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Against both Nelson Goodman and Donald Davidson
I argue for the view that one cannot explain
what metaphorically used expressions of a
given language mean unless some expressions
of that language, namely those which can
be used metaphorically, have not only extensional
meaning (may it be referential or truth-conditional)
but, in addition to that, conceptual or connotative
meaning. Metaphorical meaning is a phenomenon
of both semantics and pragmatics. In using
expressions of a language metaphorically
we transcend the bounds of its conceptual
scheme without thereby putting the uniqueness
of this scheme into question.
Metaphorically used terms are omnipresent
in everyday talk, in scientific and literary
language. In most cases we don't have any
difficulty in understanding, what metaphors,
that is metaphorically used expressions,
mean - even though we might find it difficult
to spell out in detail the meaning of a metaphor.
If Edward Craig tells us in the introduction
to his The Mind of God and the Works of Man
that « this book has grown out of a series
of radio talks », we understand that, at
first, there were some radio talks and these
talks proved to contain potential for further
development the result of which is manifest
in the book introduced. 1 « Growing » can
be literally applied to nothing but living
organisms, and so speaking of growing radio
talks is literally false. But if we understand
Edward Craig's use of « growing » metaphorically,
then we conceive of the radio talks and the
final book as of an early and a later stage
of a living and developing organism, and
we can then get involved in a metaphorical
reflection about the conditions under which
this organism has grown so nicely as well
as about its nutrition etc. Sometimes, we
don't even realize the metaphorical character
of an expression used in a particular context.
2 How do we proceed to understand metaphorically
used expressions or to use expressions metaphorically
in the right or a right way? And what can
be said about the semantics of a language
whose terms can be used metaphorically?
Since Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's
work on language and logic, scholars of so
called analytic philosophy interpret the
terms of a language (the syntax and semantics
of which is sufficently clear to be used
for scientific purposes) in a purely extensional
way: A one place term means the individual
entities of its extension, and a n-place
term means the n-tuples of its extension.
Both Nelson Goodman and Donald Davidson have
tried to explain the meaning of metaphorically
used terms on the basis of a purely extensional
interpretation of them. In my view these
explanations are not convincing. Metaphorical
meaning is not extensional, but conceptual
or connotative meaning in the first place.
In order to defend this view I shall first
discuss Nelson Goodman's and Donald Davidson's
explanations of the meaning of metaphorically
used terms and then try to develop an alternative
proposal of explanation.
Nelson Goodman's answer to the question of
what metaphors mean All languages or symbol
systems that Goodman takes into account in
his book Langages of Art (LA)3 fullfill the
conditions of radical nominalism: These languages
or symbol systems consist of nothing but
concrete individual signs (signs that can
be combined in particular ways) and any universe
of Goodmanian discourse contains only concrete
individual entities. Goodman tries to develop
a nominalistic theory of metaphorical meaning.
He starts his discussion of metaphorical
meaning by giving the following example:
« We say of a picture of trees and cliffs
by the sea, painted in dull grays, that it
is sad. » (LA, II. 2, p. 50). Thereby we
do not understand the description of the
picture as sad literally, but metaphorically.
What does it mean to understand an expression
metaphorically? What makes an expression
have metaphorical rather than literal meaning?
Goodman develops his answer to these questions
in three steps:
He first states that the description of a
picture as sad, understood literally, has
to be judged as false.
He then compares the metaphorical use of
'sad' to the use of ambiguous terms.
In order to distinguish between metaphorically
used and ambiguous terms he finally develops
his theory of metaphors as a transfer of
schemata.
I shall briefly present and then discuss
these steps.
First Step If a term is used for predication
in a sentence and if this sentence is in
its literal sense false and if there is no
reason to take the author or speaker of this
sentence either not to know the truth or
to be a lyer, we do indeed in many cases
conclude that we should understand the sentence
in question metaphorically. If a picture
is labeled sad, we usually don't take this
label to be false, even though only living
beings provided with sensibility can be sad
and pictures do not belong to this species.
Now, even if we restrict our attention to
metaphorical sentences, we have to concede
that the literal falsehood of a sentence
is not a necessary condition of its meaning
being metaphorical. The frequently mentioned
example that illustrates this phenomenon
is the sentence 'No man is an island'. This
sentence can be understood both literally
and metaphorically, and it can in both cases
be held to be true or right. Nevertheless,
the metaphorical meaning of 'No man is an
island' is independent of whether this sentence
in its literal meaning is true or false.
Second step How can we, in the realm of a
language with a nominalistic semantics, explain
the metaphorical use of a term as justified
even though this use, taken literally, is
false? The application of a metaphorically
used term to an object is literally false
if the object in question is not among those
objects to which this term literally applies.
If, in such a case, we do not want to conceive
of the application of the term to the object
as false, we can change its literal interpretation,
that is, we can add the object in question
(and all objects sufficiently similar to
it) to those objects to which the term literally
applies. If the new interpretation of a term
is not supposed to replace its old interpretation
but to exist together with it as an independent
lexical item of the language system in question,
the term will then have two different even
though equally extensional interpretations;
it will be ambiguous. Goodman, however, holds
the view that a term, when used metaphorically,
does not obtain a new extension of objects
to which it literally applies and which replaces
its old extension, and that it neither obtains
a new, second extension and thereby becomes
ambiguous: « ... metaphor is not sheer ambiguity.
» (LA, II. 5, p. 70). But it seems to me
that if the new interpretation of the term
is neither supposed to replace the old one
nor to be added to the language system so
that the term in question becomes ambiguous,
then the new interpretation of the term cannot
be justified as long as the interpretation
of the language to which it belongs respects
the demands of Goodmanian nominalism.
Where metaphors freeze and become part of
the language system to which the terms making
up the metaphor belong, the result is often
ambiguity. Just think of feet as a basic
unit of measurement as an example. But it
is neither the case that all ambiguous terms
are in one of their meanings metaphorical
nor that all metaphorically used terms are
just ambiguous. « Applying the term 'cape'
to a body of land on one occasion and to
an article of clothing on another is using
it with different and indeed mutually exclusive
ranges but is not in either case metaphorical.
» (LA, II. 5, p. 70-71). And the term 'sad'
does not become ambiguous by being applied
metaphorically to a picture.
Third step In order to explain how metaphor
and ambiguity differ, Goodman develops his
view of the transfer of schemata: « An understanding
of metaphor further requires the recognition
that a label functions not in isolation but
as belonging to a family. We categorize by
sets of alternatives. » (LA, II. 6, p. 71)
Families of related labels or terms form
a schema, and all objects to which any one
of the terms of such a schema applies belong
to the same sphere. In order to illustrate
the function of schemata in cases of ordinary,
literal predication Goodman gives the following
example: « ... what counts as red, ... ,
will vary somewhat depending upon whether
objects are being classified as red or nonred,
or as red or orange or yellow or green or
blue or violet. » (LA, II. 6, p. 71-72) The
phenomenon Goodman has in mind here can be
understood more easily if we have in our
language not only expressions and individual,
concrete objects to which expressions can
refer or which they can describe, but also
properties of these objects and relations
in which they stand to each other. Then we
can say that we start with a sphere of objects
which resemble each other in a particular
way because they have certain properties
in common; in Goodman's example this is the
sphere of colourful objects. For us who see
these objects they are differentiated to
a maximal degree with respect to their colour,
that is their colours are differentiated
to the extent to which we can discriminate
colours. However, the schema of colour terms
which we use to describe the objects of this
sphere can be more or less rich or differentiated.
Even if this schema contains all the colour
terms the English language actually provides,
it may still not be sufficient to cope with
the degree of my visual discrimination. But
in most cases we rely for the classification
of given colourful objects on schemata to
which less than all the colour terms of a
natural language belong. If a child may chose
a ball among four balls in all, one of them
red, one green, one blue, and one yellow,
then it will be perfectly sufficient if the
child says: « I would like to have the blue
ball » or « I would like to have the yellow
ball ». The child has no need of any further
linguistic discrimination of the balls' colours.
The function of schemata for our predications
and classifications of objects can be explained
in the realm of a language with an exclusively
nominalistic semantics, that is, without
any reference to either properties or relations.
But in order to be able to compare different
schemata interpreted over the same realm
of objects, we need an all-embracing background
language which contains comparatively highly
differentiated terms for classifying the
objects in this realm as well as the terms
of the schemata in question, the extension
of which can be further analysed in more
differentiated terms. For example, where
the background language distiguishes between
orange-red, red, and bluish red, we could
introduce a new term red-n the extension
of which contains all those coloured objects
which the background language classifies
as either orange-red, red, or bluish red.
Goodman's main point is that whenever a term
is used metaphorically it is not only this
term which is used for the classification
of objects to which it does not literally
apply; it is a whole schema of terms to which
this term belongs and which is transfered
to a new sphere, a sphere of different objects.
That not only a single term, but a whole
sphere of terms is transferred from one sphere
of objects (the sphere of their literal meaning)
to another sphere (the sphere of their non-literal,
e. g. their metaphorical meaning) is supposed
to allow for the distinction between a non-literal,
e. g., a metaphorical use of a term, and
a use through which the meaning of the term
is simply becoming ambiguous. « How, then,
do metaphor and ambiguity differ? Chiefly,
I think, in that the several uses of a merely
ambiguous term are coeval and independent;
none either springs from or is guided by
another. In metaphor, on the other hand,
a term with an extension established by habit
is applied elsewhere under the influence
of that habit; there is both departure from
and deference to precedent. » (LA, II. 5,
p. 71).
The new interpretation of the terms belonging
to a schema can be due to a transfer to an
entirely different realm of objects, but
it can just as well be a re-interpretation
of these terms over the same or an only partly
different realm. The transfer of a schema
from one realm to an entirely different realm
of objects is for Goodman the distinctive
feature of metaphors. For example, the transfer
of terms which describe different feelings
(such as desperate, sad, cheerful, and happy)
to a realm of non-living and non-sensible
objects (including pictures and other kinds
of material objects) is a strategy for metaphorically
applying these terms. To describe a picture
as sad is therefore metaphorical. Re-interpretation
of a schema over the same or a similar realm
of objects as the original, literal one is
the strategy not for forming metaphors, but
for irony, hyperbole or litotes.
At first sight Goodman's theory of the transfer
of schemata of terms from old to new spheres
of objects seems to be both convincing and
of simple elegance. It promises to provide
a unified explanation of different kinds
of non-literal uses of terms. But a closer
look at this theory reveals serious problems.
There is the question whether Goodman, with
his theory of a transfer of a schema underlying
metaphorical predication, succeeds in establishing
a distinction between the metaphorical and
the ambiguous meaning of terms. I don't think
he does. If it is not only one term which,
when used metaphorically, is transferred
to a new realm of objects and thereby obtains
a new extension, if all the terms of a schema
are thus transferred and obtain a new extension,
the result is nothing but ambiguity; in this
case, a whole schema of terms becomes ambiguous.
In a language the semantics of which fullfills
the strict conditions of nominalism, every
kind of non-literal use of a term and thus
every kind of metaphorical use of a single
term or a whole schema of terms can be nothing
but either false or ambiguous.
« Briefly, a metaphor is an affair between
a predicate with a past and an object that
yields while protesting. » (LA, II. 5, p.
69)
« Metaphor requires attraction as well as
resistance - indeed, an attraction that overcomes
resistance. » (LA, II. 5, p. 69/70)
« In metaphor ... a term with an extension
established by habit is applied elsewhere
under the influence of that habit; there
is both departure from and deference to the
precedent. » (LA, II. 5, p. 71)
I perfectly agree with all these Goodmanian
formulae. Here, Goodman rightly describes
the phenomenon of metaphor as determined
by two opposing forces: as a justified violence
to a rule, as breaking semantic laws, but
a breaking that reveals a similarity between
objects, a similarity that had till then
gone unnoticed. Because of this similarity
the breaking of semantic laws remains unpunished.
Now, my objection to Goodman's theory of
metaphor is this: He can only explain that
the meaning of a metaphorically used term
differs from the meaning it has when literally
used. Goodman can explain the « protest »
and the « resistance » that is being provoked
by the metaphorical use of a term, but he
can neither explain in which sense a term
is used metaphorically with deference to
it's literal use nor in which sense the metaphorical
use of a term is being attracted by the objects
of it's new extension.
Why is it the case that the meaning of a
metaphorically used term cannot be explained
on the basis of a nominalistic view of linguistic
meaning? The main point of Goodman's theory
of metaphorical meaning is the transfer of
schemata. Now, one may think that the whole
conception of these schemata and of the order
of terms in them might not be explicable
on the background of Goodman's nominalism.
But this is not, or not entirely, the case;
Goodman does have something to offer in order
to deal with these problems, even though
what he actually offers may not be sufficient.
The first problem is to explain how we actually
chose the terms that belong to such a schema
from all the terms belonging to the language
in question. The criterium guiding this choice
cannot refer to the syntactical properties
of the terms that are to be chosen, it has
to be semantic: The objects of a sphere which
are classified by the terms of a schema must
belong to the same semantic field. But Goodman's
nominalism does not allow for semantic fields.
The criterium in question can only relate
to objects to which certain predicates apply.
As far as I can see, there is only one possibility
to explain the choice of terms belonging
to a schema in the context of an exclusively
extensional language (and this is not a very
convincing one): Terms belong to a schema
if and only if there is a term in the language
in question which does not belong to the
schema but the extension of which contains
all and only the extensions of the terms
of the schema. On the basis of such a criterium
we can, for example, form the schema of all
the colour terms belonging to a language:
All and only the objects that belong to the
extension of a particular colour-term also
belong to the extension of the term 'colourful'.
This explanation raises a suspicion of circularity,
but I do not want to deal with it here. I
just want to raise the question to what extent
the suggested criterium of choice can help
to establish the kind of schemata we need.
Which schema do we rely on if we describe
a human being metaphorically as a wolf? On
the schema of all terms which apply to objects
to which the term 'natural kind of animal'
applies? Or on the schema of all terms to
which the term 'is an animal of one of the
kinds mentioned by La Fontaine in his fabels'?
If we try to understand the meaning of the
metaphorical description of human beings
as wolves, do we then have all the natural
kinds of animals in mind to be found on earth,
the giraffes and catarpillars and all the
others, or at least all the kinds of animals
mentioned by La Fontaine? I doubt that this
criterium will help us to form the schemata
we need for interpreting metaphors. Goodman
does not raise the question of how we obtain
these schemata, he relies exclusively on
the persuasive power of examples.
It seems to me that the choice of terms which
are supposed to be in one schema raises serious
problems if it is to be explained on the
basis of a purely extensional language. Another
problem arises when we try to explain the
order of terms in a schema. Again, this order
has to be a semantic order, not a syntactical
order (as the traditional or conventional
order of letters in the alphabet or the alphabetical
order of terms in a dictionary - see LA,
II. 6, p. 77/8). But how are we going to
obtain a semantic order of the terms of a
schema, given that we are not allowed to
rely on properties or relations of objects
in the realm of that schema, properties and
relations which are measurable?
Goodman has shown - first in his The Structure
of Appearance (SA) and then in chapter IX.
of his Problems and Projects (PP) - that
there is a solution to the problem of establishing
a linear order of objects which respects
the demands of nominalism and exclusively
extensional semantics. 4 But his solution
to this problem operates with a trick: Goodman
characterizes the individual entities in
the realm over which the language we use
for expressing our empirical knowledge of
the world as qualia. He defines qualia as
individual entities which are observable
and which stand to other qualia in relations
of apparent matching, that is « apparent
indifference », or apparent non-matching,
that is « apparent difference » (see PP,
p. 424). Goodman characterizes the matching-relation
as being both reflexive and symmetrical,
but not transitive. 5
This characterization may appear to be contra-intuitive.
Nevertheless, it can be made plausible with
the help of an example provided by C. I.
Lewis. Imagine three samples of material
A, B und C (as in a tailor's book of samples)
which are identical with respect to their
size, the material they are made of, their
weight and their weaving structure and which
are very similar with respect to their colour.
Indeed, theses samples are so similar that
we cannot distiguish neither A from B nor
B from C. But as soon as we put B aside and
compare A to C with respect to their colour
we become aware of a minimal difference between
their colours. That is, A and B apparently
match just as B and C do, but A and C are
nevertheless apparently different. Goodmans
characterizsation of the relation of non-matching
as both reflexive and symmetrical, but non-transitive
turns out to be plausible. 6 If A apparently
matches B and B apparently matches C but
A apparently does not match C, then not only
A and C, but also A and B and B and C are
different - even though not apparently.
In so far as they are observable and comparable
individuals Goodman's qualia have something
conceptual about them. Nevertheless, Goodman
does not conceive of qualia as having observable
properties - a feature that does not make
it easier to understand in which sense qualia
are supposed to be observable. On the basis
of his conception of the relation of apparent
matching between qualia and two additional
relations between qualia, namely the relation
of betwixtness and the relation of besideness
(see PP, p. 428, SA, p. 216-227) Goodman
succeeds in establishing a linear order of
qualia. The establishment of this order fullfills
the conditions of extensionality of the language
in question; it does not rely on measurable
properties of objects. Observing qualia and
ordering them in a linear manner by testing
their apparent matching, their betwixtness,
and their besideness does not rely on any
ascription of predicates to qualia.
Unfortunately, Goodman's theory of qualia
and their linear ordering (which fullfills
the conditions of nominalism and extensional
semantics) is of little help for the explanation
of the order of terms in a schema such as
Goodman needs it in his theory of metaphor.
A world of qualia can be fully and correctly
described with the help of terms of a purely
extensional language. In a world of qualia
and its description there is no room for
metaphorical uses of terms - and no need
of it. But this is not the main problem of
his theory.
My main objection against Goodman's nominalistic
theory of metaphor is the following: We may
- on the background of a nominalistic ontology
and with the means of an exclusively extensional
language - be able form schemata of terms
and we may as well have semantic criteria
to establish a linear order of these terms
(at least when these terms apply to observable
qualia). But as soon as the terms of such
a schema are seperated from the realm of
objects to which they literally apply in
order to be transferred to some other realm,
these terms just lose their meaning. As soon
as these terms are used to classify objects
in a new realm they obtain a new extensional
meaning. But this new meaning has nothing
whatsoever to do with their old meaning.
There is no way in which Goodman could explain
how, in such an exclusively extensional language,
the new use of a term shows any deference
to its old use or is attracted by the objects
of its new extension. After having lost its
old meaning and before having obtained a
new meaning, i. e. in the process of being
transferred from one realm of objects to
another, a term of a Goodmanian language
is just a meaningless sign - if it is not
just a bare particular and then even loses
the status of a sign. But if terms lose their
literal meaning on the way to being transferred
to a new realm of objects, they automatically
lose their metaphorical potential.
Now, one might think that Goodman has an
argument that allows him to reject this criticism,
namely his distinction between representation
and representation-as, that is the distiction
between signs that denote objects of a certain
kind and signs of a certain kind. Goodman
introduces this distinction in the context
of his analysis of pictorial signs; 'representation'
means for him 'pictorial sign': « A picture
that represents a man denotes him; a picture
that represents a fictional man is a man-picture;
and a picture that represents a man as a
man is a man-picture denoting him. » (LA,
I. 6, p. 27/8). Representation is denotation
of something by a pictorial sign, the reference
of a pictorial sign to actually existing
objects. However, representation-as is not
necessarily denotation or reference; a picture
pictures an object as being of a certain
kind by being itself a picture of a certain
kind, and if there is no object to be pictorially
referred to, the picture remains nevertheless
a picture of a certain kind. What kind of
picture a given picture is depends on its
syntactical properties, on some of the physical
properties of the sign-token. Goodman's defense
against my main objection to his theory of
metaphor as a transfer of schemata could
rely on his distinction between representation
and representation-as in the following way:
Whenever a term or a schema of terms loses
its reference to a particular sphere of objects,
the sphere of its literal extension, to be
transfered to a new sphere of objects, the
sphere of its metaphorical extension, the
terms in the schema do indeed lose their
literal meaning, namely their reference to
objects, but they do not thereby lose their
syntactical properties; syntactically, they
remain signs of the same kind. And these
signs remain signs of the same kind even
when they obtain their new, metaphorical
meaning. Thus, Goodman could try to explain
in which sense the metaphorical use of a
sign is a use with deference to its literal
use by referring to the sign token which,
while being transfered from one realm of
objects to another, does stay a sign of the
same kind.
It may not be obvious in which sense this
line of argument might lead to a defeat of
my objection to Goodman's theory of metaphor.
Doesn't Goodman himself underline that metaphor
is not a syntactical, but a semantic phenomenon?
Where the term-signs that are either literally
or metaphorically used, are not pictorial
but conventional with respect to their syntactical
properties, where they are term-signs of
a natural language, it will certainly be
difficult - if not impossible - to explain
the deference of their metaphorical use to
their literal use by referring to their syntactical
properties. But in the special case of pictorial
signs the situation is different: The pictorial
representation of a woman receiving a letter
which is brought to her by her maid may mean
metaphorically the Virgin receiving the message
of her pregnancy with Jesus from an angel.
7 Where pictorial signs are used metaphorically
their syntactical properties, as they remain
the same for both their literal and their
metaphorical use, can indeed be seen as establishing
a relation of deference between their literal
and their metaphorical use. This is so because
their syntactical properties are determined
by the way the objects to which they refer
in their literal use look or would look if
they existed.
But this defense of Goodman's theory of metaphors,
which is limited to the special case of pictorial
signs anyway, is of a kind that Goodman himself
does not have at his disposal. And this problem
has nothing to do with his theory of metaphor
but it is a consequence of his conception
of pictorial signs. To put it briefly, Goodman
denies that there is any difference in kind
between signs of a natural language on one
hand and pictorial signs on the other with
respect to their being conventional. I am
not convinced by this theory. But it may
indeed be the case that, on the basis of
his radical nominalism, there is no way to
conceive of pictorial signs as syntactically
non-conventional. And the defense against
my objection to Goodman's theory of metaphor
- limited as it is to the case of pictorial
signs and their metaphorical use - relies
on a conception of syntactical features of
pictures as non-conventional and motivated
by visual properties of the objects to which
these signs literally apply. My objection
against Goodman's theory of metaphors thus
remains the same: The terms of a language
whose semantics meet the conditions of Goodman's
strict nominalism cannot be used metaphorically.
Donald Davidson's answer to the question
of what metaphors mean Davidson is certainly
not a nominalistic and his view of linguistic
meaning differs considerably from that of
Goodman. But there is one point about which
they both agree
(together with many other analytic philosophers):
They insist on a purely extensional interpretation
of the terms of a language. Davidson holds
the originally Fregean view that only in
the context of a sentence do linguistic expressions
have meaning. He conceives of the meaning
of a sentence as its truth condition. 8 The
sentence 'Socrates flies.' means that Socrates
flies, and the sentence 'Julia is the sun.'
means that Julia is the sun. In order to
write a dictionary where fixed meanings of
the vocabulary of a language are given, the
meanings of the terms of that language have
to be abstracted from the meanings of the
true sentences in which they occur. As Davidson
holds the view that sentences in which terms
are used metaphorically are usually false,
he can say that the meaning of these sentences
and of the terms they contain does not have
to be taken into account when the dictionary
meaning of these terms is to be fixed. 9
Davidson does not deny the phenomenon of
metaphor and he is even willing to allow
for metaphorical expressions in a scienticifally
adequate language. 10 In his famous paper
« What metaphors mean » he holds the view
that not only do we rely on the literal meanings
of words for understanding metaphorical expressions
but « that metaphors mean what the words,
in their most literal interpretation, mean,
and nothing more ».11 He thereby denies that
in forming or understanding metaphors we
make use of « semantic resources beyond the
resources on which the ordinary depends ».12
The ordinary is, for Davidson, the literal,
and thus he consequently rejects the idea
of metaphorical meaning as distinct from
literal meaning.
This denial of metaphorical meaning (even
though not of metaphors) has to be understood
against the background of his conception
of literal meaning as exclusively truth-conditional
and extensional and of his ideas concerning
the learnability of a language. Human beings
with their limited lifetime and limited intellectual
capacity can learn a language only if the
vocabulary of this language is limited. Terms
of a language can be used metaphorically
in many different ways. If one allows that
terms of a language can have, in addition
to their literal meaning, metaphorical meanings,
and that they can have as many different
metaphorical meanings as there are different
possible metaphorical uses of these terms,
then one will risk a multiplication of the
elements of the vocabulary of the language
and thereby put the learnability of the language
into question. In addition, the view of the
metaphorical meanings of a term as meanings
additional to its literal meaning comes down
to nothing but the view that terms which
are used metaphorically become - by being
so used - ambiguous. And this view has already
been rejected. Thus, it seems as if Davidson
rejects metaphorical meanings as additional
meanings for very good reasons.
Nevertheless, the view that the dictionary
of a natural language does not mention any
metaphorical meanings of terms, cannot be
defended. There are many so called frozen
metaphors that have become part of the vocabulary
of a given language. Elimination of these
elements of the vocabulary risks to reduce
considerably the wide range of application
of the language or to destroy the possibility
of its application all in all. 13
How, then, does Davidson reply to the question
what metaphors mean? What makes a sentence
which is literally false a metaphor is a
particular way of its being used: « What
distinguishes metaphor is not meaning, but
use ... . »14 But how does Davidson characterize
the metaphorical use of a sentence, how does
he distinguish metaphorical from literal
use? By which means can he establish this
distinction, given his purely extensional
concept of meaning? « No doubt metaphors
often make us notice aspects of things we
did not notice before; no doubt they bring
out surprising analogies and similarities
to our attention ... . »15 But how do metaphors
make us notice these aspects and analogies?
For Davidson metaphors do not have a fixed
cognitive content: « ... there is no limit
to what a metaphor calls to our attention,
and much of what we are caused to notice
is not propositional in character. »16 In
characterizing the cognitive content of a
metaphorically used term as complex, unlimited
and somewhat vague, Davidson does not reply
to the question what determines this content.
This content is not the meaning of the term,
but it must somehow depend on its meaning
and on the context of its use. « Metaphor
makes us see one thing as another by making
some literal statement that inspires or prompts
the insight. »17 But how can a literally
false sentence prompt such an insight? Does
Davidson admit that, when we know the meaning,
i. e. the truth condition of a sentence and
when we know the meaning of the expressions
it contains, we also know the conceptual
content of this sentence and of the expressions
it contains? Does he admit that it is this
conceptual content on which we rely in order
to decide whether the sentence, used literally
in a particular context, is true or false?
And does he refuse to admit conceptual meaning
(of sentences and expressions contained in
sentences) only for the reason of trying
to avoid the ontological implications of
such an admission? But what is such ontological
avarice good for if it makes the answer to
the question what metaphors mean impossible?
In a later paper Davidson says explicitly
that, in his paper on « What metaphors Mean
» he only intended to reject metaphorical
meaning as additional (to literal) meaning
without thereby giving an answer to the question
he had raised. 18 And in his paper « Locating
Literary Language » he explicitly admits:
« In my essay 'What Metaphors Mean' ... I
was stubborn about the word 'meaning' when
all I cared about was the primacy of 'first
meaning'. »19 He explains his distinction
between first and other (non-first) meaning
as follows:
« Sometime too hot the eye of heaven shines
» means that the sun sometimes shines too
brightly. But the first meaning of « the
eye of heaven » purports to refer to the
one and only eye of heaven. We can tell this
because Shakespeare (we assume) intended
to use words that would be recognized by
a reader to refer to the one and only eye
of heaven (if such a thing existed) in order
to prompt the reader to understand that he
meant the sun. We may wish to use the word
« meaning » for both the first meaning and
what the metaphor carries us to, but only
the first meaning has a systematic place
in the language of the author. 20
Here, Davidson explicitly allows for non-first,
non-literal, and that is metaphorical meaning.
But it seems to me that, on the basis of
his monistic conception of sentence meaning
as extensional meaning, he can neither explain
what metaphorical meaning is nor in what
way it depends on literal meaning. The reasons
for this failure are very similar to those
of Goodman's failure to explain what metaphors
mean.
What, then, do metaphors mean? In order to
explain what metaphors mean and how metaphorical
meaning depends on literal meaning, it seems
to me that we have to admit a dualism of
linguistic meaning. The dualism I have in
mind is not a dualism of literal and metaphorical
meaning in the first place but a dualism
in the realm of the literal: the dualism
of conceptual or connotational (literal)
meaning on one hand and of extensional (literal)
meaning on the other. The explanation I am
suggesting makes use of both a Goodmanian
and a Davidsonian element of thinking about
what metaphors mean: of Goodman's idea that
metaphorical meaning has its ground in a
transfer of schemata and of Davidson's idea
that in using or understanding expressions
metaphorically we rely, first of all, on
the literal meaning of these expressions
and that metaphorical meaning, if meaning
at all, is second-order meaning. But both
these ideas can only be defended coherently
on the basis of the semantic dualism I suggested
above.
If we leave the phenomenon of frozen metaphors
out of account and concentrate instead on
creative metaphors (on metaphors in which
the creative potential of language use is
manifest), we can say that no term as such
is metaphorical. A term is metaphorical only
if it is used in a particular way. It is
this use which creates the semantic tension
characteristic of most metaphors. Thus, the
phenomenon of metaphor is, and here I think
I agree with both Goodman and Davidson, intrinsically
pragmatic. But this by no means excludes
that there is a semantic dimension to the
phenomenon of metaphor too. Nor does it exclude
that there is a pragmatic dimension to literal
meaning. Compare the following two sentences:
(L) The sun is shining today.
(M) Juliet is the sun.
Tokens of the same term « the sun » are used
in both (L) and (M). (L) makes sense if we
understand it literally (and uttered at daylight);
it is true or false depending on whether,
at the time and place of its utterance, there
is sunshine in the sky or not. « The sun
» here is the brightest star in the sky,
the star we see at daylight if the sky is
not covered. With (M) things are different:
If we take it literally and have to decide
whether it is true or false, we will certainly
judge it to be false. Julia is a human being
and one and the same thing cannot be a human
being and a star at the same time. But (M),
taken literally, is not false in exactly
the same way as (L), taken literally, is
false (if uttered at daylight at a time and
place where the sky is covered). (L), taken
literally, makes sense, independently of
whether, at the time and place of its utterance,
it is actually true or false. (M), however,
taken literally, doesn't even make sense;
we cannot imagine conditions under which
(M) could possibly be true. Thus, as long
as we understand (M) literally and realize
that it doesn't make any sense at all, the
question whether it is true or false doesn't
really arise. It is this absence of sense
(rather than the absence of truth) which
makes us try to understand (M) metaphorically.
21
How do we represent « the sun » in (L) and
how in (M)? In order to answer to these questions
we have to spell out elements of the conceptual
meaning of the term « the sun ». If we want
to understand the meaning of the term as
it occurs in (L) and (M), a simple indication
of its extensional meaning, the identification
of a particular object, wouldn't be quite
satisfactory. In the case of (M) the extensional
meaning of « the sun » alone would be of
no help in order to make metaphorical sense
of the sentence. And in the case of (L) this
meaning alone would leave us without any
idea of the criterium which allows us not
only to make sense of the sentence, but also
to decide whether, at the time and place
of its utterance, it is actually true or
false. If we understand (L) literally and
make sense of it, we represent the sun as
the brightest star in the sky, the origin
of daylight, visible at daytime when there
are no or few clouds in the sky. In addition
to that, we might represent the sun as creating
the opposition of light and shadow, as the
source not only of light, but also of warmth,
or as a source of a radiation dangerous for
the uncovered human skin. However, in order
to make sense of (M), we have to represent
« the sun » in a somewhat different way:
We have to represent it as a bright object
and as a source of warmth, but, in addition
to that, as the center of a system and as
an object which has power over human beings
and their fate.
The context of Shakespeare's play « Romeo
and Juliet » where Romeo utters (M) in the
second scene of the second act helps us to
understand how we should represent the sun
in order to make sense of (M):
Romeo: « ... But soft! What light through
yonder window breaks? It is the East, and
Juliet is the sun! Arise, fair sun, and kill
the envious moon, Who is already sick and
pale with grief That thou her maid art far
more fair than she. ... » (Act II, scene
2, verses 2-6)
Romeo's metaphor picks up the light-and-darkness
imagery associated with Romeo and Juliet
and this imagery will be further developed
throughout the whole play. 22 Taken apart
from its context « Juliet is the sun. » may
be misunderstood as a compliment of limited
originality used by a lover who is young,
romantic, and of conventional imagination.
But J. W. Draper has associated the plot
of the whole play as well as the personal
characters of its principle figures to XVIth
century astrology. The text contains detailed
information about the time of Juliet's birth.
Following the « horoscope of her nativity
... her planet should be Mars or the sun
» - and with the latter Romeo associates
her here. 23 Thus, the seemingly conventional
metaphor contains a hint to a fate dominated
by heavenly powers. Indeed, throughout the
play, Juliet is characterized in terms of
light and brightness.
Whereas Juliet is associated with the sun,
with light, Romeo is associated with darkness.
Here, Romeo passes from darkness to light
and life brought about by the presence of
Juliet: There is a dimension of birth and
rebirth in the scene, due to the conceptual
connotations of « the sun ». These connotations
are underlined at verse 50 in this same scene
2 where the idea of Romeo's rebirth is expressed
through the topic of his new baptism:
Juliet: « ... ... O, be some other name!
What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other word would smell as sweet. So
Romeo would, were he not Romeo called, Retain
that dear perfection which he owes Without
that title. Romeo, doff thy name; And for
thy name, which is no part of thee, Take
all myself.
Romeo: « I take thee at thy word. Call me
but love, and I'll be new baptized. Henceforth
I never will be Romeo. »
(verses 41-51)
These are only hints to the conceptual connotations
which « the sun » obtains in the context
of Romeo's talk in this scene, in this play
written at that time. There may be more elements
of the conceptual meaning of « the sun »
as I have mentioned, and it is to the readers
and audience of Shakespeare's play to reflect
about these elements. Whether Shakespeare
himself has already had all these elements
in mind, all the connotations we bring about
or even constitute in our reflection about
the conceptual meaning of « the sun » - this
is a question which, to my mind, is of secondary
importance. The interpretion of conceptual
meaning of a term is a process which can
be described as a working out or bringing
about its possible connotations.
For most of us, astrology has lost its power.
This doesn't hinder us from referring to
it in order to understand the connotations
of Romeo's seemingly trivial compliment comparing
Juliet to the sun. But when we talk about
the weather and wonder whether the sun is
out or not, there is certainly no association
of the sun with the powers that former cultures
used to attribute to this star.
The interpretation of a term in the course
of which we aim at understanding its conceptual
content can be analysed in terms of a construction
of a semantic field. A semantic field consists
of a lexical field and of a domain of conceptual
content which can be used to represent and
thereby organize a realm of objects. 24 The
conceptual content of such a field contains
not only representations of properties of
objects and of relations between objects
but also representations of properties and
relations that people have - in former and
present times - attributed to these objects
as well as representations of (both literal
and metaphorical) ways in which terms belonging
to that field have been used. A semantic
field can be conceived of as a network of
interrelated terms which mutually determine
their conceptual content. 25 Thus, the domain
of conceptual content characteristic of the
semantic field to which the term « the sun
» belongs does not only contain the properties
and relations attributed to the sun by modern
physics but also actual and former common
sense ideas about the sun as well as all
the mystical and religious powers that astrology
and ancient cultures have attributed to it.
In cases both of literal and of metaphorical
use or understanding of a term, we interpret
its conceptual content by constructing a
semantic field around it. The elements of
the domain of conceptual content of this
field are all possible elements of literal
conceptual meaning of the lexical elements
of this field. Thus, both our literal and
our metaphorical understanding of the conceptual
content or meaning of a term are, in the
first place, cases of an understanding of
literal conceptual meaning. But whereas a
term is literally used or understood to represent
objects of its common extension, the metaphorical
use or understanding of a term is based on
a transfer of the semantic field to which
it belongs (on a transfer of the lexical
field and its domain of conceptual content)
to a realm of objects which is commonly organized
by an entirely different semantic field.
As a result of this transfer, a realm of
objects is newly organized by the terms of
a semantic field to the literal extensions
of which the objects of this realm do not
belong. In the case of the above quoted Shakespearian
example the semantic field to which the term
« the sun » belongs and which is commonly
used to represent heavenly bodies is transferred
to the realm of the characters in the play;
it is mainly Romeo himself and Juliet whose
relations are newly organized in terms of
the semantic field of the sun and other heavenly
bodies. 26
Insofar as the procedures of both literal
and metaphorical interpretation include the
construction of a semantic field around the
term to be interpreted, both procedures include
a pragmatic element. The pragmatically interpreted
conceptual content of a term used literally
serves as a criterium for deciding whether
the sentence in which it occurs is, at the
time and place of its utterance, true or
false. In order to decide whether the sentence
« The sun is shining today » is, at the time
and place of its utterance, true or false,
we represent the sun as the brightest star
in the sky, seen at daylight if there are
no or few clouds, and we thereby know how
to proceed for making this decision: We look
at the sky at the time and place where the
sentence is uttered in order to see whether
there are clouds or not, whether we can see
the sun or not. The conceptual content of
a metaphorically used term, pragmatically
interpreted with the help of a semantic field,
however, is used in the first place not as
a criterium for deciding about the truth
or falsity of a sentence, but as a means
for reorganizing a realm of objects which
do not belong to the extension of this term.
When Romeo characterizes Julia metaphorically
as the sun, Julia does not thereby become
an object in the extension of « the sun ».
Instead, her position and function among
the characters of the play is compared to
the position of the sun among the heavenly
objects and to the function of the sun for
both these objects and the people on earth
and their fates.
The function of a metaphorically used term
and the corresponding semantic field can
be compared to that of a model, a structure
thought of in a certain conceptual content
which can be used to represent objects of
different realms and thus serve to organize
different realms of objects. The metaphorical
potential of a term and its semantic field
lies in its capacity to serve as such a model
for the organization of different realms
of objects. Every term and its corrsponding
semantic field may have some metaphorical
potential, but this does not imply that every
semantic field can serve as a model for organizing
every possible realm of objects. The model
must fit in some sense to the realm of objects
that is supposed to realize it. Therefore,
the metaphorical application of a term to
a particular object or to objects of a certain
kind can be right or wrong, just as the literal
application of a term to a particular objects
or to objects of a certain kind can be true
or false. Kittay gives the following example
for the way in which sentences containing
metaphorically used terms can be right or
wrong: « Relative to a scheme in which cities
are thought of as women, 'The Venice of the
Renaissance was a noblewomen' would be true
while 'The Venice of the Renaissance was
a washerwomen' would be false. »27 However,
given that 'The Venice of the Renaissance
was a noblewomen' is, literally understood,
false or senseless and that we rely on the
conceptual literal content for both our literal
and metaphorical interpretations of this
sentence and the expressions it contains,
I suggest speaking of the sentence as metaphorically
right rather than true because I can thus
avoid the contradiction of judging this sentence
as both false (or senseless) and true.
Only if a term is metaphorically used in
a correct way to represent an object or objects
of a cerain kind does it make sense, only
then metaphorical meaning emerges. Metaphorical
meaning is conceptual or connotative meaning;
it is the conceptual content of the thought
representing an object or objects of a certain
kind by means of a term which does not literally
apply to these objects but which is a correct
metaphor for them. Romeo rightly represents
Julia as the sun; this representation corresponds
perfectly well to her position in his social
universe and helps to understand the logic
of the drama. But had he represented her
as a shooting star in the context of the
very same drama, his metaphor would not have
been right, it wouldn't have made any sense.
The term « shooting star », applied metaphorically
to the Julia of Shakespeare's play, wouldn't
have any metaphorical meaning.
Insofar as the interpretation of a metaphorically
used term starts from constructing its literal
meaning with the help of a semantic field,
the emerging metaphorical meaning of this
term is a kind of second order meaning (as
Davidson has suggested). It seems to me that
the account of metaphorical meaning I am
suggesting here does not provoke any of Davidson's
objections. The metaphorical meaning a term
obtains when used in a metaphorically right
way is a kind of momentary meaning, the result
of a process of interpretation and metaphorical
reflection about the literal meaning of the
term and the object or objects to which it
is metaphorically applied. This process is
neither a process of change of literal meaning
of the term in question, nor a process of
change from one (literal) to another (metaphorical)
meaning of it, nor a process of establishing
a new, additional meaning, namely a process
of an emerging ambiguity of this term. Applying
a term metaphorically in a right and convincing
way does not lead to a lasting change of
the vocabulary of the language to which it
belongs and thus does not put the learnability
of the language into question. Such an application
may leave no traces in the language system
at all. However, if a term is used metaphorically
and if this use is right and convincing and
if it happens in a prominent place (like
in a Shakespearean play) then it may well
leave a trace in the language: It may enter
the semantic field of this term insofar as
this field may contain a representation of
the conceptual content this term has had
in former metaphorical applications. If «
the sun » is applied metaphorically today,
the interpretation of its conceptual content
may rely on a semantic field which contains
somewhere at its borders former prominent
metaphorical applications of this term, among
them Romeo's « Juliet ist the sun ».
Davidson may have had in mind a process of
interpreting and understanding a metaphorically
used expression very similar to the one I
am defending here. And this is what Sue Larson
has suggested to me when I had the opportunity
to dicuss this problem with her. But then
Davidson should admit that there is more
than extensional literal meaning to words,
namely conceptual or connotative literal
meaning. His conception of metaphorical meaning
as second order meaning makes sense only
if this second order meaning (and the underlying
first order meaning) are conceived of as
conceptual or connotative meaning. Davidson
may well refuse to call the conceptual content
of terms meaning because there is no way
to spell out what this meaning precisely
is. One cannot have a systematic theory of
the conceptual content of a term (independent
of whether it is used literally or metaphorically).
Therefore, there are no rules to tell us
how to interpret metaphors. But admitting
that interpreting a metaphorically used term
brings about a second order meaning of this
term and describing this interpretation as
a process in which our imagination is deeply
involved, 28 hardly goes together with the
claim that metaphors do not make use of semantic
resources beyond the literal, where the literal
is conceived of in terms of purely extensional
meaning. 29
Kittay proposes to analyse the distinction
of metaphorical meaning from literal meaning
of a term and of the corresponding semantic
field in terms of a distinction between two
incommensurable conceptual schemes. But this
aspect of her theory of metaphors is at odds
not only with Davidson's very idea of a conceptual
scheme (which she rejects) but also with
his conception of metaphorical meaning as
second order meaning (which she accepts).
Metaphorical meaning can rightly be analysed
as second order meaning because we interpret
a metaphorically used term on the basis of
the conceptual scheme of the language to
which it belongs and which determines its
literal meaning. If, in the course of this
interpretation, metaphorical meaning emerges,
we do indeed transcend the bounds of this
conceptual scheme, we try to represent certain
objects in a way not provided for by this
scheme. Nevertheless, we do not thereby establish
a new conceptual scheme incommensurable with
the first. Incommensurable conceptual schemes
are supposed to be incomparable and untranslatable
into each other. If the interpretation of
metaphor involved a move from one concepual
scheme to another, incommensurable with the
first, we would never be able to understand
a metaphorically used term in the right way
and to be at the same time aware of the fact
that, understood literally, it would be false
or senseless. In trying to spell out the
conceptual content thought of in a metaphorically
used term we rely on the lexical means and
the corresponding conceptual (literal) content
of the very same scheme to which this term
literally belongs. This does not imply that
metaphorically used terms can be translated
into literally used terms without any loss
of conceptual meaning. The meaning of a metaphorically
used term is indeed incommensurable from
the point of view of the conceptual scheme
to which this term literally belongs. But
this is not because this term, when used
metaphorically, belongs to a different conceptual
scheme but because spelling out the conceptual
content of a metaphorically used term is
an endless task. There are no limits to interpreting
the conceptual content of a metaphorically
used term, it is a task for both our imagination
and creativity, and therein lies the charm
of metaphors.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes
1. See Craig, Edward: The Mind of God and
the Works of Man. Oxford 1987, p. 1.
2. Johnson and Lakoff give many examples
for expressions in our everyday language
which we use and understand metaphorically
without realizing their metaphorical character.
See Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark: Metaphors
we live by. Chicago and London 1980.
3. Goodman, Nelson: Languages of Art. An
Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Brighton
1981.
4. See Goodman, Nelson: The Structure of
Appearance. Third edition with an Introduction
by Geoffrey Hellman, Dordrecht 1977 (SA);
Goodman, Nelson: Problems and Projects. Indianapolis
1972 (PP).
5. See SA, p. 209.
6. See C. I. Lewis: Mind and the World Order.
New Vork 1956, p. 363/4. See also SA, p.
212.
7. The painting I have in mind here is Johannes
Vermeers Mistress and Maid from the Frick-Collection
in New York. It was Amelie Rorty who mentioned
to me the idea of interpreting this painting
as a representation of the Annuntiation.
Thus interpreted this painting of Vermeer's
has both a literal and a metaphorical meaning.
8. See e. g. Davidson, Donald: « Reality
without Reference. » In: Platts, Mark (ed.):
Reference, Truth and Reality. Essays on the
Philosophy of Language. London et al.
1980, p. 131-140.
9. See Davidson, Donald: « What Metaphors
Mean. » In: Davidson, Donald: Inquiries into
Truth and Interpretation. Oxford 1990, p.
245-264 (« Metaphors »), here p. 257: « If
a sentence used metaphorically is true or
false in the ordinary sense, then it is clear
that it is usually false. »
10. « Metaphor is a legitimate device not
only in literature but in science, philosophy
and the law; it is effectice in praise and
abuse, prayer and promotion, description
and prescription. » (See Davidson, « Metaphors
», p. 246.)
11. Davidson, « Metaphors », p. 245.
12. Davidson, « Metaphors », p. 245.
13. See Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark:
Metaphors we live by.
14. Davidson, « Metaphors », p. 259.
15. Davidson, « Metaphors », p. 261.
16. Davidson, « Metaphors », p. 263.
17. Davidson, « Metaphors », p. 263.
18. See Davidson, Donald: « Reply to Oliver
Scholz. » In: Stoecker, Ralf (ed.): Reflecting
Davidson. Donald Davidson Responding to an
International Forum of Philosophers. Berlin/New
York 1993, p. 172-3.
19. Davidson, Donald: « Locating Literary
Language. » In: Dasenbrock, Reed Way: Literary
Theory After Davidson. New York 1993, p.
307, footnote.
20. Davidson, « Locating Literary Language
», p. 300. See also Davidson, Donald: « A
Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. » In: LePore,
Ernest (Hsg.): Truth and Interpretation.
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald
Davidson. Oxford 1986, S. 433-446.
21. In this respect I disagree with Louise
Röska-Hardy's speech-act theory of metaphor.
Röska-Hardy holds the view that we are willing
to try to make metaphorical sense of a term
in a sentence which, at first sight and taken
literally doesn't make any sense, if and
only if we take the utterance of the sentence
to be a speech act by a rational being produced
intentionally. But this is not a necessary
but only a sufficient condition for the intention
of interpreting a term metaphorically. In
order to try to make metaphorical sense of
a term in a sentence we do not depend on
a speaker's intention. We can try to understand
a term used metaphorically in a sentence
even if we know that the sentence in question
was uttered by a speaker of limited linguitic
competence (by a speaker, for example, to
whom the language in question is foreign)
or by a machine producing arbitrarily sequences
of words. See Röska-Hardy, Louise: « Metapher,
Bedeutung und Verstehen. » In: Danneberg,
Lutz, Graeser, Andreas und Petrus, Klaus:
Metapher und Innovation. Die Rolle der Metapher
im Wandel von Sprache und Wissenschaft. Bern,
Stuttgart, Wien 1995, p. 138-150.
22. See Shakespeare, William: Romeo and Juliet.
Ed. by T. J. B. Spencer. London/New York
1967; here verses 19-22.
23. See Draper, J. W.: « Shakespeare's 'Star-Crossed
Lovers'. » In: Andrews, John F. (ed.): Romeo
and Juliet. Critical Essays. New York a.
London 1993, p. 285-306, esp. p. 293.
24. See Lyons, John: Introduction to Theoretical
Linguistics. Cambridge 1968.
25. For the way in which terms of a semantic
field mutually determine their conceptual
content see Saussure, Ferdinand de: Cours
de Linguistique Générale. Publié par Charles
Bally et Albert Sechehaye, avec la collaboration
de Albert Riedlinger. Ed. critique par Tullio
de Mauro. Paris 1982.
26. Here I follow Eva Feder Kittay who has
suggested explaining what metaphors mean
with reference to a transfer of a semantic
field from one realm of objects to another.
See Kittay, Eva Feder: Metaphor. Its Cognitive
Force and Linguistic Structure. Oxford 1987.
27. See Kittay, Metaphor, p. 313.
28. Davidson, Metaphor, p. 245.
29. I profited from discussions of Davidson's
conception of meaning not only with Sue Larson,
but also with Achille Varzi and other members
of the Department of Philosophy of Columbia
University where I was invited to read a
paper about the subject. Further help came
from discussions with Louise Röska-Hardy
who shares Sue Larson's suspicion that, concerning
the understanding of metaphors, Davidson
and I have more in common than I think.
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Evans Experientialism 
