old boring black,
white, and shades of grey. Mary studies the
neurophysiology of vision. After some time
she assimilates all the information about
what goes on in us when we see objects which
are red. However Mary does not know all there
is to know about our experiences or qualia.
When she finally leaves the room, and sees
a ripe tomato for the first time, there is
something new she will learn about our experiences.
She will learn what it is like to see red.
This shows that there is more to know about
our experiences than is captured by the physical
information which Mary had when she was still
in the room. So, the conclusion is that the
physical information must not be all the
information.
Alas, poor Mary. Are
we are expected to believe that the unfortunate
girl has demurely averted her bloodshot eyes
from her own genitals for a decennia and
never seen the colour of her own red menstrual
blood or the redness of a boil
after being deprived of natural sunlight
for so long doing all that intensive reading
about the techicalities of the human aprehension
of colour she is supposed to have done? But
I will ignore the negatives and play around
with the constructive ideas. Dennet says
'qualia' is a confused notion, and that experience
does not have the properties designated by
it and that it is best to eliminate it. [10.
[Drakon. 2000 quoting Dennet. 1988]
I agree with Dennet.
For me it is question of rejecting the ontological
suggestions offered by Folk Psychology and the useful fiction that there is a non-physical
realm where 'pain' exists. I accept the physical
reality of our personal and private suffering
from inflictions which painful body-parts
involves. Pain and pleasure are very much
an individual experiences which can only
be very inadequately reported and are heavily
influenced by idiosyncratic variables of
an biological, environmental, cultural, cognitive,
affectional nature.
I will end by again addressing
the essay question. If by using the term 'qualia' the question is positing the Folk Psychology
version of 'qualia' then my answer is no.
If the question is an 'open question' in
the sense that an interpretation of the word
‘qualia’ can be other than the historical version
then I would answer yes. Whichever the case
though - the existential states which we
label 'feelings' and qualia' are an essential feature of our ability
to exist as humans and to survive.
Lastly, I find the philosophy
of science-fiction an excellent entrée to
a comprehensive exploration of such phenomena
and philosophical questioning in general.
The profound questions raised in this genre
encapsulate all of the questions which thinkers
have grappled with since man first began
to wonder about himself and the contents
of the cosmos in which he found himself.
REFERENCES
1. Churchland. Paul. ‘Behaviourism, Materialism and Functionalism.’ Matter and Consciousness. MIT Press. 1984.
P. 369 in ‘Reason and Responsibility 2002. Joel Fenberg/Russ Shaferman [eds.]
Wadsworth
2. Gwaltney, Marilyn. 'Androids as a Device for Reflection on Personhood.'
Retrofitting Blade Runner: Issues in Ridley
Scott's Blade Runner and Philip K. Dick's Do Androids
Dream of Electric Sheep? Judith B. Kerman, ed. Bowling Green, OH:
Popular Press, 1991. p. 32.
3. http://classes.colgate.edu/pgregory/phil341/..%5Cglossary.html
[accessed 03.03.2000.]
4. Nagel. Thomas. ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ Philosophical Review 83, No. 4. 1974. p.
209
5. Jackson. Frank. ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982), pp.
127-36.]
6. Churchland. Patricia. ‘Neurophilosophy.’ MIT Press. Cambridge, Mass. Eleventh printing
2000. p. 318.
7. Asimov. Isaac. ‘Bicentennial Man.’ p. 23.
8. Dennett. Daniel. 'Brainstorms.' Bradford Books 1978. MIT Press. p. 234.
9.
9. Gütig. Robert and Sompolinsky. Haim. ‘The Tempotron: A Neuron that Learns Spike
Timing–Based Decisions.’ Nature Neuroscience 9, 420 - 428 (2006)
Published online: 12 February 2006.
10. Drakon. Derek. ‘Philosophical Psychology.’ Routledge, Vol 13, Number 4 / Dec. 1, 2000
P. 505.
11. Coghill,. Robert C. Brain Mechanisms of Pain: Overview. P. 234.
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