HUME: UNIVOCITY,
EQUIVOCITY, LOGICITY, NECESSITY
GARY. C. MOORE:
I am renewing my exploration of the
works
of David Hume. Specifically I am falling
back upon AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,
DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION, and THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION along with HUME'S PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF: A STUDY OF HIS FIRST
INQUIRY by Anthony FLEW and PHILOSOPHICAL MELANCOLY AND DELIRIUM: HUME'S
PATHOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHY by Donald W. Livingston.
This still can relate
to the
discussion of the scholastics Aquinas,
Scotus,
and Ockham on several accounts. First,
the
last serious thought I contended with
was
Ockham's contention that only the soul
was
immortal . THE PERSON WAS NOT!!! I
still
need to go back and find out exactly
what
he meant but [A] it undeniably asserts
some
kind of disintegration of personal
identity,
something that Hume analyzed deeply
to the
point of denying its existence and
everything
in my physical experience, especially
in
my present condition, confirms wholly,
and
[B] the political and social practice
of
rational theology *within* religion
is an
extremely complex event depending little
to nothing on logical statements of
truth
but rather allowing areas of dialogue
which
can accommodate ANY point of view under
politically
appropriate language, that is, where
outright
atheism, denial of immortality, and
denial
of an objective ground to ethics beyond
responsibility
for the consequences of your premises
and
actions - which not even the most thorough,
if not *fanatical* - atheist would
deny -
could be accepted if politically rephrased.
Now Hinduism and Buddhism and, in more
modern
times, Judaism and Unitarianism have
accommodated
themselves explicitly, if not loudly,
to
this. To find it happening surreptitiously
in Catholicism that led just as surreptitiously
to the specifically Lutheran *reformation*
is interesting. Luther has become a
thoroughly
quarantined figure in religious history
whose
actual views have been quietly but
thoroughly
censured by religious fanatics like
Philip
Melancthon and John Calvin, David Hume’s
personal bette noir as represented
by John
Knox.
This leads to my
second
point, that is, how thoroughly going
of a
Skeptic was David Hume? Though he himself
seems to state that going to skeptical
extremes
is fruitless and counter-productive,
in learning
specifically what ancient Skepticism
believed
and how it operated when I delved into
Stoicism,
such a political and social move was
a matter
*of course* among the ancient Skeptics
-
whereby in principle they were the
ultimate
anti-fanatics. Donald W. Livingston
directly
links up to my discussion of necessary
versus
contingent principles whereby any *necessary*
principle whatsoever is subordinate
to a
superior contingent principle - or
mere physical
fact of specific place and time.
The very first thing I read on reopening
his book was -
QUOTE page 120
Hume argues that instead of explaining
the
operations of external objects,
the modern
philosopher *utterly annihilates all these objects* [TREATISE, 228]. The reason is that we can
form no idea of primary qualities
devoid
of the secondary qualities. Thus
if the later
are not continuous and independent
existences,
then neither are the former:
*When we exclude these sensible qualities
there remains nothing in the
universe, which
has such an existence* [TREATISE, 231] The *fundamental principle* of modern philosophy, if consistently carried
out, yields nihilism about public
objects.END
QUOTE |
So I see no reason not to say Hume is in
accord with Pyhrro and Sextus Empiricus.
This leads to the proposition that
all communication
of so-called fact and self-evident
knowledge
is actually dependent in experience
upon
the scientific methodology of the repeatability
of the experiment and the deliberate
search
for anomalies such as Hume noted in
the physical
practice of geometry that was confirmed
by
Polanyi [?] and Lobachevsky in their
non-Euclidean
geometries. Linear equations, then,
of any
type whatsoever are *gross*, that is,
*approximate*
truths since there is always the possibility
some other scale, microscopic if nothing
else or always ever-present political
or
social or economic or psychological,
will
note contamination in the experiment.
When David Hume went
to Paris
on diplomatic assignment and attended
a meeting
of the French philosophes [amongst
them Jacques
Diderot], Baron d’Holbach greeted him
at
the doorway with the question of whether
he was an atheist or not. Hume replied
he
was a *philosophical theist* whereas
d’Holbach
insisted he must be an atheist and
that since
they were all atheists here, he was
free
to state it forthrightly. But Hume
insisted
on his statement without explanation.
Now,
this cannot in any way be a
*religious* statement nor one forced
by circumstances
of any sort. Yet, in truth, I do not
know
what he meant by it. And I cannot remember
a specific statement anywhere where
he explains
it without forces of coercion immediately
looking over his shoulder - not even
in DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION published posthumously since even its publication
warranted prosecution of the executors
of
his will and the printer. So if anyone
knows
of a clear positive statement or explanation
I would appreciate it.
RICHARD SANSOM:
Gary, in the section titled *Miracles*
in
Humes An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, we find the following, as an interesting
comment from Hume that relates to your
question
about his religious sentiments:
| HUME:
I am the better pleased with the method of
reasoning here delivered, as
I think it may
serve to confound those dangerous
friends
or disguised enemies to the Christian
Religion,
who have undertaken to defend
it by the principles
of human reason.
* |
GARY. C. MOORE:
Eloquence, rhetoric are in evidence
here.
As I have observed with Epictetus,
using
customary ways of speaking gets a sympathy
from the audience which a direct approach
would lose immediately, all this simply
from
initial emotional reaction. And, as
I also
noted in Platos manner of argument,
if you
lay aside rhetorical arguments of comparison
and probability built up in stages
of abstraction
- therefore actually less and less
actually
similar and probable but seemingly
from a
common sense base - and rely solely
on logical
arguments needing mathematical precision,
you are very soon left with little
you can
say accounted for in such a fashion.
Hume
is not an enemy of rhetoric since it
is obviously
always going to be the most pervasive
and
convincing mode of conviction in any
endeavor
whatsoever. But, just as in Plato and
Epictetus,
you can use the appeal to *common sense*,
just as the opposition does to a point,
to
undermine further abstractions of common
sense by showing *common sense* no
longer
supports such statements.
Now, *common sense* and
*custom*
are the same thing to Hume, and he
says elsewhere
that one should never question custom
simply
because it is *custom* because, even
though
it has become a form of faith or *belief*,
that belief is actually founded upon
many
years, even ages, of actual experience.
So,
having *witnesses* to miracles is all
fine
and good. The exact same things happens
to
all the recorded events of history.
However,
*common sense* here is brought against
the
next stage of abstracting from *common
sense*
by retrogression, that is, Do you know
the
witnesses? From what source of information?
By what standards of reliability can
you
judge their truthfulness? Do they in
fact
*measure up*? You know the answer as
to miracles,
and the miraculous is the whole basis
of
any kind of religious faith. Compare
this
with the judgment of a mere historical
account.
If such questions are raised and cannot
be
immediately answered satisfactorily,
it is
thrown out the window without ceremony.
And
yet the judgment of the historical
account
of miracles and ordinary history starts
from
the same *common sense* point. However,
the
whole chain of reasoning from that
point
should be judged by *common sense*
at each
link where one finds the *customs*
of everyday
life if applied consistently always
brings
down accounts of miracles and many
times
brings secular historical accounts
into question.
And in this first statement, Hume has
thrown
out reason altogether in judging *Christian
religion* as if he were doing it a
favor
- a wonderful rhetorical device!
| HUME:
Our most holy religion is founded on Faith,
not on reason; and it is a sure
method of
exposing it to put it to such
a trial as
it is, by no means, fitted to
endure. To
make this more evident, let us
examine those
miracles, related in scripture;
and. not
to lose ourselves in too wide
a field, let
us confine ourselves to such
as we find in
the Pentateuch, which we shall
examine, according
to the principles of these pretended
Christians,
not as the word or testimony
of God himself,
but as the production of a mere
human writer
and historian. Here then we are
first to
consider a book, presented to
us by a barbarous
and ignorant people, written
in an age when
they ere still more barbarous,
and in all
probability long after the facts
which it
relates, corroborated by no concurring
testimony,
and resembling those fabulous
accounts, which
every nation gives of its origin.
Upon reading
this book, we find it full of
prodigies and
miracles. It gives an account
of a state
of the world and of human nature
entirely
different from the present: of
our fall from
that state: of the age of man,
extended to
near a thousand years: of the
destruction
of the world by a deluge: of
the arbitrary
choice of one people, as the
favourites of
heaven; and that people the countrymen
of
the author: of their deliverance
from bondage
by prodigies the most astonishing
imaginable:
I desire anyone to lay his hand
upon his
heart, and after a serious consideration
declare, whether he thinks that
the falsehood
of such a book, supported by
such a testimony,
would be more extraordinary and
miraculous
than all the miracles it relates;
which is,
however, necessary to make it
be received,
according to the measures of
probability
above established.
*** What we have said of miracles
may be
applied without any variation,
to prophecies;
and indeed, all prophecies are
real miracles,
and as such only, can be admitted
as proofs
of any revelation. If it did
not exceed the
capacity of human nature to foretell
future
events, it would be absurd to
employ any
prophecy as an argument for a
divine mission
or authority from heaven. So
that, upon the
whole, we may conclude, that
the Christian
Religion not only was at first
attended with
miracles, but even at this day
cannot be
believed by any reasonable person
without
one. Mere reason is insufficient
to convince
us of its veracity: and whoever
is moved
by Faith to assent to it, is
conscious of
a continued miracle in his own
person, which
subverts all the principles of
his understanding,
and gives him a determination
to believe
what is most contrary to custom
and experience. |
GARY. C. MOORE:
Everything I said at first is supported
by
everything else Hume says. What he
has in
fact done is put religion in a contamination
isolation from any kind of reason and
philosophy,
and blandly says, under those conditions
it is fully justified! But if religion
cannot
make a statement supported by or relating
to reason or philosophy, that is, *to
custom
and experience* [his final words],
then .
. . .
RICHARD SANSOM:
I liked the remark by Hume:
*So that, upon the whole, we may conclude
that the Christian religion not
only was
at first attended with miracles,
but even
at this day cannot be believed
by any reasonable
person without one. Mere reason
is insufficient
to convince us of its veracity:
and whoever
is moved by faith to assent to
it, is conscious
of a continued miracle in his
own person,
which subverts all the principles
of his
understanding, and give him a
determination
to believe what is most contrary
to custom
and experience.*
|
Fascinating and original that he makes
the
point that to accept, and base ones
faith
and religion on, miracles is to engage
in
a miracle by this very acceptance!
Or: Faith
based on miracles is itself a miracle.
Reason
and rational thought can never defeat
such
a position, and not only that, the
very act
of miraculous faith automatically rules
out
reason. The recent attempts by some
far-right
Christians to insist upon *Intelligent
Design*
[aka Creationism] being taught alongside
Darwinian Evolution in schools is an
example
of faith going up against reason and
rationality,
but with the imprimatur of claimed
scientific
legitimacy. Such a position is also
going
against *common sense.*
The four basic precepts [which are
actually
observations with attendant facts]
opined
by Darwin, which are no doubt not read
by
the Creationists, are quite commonsensical.
However the miracles that were the
creations
discussed in Genesis are anything but
commonsense.
I will forever find it almost impossible
to believe that there are actually
people
with brains who deny the discoveries
of paleontology
and paleozoology and substitute the
miracles
of the Pentateuch and the blathering
of Bishop
Usher as *proof* of Creationism.
Do we not all have more or less the
same
cognitive system that gives meaning
to *commonsense?*
Apparently not. Good sense is not 100%
common.
It is like those folks claiming that
their
lack of commonsense is a miracle! I
am beginning
to wonder, as I recall Jud suggesting,
if
there is a genetic basis for certain
kinds
of stupidity. I am struggling with
a paper
that deals with how various positions,
morals,
etc. come about during the formative
years
of life. It is a tough problem to get
my
hands around.
GARY C. MOORE:
Yes, I agree with you totally on the
Monk
bio of Wittgenstein. His bio of Russell
is
good in the philosophical parts but
the rest
of his life compared to Wittgenstein
is thoroughly
hum-drum though I never finished vol
1 and
never got to vol 2. With Wittgenstein,
not
only are you presented with by far
the best
study of his thinking I have seen,
but you
keenly wonder about the effects of
his life,
with his personal beliefs and feelings
that
make you seriously wonder what *belief*
is
- it is certainly not a statement of
faith
presented as a statement about reality,
precisely
relevant to Hume - , what *homosexuallity*
is which is far more complex than even
what
almost all homosexuals believe, and
the nature
of personally killing numerous human
beings
which may or may not be related to
his relations
with lovers he tired of or his fascination
with murder novels - certainly the
investigative
aspect of facts that do not *interpret*
themselves
in the real world is a factor - so
you wonder
because you can see a distantly possible
relation but nothing clear at all.
However,
his reading of Otto Weinegger [spell?
*SEX
AND CULTURE*?] has been demonstrated
to have
a distinct fingerprint on his manner
of philosophical
thinking which took me by surprize!
The LETTER
should
be put in the context of his desire
to get
a professorship at Edinburgh or Glasgow
betweem
1745 which required minimal religious
duties,
the failure of which Livingston, in
his book,
thinks hardened his stand against his
religious
philosophy, *false philosophy*, attackers
in AN ENQUIRY ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.
The
Livingston book PHILOSOPHICAL MELANCOLY
AND
DELIRIUM: HUMES PATHOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHY
does
the best job of relating Humes life
with
his thinking. E. C. Mossners THE LIFE
OF
DAVID HUME [Oxford, paperback, second
edition]
is the most easily available biography,
but
that is essentially all it is but with
great
detail. You should already have Humes
autobiography.
But if you can keep my sick, feeble
mind
on Hume I will look around the house
to find
if I can find some of the Hume books
I bought
in my Hume frenzy.
RICHARD SANSOM:
Upon reading the rebuttal Hume gives
to the
six charges of impiety and atheism,
I see
Hume at his best as a rhetoritician
. From
all that I have read and inferred from
Hume,
I feel strongly that he was indeed
an atheist,
though the charge of deist or agnostic
might
be more to his liking for the sake
of reputation.
Previously I stated that I believed
him to
be unconcerned with *God* in that God
plays
no part [if he does exist in some manner]
in the affairs of man and nature, but
the
more I read, the more I believe that
he felt
beyond that – that there is no such
entity
that controls the natural and personal
world
in the way most believers hold, and
in that
belief he is, by definition, an atheist.
Why , then, does he not simply come
out and
say so? I believe there are two reasons:
1] He believes that such a blatant
admission
would be impolitic and unwise and 2]
He has
more matters to attend than those having
to do with a war with prevailing theological
forces. His was always a psychologistic
interpretation
of the ways of man and such a position
clearly
leaves out the hand of God in the arrangements
of our morals and lays them all at
the feet
of perception, senses, experience,
memory,
rational thought, etc. I forgive him
his
rhetorical dance around the issues
since
he dances so well. The fact that he
defers
to Locke and Berkeley on the matter
of the
immateriality of the soul indicates
to me
that he need not argue a point previously
[in part] made by his predecessors
– i.e.
he does not have the time to argue
something
so ontologically absurd. Regarding
his morality,
I love what Adam Smith said of him
in the
letter that is contained in the first
volume
of Humes History of England: *I have
always
considered him, both in his lifetime
and
since his death, as approaching as
nearly
to the idea of a perfectly wise and
virtuous
man as perhaps the nature of human
frailty
will permit.*
By the way, I am now reading that History
of England that you so generously sent
me
and I am enjoying it fully.[One can
read
between the lines to find his sentiments
regarding the absurd religious practices
of the day that were not that far removed
from those of Humes era] You mentioned
that
you thought I have his autobiography
– I
cannot find it. Are you sure you sent
it
to me?
1a. Re2: A LETTER FROM A GNOME TO A
GENTLEMAN
RICHARD SANSOM:
Upon reading the rebuttal Hume gives
to the
six charges of impiety and atheism,
I see
Hume at his best as a rhetoritician
.
GARY C.MOORE: Yes. Livingston
makes a strong point that AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS is, in a sense,
more basic than AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING. Sentiment and custom come
before philosophical questioning and are
actually the ground from which it comes.
The pursuit of philosophy not only has an
emotional motivation, it can never be a primary
end in itself. Only clarifying and making
rationally consistent *belief*, i. e., *sentiment
and custom*, in both a publicly acceptable
mode, and privately among a group of friendly
minds where one still needs to maintain a
balanced and judicative mind can justify
philosophy and then only in a secondary role.
This is in fact what has always in every
case happened in history except when *false
philosophy* became *enthusiastic*, just as
in religion and usually becoming religious
itself, and then became socially and politically
oppressive.
RICHARD SANSOM:
From all that I have read and inferred
from
Hume, I feel strongly that he was indeed
an atheist, though the charge of deist
or
agnostic might be more to his liking
for
the sake of reputation.
GARY C.MOORE:
Taken within Humes context that *custom*,
*belief* is the primary ground all
thought
grows out of, I think he was justified
when
he insisted he was a *philosophical
theist*.
Also, there is the problem of the true
opposites
of *self* - which as a real entity
Hume did
not believe in [but then this also
brings
in the pseudo-contrast of self versus
God
which, in showing *self* to be a mere
conglomeration
of qualities shows the concept of *God*
to
be exactly the same thing so than any
such
pseudo-opposition is logically meaningless
- this is why I keep asking people
what they
mean by *God* which also applies to
*self*]
and *God* which are necessary organizing
products of the imagination - but the
imagination
of whom? - or what? One has to be able
to
make a meaningful distinction between
Gary
and Jud, even though no such things
as Gary
and Jud exist - and one needs a concept
of
the whole in order to talk about the
laws
of the universe when no such real
entity as the *universe* exists. If
one treats
*universe* and *god* as the same order
of
concepts, one then sees the use of
such words
in their true light as organizing concepts
for things one cannot really conceive
but
one still wants in some way to deal
with
in a practical way. This can be also
exemplified
in Humes rejection of *special providence*,
which involves acceptance of the reality
of miracles, and acceptance of *general
providence*.
Having read the Stoics and most especially
Marcus Aurelius keeps one see *general
providence*
as meaning the processes of the universe
through time is rational and realistic,
that
is [Hegel] *What is, is rational*,
what is
rational is
*good* because it the way it has to
be anyway,
regardless.
However, Humes
willingness
to compromise and live with Christians
was
severely tried by the loss of the professor
ship, the attempt to excommunicate
him from
the Presbyterian state church [as his
liberal
minister friends said, How can you
excommunicate
him if he does not claim to even believe
or belong?] so that, as he grew older,
what
you say seems more and more justifiable,
especially considering the troubles
he had
with the bishops of the Anglican Church
after
he had become a prominent London author,
and civil servant, and Anglicized himself
thoroughly.
RICHARD SANSOM:
Previously I stated that I believed
him to
be unconcerned with
*God* in that God plays no part [if
he does
exist in some manner] in the affairs
of man
and nature, but the more I read, the
more
I believe that he felt beyond that
– that
there is no such entity that controls
the
natural and personal world in the way
most
believers hold, and in that belief
he is,
by definition, an atheist. Why , then,
does
he not simply come out and say so?
I believe
there are two reasons: 1] He believes
that
such a blatant admission would be impolitic
and unwise and 2] He has more matters
to
attend than those having to do with
a war
with prevailing theological forces.
GARY C.MOORE:
What you say is true but also must
be combined
with what I said above about the logical
consistency of his philosophy which,
however,
as I have brought up long ago, was
actually
slowly dropped in favor of political,
economic,
and then especially historical concerns,
that is, things of imminent public
interest.
The issues of philosophy and theology
are
simply not that important to him after
about
1760. Other things take real precedence.
RICHARD SANSOM:His was always a psychologistic
interpretation of the ways of man and such
a position clearly leaves out the hand of
God in the arrangements of our morals and
lays them all at the feet of perception,
senses, experience, memory, rational thought,
etc.
GARY C.MOORE:
True, but just like Marcus Aurelius.
RICHARD:
I forgive him his rhetorical dance
around
the issues since he dances so well.
GARY C.MOORE:
I do not think there is anything to
forgive.
He is a rhetorician first and foremost.
He
is trying to convince people on serious
practical
issues. They are not going to listen
to an
atheist either then or now. That is
not socially
or politically important in and of
itself.
You should read the essays as a whole,
start
to finish. That gives you the best
rounded
picture of who Hume was.
RICHARD SANSOM:
The fact that he defers to Locke and
Berkeley
on the matter of the immateriality
of the
soul indicates to me that he need not
argue
a point previously [in part] made by
his
predecessors – i. e. he does not have
the
time to argue something so ontologically
absurd.
GARY C.MOORE:
Or, going back to the *miracle* of
believing
in miracles, how can the *immaterial*
effect
the material? He gives the believers
the
gift of that *victory*. They can have
all
the *immateriality* they want. It is
when
they say it effects matter is when
he asks
for material evidence.
RICHARD SANSOM:
Regarding his morality, I love what
Adam
Smith said of him in the letter that
is contained
in the first volume of Humes History
of England:
*I have always considered him, both
in his
lifetime and since his death, as approaching
as nearly to the idea of a perfectly
wise
and virtuous man as perhaps the nature
of
human frailty will permit.* By the
way, I
am now reading that History of England
that
you so generously sent me and I am
enjoying
it fully.[One can read between the
lines
to find his sentiments regarding the
absurd
religious practices of the day that
were
not that far removed from those of
Humes
era].
GARY C.MOORE:
Yes, through the time of Henry II it
is BLACK.
But note the bishops lonely defense
of Richard
II, the qualification that, despite
everything
else, the Church was the ONLY real
force
for maintaining peace in Europe against
the
universal bloodlust of kings [that
is, before
the Reformation], the results of unjust
punishment
or groups for the actions of a few
of their
members, and his defense of the *enthusiastic
religious*, the Quakers, against Anglican
persecution - What harm have they done
anybody?
[ESSAYS].
RICHARD SANSOM:
You mentioned that you thought I have
his
autobiography – I cannot find it. Are
you
sure you sent it to me?
GARY C.MOORE:
It is a famous piece. It is in almost
all
anthologies, entitled MY OWN LIFE.
|
| The text of "My Own Life" was drawn from the 1898 Green and Grose
edition. Page numbers identifying folios
refer to page numbers found in Green and
Grose. |
Text -
MY OWN LIFE. PAST MASTERS. |
Hume: MOL Para. 1/21 p. 1
It is difficult for a man to
speak long of
himself without vanity; therefore,
I shall
be short. It may be thought an
instance of
vanity that I pretend at all
to write my
life; but this Narrative shall
contain little
more than the History of my Writings;
as,
indeed, almost all my life has
been spent
in literary pursuits and occupations.
The
first success of most of my writings
was
not such as to be an object of
vanity.
Hume: MOL Para. 2/21 p. 1 I was
born the
26th of April 1711, old style,
at Edinburgh.
I was of a good family, both
by father and
mother: my father's family is
a branch of
the Earl of Home's, or Hume's;
and my ancestors
had been proprietors of the estate,
which
my brother possesses, for several
generations.
My mother was daughter of Sir
David Falconer,
President of the College of Justice:
the
title of Lord Halkerton came
by succession
to her brother.
Hume: MOL Para. 3/21 p. 1 My
family, however,
was not rich, and being myself
a younger
brother, my patrimony, according
to the mode
of my country, was of course
very slender.
My father, who passed for a man
of parts,
died when I was an infant, leaving
me, with
an elder brother and a sister,
under the
care of our mother, a woman of
singular merit,
who, though young and handsome,
devoted herself
entirely to the rearing and educating
of
her children. I passed through
the ordinary
course of education with success,
and was
seized very early with a passion
for literature,
which has been the ruling passion
of my life,
and the great source of my enjoyments.
My
studious disposition, my sobriety,
and my
industry, gave my family a notion
that the
law was a proper profession for
me; but I
found an unsurmountable aversion
to every
thing but the pursuits of philosophy
and
general learning; and while they
fancied
I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius,
Cicero
and Virgil were the authors which
I was secretly
devouring.
Hume: MOL Para. 4/21 p. 2 My
very slender
fortune, however, being unsuitable
to this
plan of life, and my health being
a little
broken by my ardent application,
I was tempted,
or rather forced, to make a very
feeble trial
for entering into a more active
scene of
life. In 1734, I went to Bristol,
with some
recommendations to eminent merchants,
but
in a few months found that scene
totally
unsuitable to me. I went over
to France,
with a view of prosecuting my
studies in
a country retreat; and I there
laid that
plan of life, which I have steadily
and successfully
pursued. I resolved to make a
very rigid
frugality supply my deficiency
of fortune,
to maintain unimpaired my independency,
and
to regard every object as contemptible,
except
the improvement of my talents
in literature.
Hume: MOL Para. 5/21 p. 2 During
my retreat
in France, first at Reims, but
chiefly at
La Fleche, in Anjou, I composed
my Treatise
of Human Nature. After passing
three years
very agreeably in that country,
I came over
to London in 1737. In the end
of 1738, I
published my Treatise, and immediately
went
down to my mother and my brother,
who lived
at his country house, and was
employing himself
very judiciously and successfully
in the
improvement of his fortune.
Hume: MOL Para. 6/21 p. 2 Never
literary
attempt was more unfortunate
than my Treatise
of Human Nature. It fell dead-born
from the
press, without reaching such
distinction,
as even to excite a murmur among
the zealots.
But being naturally of a cheerful
and sanguine
temper, I very soon recovered
the blow, and
prosecuted with great ardour
my studies in
the country. In 1742, I printed
at Edinburgh
the first part of my Essays:
the work was
favourably received, and soon
made me entirely
forget my former disappointment.
I continued
with my mother and brother in
the country,
and in that time recovered the
knowledge
of the Greek language, which
I had too much
neglected in my early youth.
Hume: MOL Para. 7/21 p. 2 In
1745, I received
a letter from the Marquis of
Annandale, inviting
me to come and live with him
in England;
I found also, that the friends
and family
of that young nobleman were desirous
of putting
him under my care and direction,
for the
state of his mind and health
required it.
I lived with him a twelvemonth.
My appointments
during that time made a considerable
accession
to my small fortune. I then received
an invitation
from General St. Clair to attend
him as a
secretary to his expedition,
which was at
first meant against Canada, but
ended in
an incursion on the coast of
France. Next
year, to wit, 1747, I received
an invitation
from the General to attend him
in the same
station in his military embassy
to the courts
of Vienna and Turin. I then wore
the uniform
of an officer, and was introduced
at these
courts as aide-de-camp to the
general, along
with Sir Harry Erskine and Captain
Grant,
now General Grant. These two
years were almost
the only interruptions which
my studies have
received during the course of
my life: I
passed them agreeably and in
good company;
and my appointments, with my
frugality, had
made me reach a fortune, which
I called independent,
though most of my friends were
inclined to
smile when I said so; in short,
I was now
master of near a thousand pounds.
Hume: MOL Para. 8/21 p. 3 I had
always entertained
a notion, that my want of success
in publishing
the Treatise of Human Nature,
had proceeded
more from the manner than the
matter, and
that I had been guilty of a very
usual indiscretion,
in going to the press too early.
I, therefore,
cast the first part of that work
anew in
the Enquiry concerning Human
Understanding,
which was published while I was
at Turin.
But this piece was at first little
more successful
than the Treatise of Human Nature.
On my
return from Italy, I had the
mortification
to find all England in a ferment,
on account
of Dr. Middleton's Free Enquiry,
while my
performance was entirely overlooked
and neglected.
A new edition, which had been
published at
London, of my Essays, moral and
political,
met not with a much better reception.
Hume: MOL Para. 9/21 p. 3 Such
is the force
of natural temper, that these
disappointments
made little or no impression
on me. I went
down in 1749, and lived two years
with my
brother at his country house,
for my mother
was now dead. I there composed
the second
part of my Essays, which I called
Political
Discourses, and also my Enquiry
concerning
the Principles of Morals, which
is another
part of my treatise that I cast
anew. Meanwhile,
my bookseller, A. Millar, informed
me, that
my former publications (all but
the unfortunate
Treatise) were beginning to be
the subject
of conversation; that the sale
of them was
gradually increasing, and that
new editions
were demanded. Answers by Reverends,
and
Right Reverends, came out two
or three in
a year; and I found, by Dr. Warburton's
railing,
that the books were beginning
to be esteemed
in good company. However, I had
fixed a resolution,
which I inflexibly maintained,
never to reply
to any body; and not being very
irascible
in my temper, I have easily kept
myself clear
of all literary squabbles. These
symptoms
of a rising reputation gave me
encouragement,
as I was ever more disposed to
see the favourable
than unfavourable side of things;
a turn
of mind which it is more happy
to possess,
than to be born to an estate
of ten thousand
a year.
Hume: MOL Para. 10/21 p. 4 In
1751, I removed
from the country to the town,
the true scene
for a man of letters. In 1752,
were published
at Edinburgh, where I then lived,
my Political
Discourses, the only work of
mine that was
successful on the first publication.
It was
well received abroad and at home.
In the
same year was published at London,
my Enquiry
concerning the Principles of
Morals; which,
in my own opinion (who ought
not to judge
on that subject), is of all my
writings,
historical, philosophical, or
literary, incomparably
the best. It came unnoticed and
unobserved
into the world.
Hume: MOL Para. 11/21 p. 4 In
1752, the Faculty
of Advocates chose me their Librarian,
an
office from which I received
little or no
emolument, but which gave me
the command
of a large library. I then formed
the plan
of writing the History of England;
but being
frightened with the notion of
continuing
a narrative through a period
of 1700 years,
I commenced with the accession
of the House
of Stuart, an epoch when, I thought,
the
misrepresentations of faction
began chiefly
to take place. I was, I own,
sanguine in
my expectations of the success
of this work.
I thought that I was the only
historian,
that had at once neglected present
power,
interest, and authority, and
the cry of popular
prejudices; and as the subject
was suited
to every capacity, I expected
proportional
applause. But miserable was my
disappointment:
I was assailed by one cry of
reproach, disapprobation,
and even detestation; English,
Scotch, and
Irish, Whig and Tory, churchman
and sectary,
freethinker and religionist,
patriot and
courtier, united in their rage
against the
man, who had presumed to shed
a generous
tear for the fate of Charles
I. and the Earl
of Strafford; and after the first
ebullitions
of their fury were over, what
was still more
mortifying, the book seemed to
sink into
oblivion. Mr. Millar told me,
that in a twelvemonth
he sold only forty-five copies
of it. I scarcely,
indeed, heard of one man in the
three kingdoms,
considerable for rank or letters,
that could
endure the book. I must only
except the primate
of England, Dr. Herring, and
the primate
of Ireland, Dr. Stone, which
seem two odd
exceptions. These dignified prelates
separately
sent me messages not to be discouraged.
Hume: MOL Para. 12/21 p. 5 I
was, however,
I confess, discouraged; and had
not the war
been at that time breaking out
between France
and England, I had certainly
retired to some
provincial town of the former
kingdom, have
changed my name, and never more
have returned
to my native country. But as
this scheme
was not now practicable, and
the subsequent
volume was considerably advanced,
I resolved
to pick up courage and to persevere.
Hume: MOL Para. 13/21 p. 5 In
this interval,†1
I published at London my Natural
History
of Religion, along with some
other small
pieces: its public entry was
rather obscure,
except only that Dr. Hurd wrote
a pamphlet
against it, with all the illiberal
petulance,
arrogance, and scurrility which
distinguish
the Warburtonian school. This
pamphlet gave
me some consolation for the otherwise
indifferent
reception of my performance.
Hume: MOL Para. 14/21 p. 5 In
1756, two years
after the fall of the first volume,
was published
the second volume of my History,
containing
the period from the death of
Charles I. till
the Revolution. This performance
happened
to give less displeasure to the
Whigs, and
was better received. It not only
rose itself,
but helped to buoy up its unfortunate
brother.
Hume: MOL Para. 15/21 p. 5 But
though I had
been taught by experience, that
the Whig
party were in possession of bestowing
all
places, both in the state and
in literature,
I was so little inclined to yield
to their
senseless clamour, that in about
a hundred
alterations, which farther study,
reading,
or reflection engaged me to make
in the reigns
of the first two Stuarts, I have
made all
of them invariably to the Tory
side. It is
ridiculous to consider the English
constitution
before that period as a regular
plan of liberty.
Hume: MOL Para. 16/21 p. 6 In
1759, I published
my History of the House of Tudor.
The clamour
against this performance was
almost equal
to that against the History of
the two first
Stuarts. The reign of Elizabeth
was particularly
obnoxious. But I was now callous
against
the impressions of public folly,
and continued
very peaceably and contentedly
in my retreat
at Edinburgh, to finish, in two
volumes,
the more early part of the English
History,
which I gave to the public in
1761, with
tolerable, and but tolerable
success.
Hume: MOL Para. 17/21 p. 6 But,
notwithstanding
this variety of winds and seasons,
to which
my writings had been exposed,
they had still
been making such advances, that
the copy-money
given me by the booksellers,
much exceeded
any thing formerly known in England;
I was
become not only independent,
but opulent.
I retired to my native country
of Scotland,
determined never more to set
my foot out
of it; and retaining the satisfaction
of
never having preferred a request
to one great
man, or even making advances
of friendship
to any of them. As I was now
turned of fifty,
I thought of passing all the
rest of my life
in this philosophical manner,
when I received,
in 1763, an invitation from the
Earl of Hertford,
with whom I was not in the least
acquainted,
to attend him on his embassy
to Paris, with
a near prospect of being appointed
secretary
to the embassy; and, in the meanwhile,
of
performing the functions of that
office.
This offer, however inviting,
I at first
declined, both because I was
reluctant to
begin connexions with the great,
and because
I was afraid that the civilities
and gay
company of Paris, would prove
disagreeable
to a person of my age and humour:
but on
his lordship's repeating the
invitation,
I accepted of it. I have every
reason, both
of pleasure and interest, to
think myself
happy in my connexions with that
nobleman,
as well as afterwards with his
brother, General
Conway.
Hume: MOL Para. 18/21 p. 6 Those
who have
not seen the strange effects
of modes, will
never imagine the reception I
met with at
Paris, from men and women of
all ranks and
stations. The more I resiled
from their excessive
civilities, the more I was loaded
with them.
There is, however, a real satisfaction
in
living at Paris, from the great
number of
sensible, knowing, and polite
company with
which that city abounds above
all places
in the universe. I thought once
of settling
there for life.
Hume: MOL Para. 19/21 p. 7 I
was appointed
secretary to the embassy; and
in summer 1765,
Lord Hertford left me, being
appointed Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland. I was
charge d'affaires
till the arrival of the Duke
of Richmond,
towards the end of the year.
In the beginning
of 1766, I left Paris, and next
summer went
to Edinburgh, with the same view
as formerly,
of burying myself in a philosophical
retreat.
I returned to that place, not
richer, but
with much more money, and a much
larger income,
by means of Lord Hertford's friendship,
than
I left it; and I was desirous
of trying what
superfluity could produce, as
I had formerly
made an experiment of a competency.
But in
1767, I received from Mr. Conway
an invitation
to be Under-secretary; and this
invitation,
both the character of the person,
and my
connexions with Lord Hertford,
prevented
me from declining. I returned
to Edinburgh
in
1769, very opulent (for I possessed
a revenue
of 1000 l. a year), healthy,
and though somewhat
stricken in years, with the prospect
of enjoying
long my ease, and of seeing the
increase
of my reputation.
Hume: MOL Para. 20/21 p. 7 In
spring 1775,
I was struck with a disorder
in my bowels,
which at first gave me no alarm,
but has
since, as I apprehend it, become
mortal and
incurable. I now reckon upon
a speedy dissolution.
I have suffered very little pain
from my
disorder; and what is more strange,
have,
notwithstanding the great decline
of my person,
never suffered a moment's abatement
of my
spirits; insomuch, that were
I to name the
period of my life, which I should
most choose
to pass over again, I might be
tempted to
point to this later period. I
possess the
same ardour as ever in study,
and the same
gaiety in company. I consider,
besides, that
a man of sixty-five, by dying,
cuts off only
a few years of infirmities; and
though I
see many symptoms of my literary
reputation's
breaking out at last with additional
lustre,
I knew that I could have but
few years to
enjoy it. It is difficult to
be more detached
from life than I am at present.
Hume: MOL Para. 21/21 p. 7 To
conclude historically
with my own character. I am,
or rather was
(for that is the style I must
now use in
speaking of myself, which emboldens
me the
more to speak my sentiments);
I was, I say,
a man of mild dispositions, of
command of
temper, of an open, social, and
cheerful
humour, capable of attachment,
but little
susceptible of enmity, and of
great moderation
in all my passions. Even my love
of literary
fame, my ruling passion, never
soured my
temper, notwithstanding my frequent
disappointments.
My company was not unacceptable
to the young
and careless, as well as to the
studious
and literary; and as I took a
particular
pleasure in the company of modest
women,
I had no reason to be displeased
with the
reception I met with from them.
In a word,
though most men anywise eminent,
have found
reason to complain of calumny,
I never was
touched, or even attacked by
her baleful
tooth: and though I wantonly
exposed myself
to the rage of both civil and
religious factions,
they seemed to be disarmed in
my behalf of
their wonted fury. My friends
never had occasion
to vindicate any one circumstance
of my character
and conduct: not but that the
zealots, we
may well suppose, would have
been glad to
invent and propagate any story
to my disadvantage,
but they could never find any
which they
thought would wear the face of
probability.
I cannot say there is no vanity
in making
this funeral oration of myself,
but I hope
it is not a misplaced one; and
this is a
matter of fact which is easily
cleared and
ascertained. April 18, 1776.
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Evans Experientialism 
