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HEIDEGGER THE NAZI PROSELYTISER
The Banality of Banality
Heidegger (Nazi membership card number 312589) worshipped Adolf Hitler
From April 1933 through April 1934, Heidegger
served as the heavy-handed and controversial
rector of Freiburg University, and in the
early months of his tenure he not only lent
his name and efforts to the Nazi revolution
but also became an outspoken propagandist
for Hitler's foreign and domestic policies.
During this period he rushed to establish
the Der Fuhrer principle at the university
(October I, 1933), thereby making himself
the virtual dictator of the campus.
He applied the Nazi "cleansing laws
"to the Freiburg University student
body (November 3) and thus ended financial
aid for "Jewish or Marxist studentsll
or anyone who fit the description of a "non-Aryan"
in Nazi law. On the same day he told the
assembled students that lIthe FiihleI himself
and he alone is German reality and its law,
today and for the future, 1I and a week later
(November IO) he took to the radio to urge
ratification of Hitler's withdrawal of Germany
from the League of Nations.
In private he engaged in the more despicable
work of a Nazi informer. On September 29,
1933, he secretly denounced a colleague,
Professor Hermann Staudinger, for having
been a pacifist during the Great War, and
when the Gestapo confirmed his tip, Heidegger
quietly urged the governmeno fire the man
without a pension (February IO,
1934). He also wrote a secret and damning
letter to the head of a Nazi organization
against a former friend and colleague, Professor
Eduard Baumgarten (who, he said, had "very
actively frequented the Jew Frankel"),
and thereby helped get the man suspended
from a teaching job (December 16, 1933).
As late as 1938 he prevented the young Max
Muller from getting an academic position
by informing the administration of Freiburg
University that:" Muller was "unfavorably
disposed" to the Nazi regime".ented
the young Max Muller from getting an academic
position by informing the administration
of Freiburg University that:" Muller
was "unfavorably disposed" to the
Nazi regime".
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| Hannah Arendt.. |
At home with his wife. |
Heidegger's Frau. |
Heidegger
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University of Freiburg
At the University of Freiburg he studied
Catholic theology and medieval Christian
philosophy. In fact, his interest in philosophy
had already begun when, at secondary school,
he started an intensive study of the late
19th-century Catholic philosopher Franz Brentano,
author of a "descriptive" psychology,
as presented in Brentano's Von der mannigfachen
Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (1862;
"On the Manifold Meaning of Being According
to Aristotle").
For the rest of his life Heidegger was to
contemplate the possibility that there is
a basic sense of the verb "to be"
that lies behind its variety of usages. From
his early study of Brentano also stems his
enthusiasm for the Greeks, especially the
pre-Socratics, whose thought marks the dawning
of the penetrating reflection that transpired
before the cleavage of thinking into poetry,
philosophy, and science. (see also Index:
ontology)
The philosophy of Heidegger is obviously
dependent upon the philosophers prior to
Socrates, upon Plato and Aristotle, and upon
the Gnostics. He was particularly influenced,
however--positively or negatively--by several
19th- and early 20th-century philosophers:
by the Danish theological thinker Søren Kierkegaard
and the Dionysian vitalist Friedrich Nietzsche,
founders of Existentialism; by the historical
vitalist Wilhelm Dilthey, noted for directing
the attention of philosophers to the human
and historical sciences; and by the founder
of Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl.
While still in his 20s, Heidegger studied
at Freiburg with Heinrich Rickert, later
of the southwest school of axiological Kantianism,
and with Husserl, who was then already famous.
Husserl's Phenomenology, and especially his
struggle against the intrusion of psychology
into essential studies of man--which he felt
should, instead, be conducted on the philosophical
level--determined the background of the young
Heidegger's doctoral dissertation (1914).
Consequently, what Heidegger later said and
wrote about anxiety, thinking, forgetfulness,
curiosity, distress, care, or awe was not
meant as psychology; and what he said about
man, publicness, and other-directedness was
not intended to be sociology, anthropology,
or political science. His utterances were
meant to disclose ways of Being..
Being and Time.
HHis magnum opus: "Being and Time."
Heidegger started teaching at the University
of Freiburg during the winter semester of
1915 and earned his habilitation through
a study of the 13th-century British Franciscan
philosopher Duns Scotus. In this position,
as a colleague of Husserl, Heidegger.jpg) was expected to carry the  Phenomenological movement further along in
the spirit of his former master. As a religiously
inclined young man, however, he went his
own way instead and in 1927 astonished the
German philosophical world with Sein und
Zeit (Being and Time, 1962)--a work that,
though almost unreadable, was immediately
felt to be of prime importance, whatever
its relation to Husserl might be. In spite
of, or perhaps partly because of, its intriguingly
difficult style, this book was acclaimed
as a deep and important work not only in
German-speaking countries but also in Latin
countries, where Phenomenology was already
well known. It strongly influenced Jean-Paul
Sartre in France and other Existentialists,
and, despite Heidegger's protestations, he
was classed, on the strength of this book,
as the leading atheistic Existentialist.
Its reception in the English-speaking world,
however, was rather chilly, and its influence
was negligible for several decades.
In Being and Time, Heidegger's declared purpose
is to bring to light what it means for a
man to be, or, more accurately, how it is
to be. This leads to a more fundamental question:
what it means to ask "What is the meaning
of Being?" These questions lie behind
the obviousness of everyday life and, therefore,
also behind the empirical questions of natural
science. They are usually overlooked because
they are too near to be grasped in everyday
life. One might say that the whole prophetic
mission of Heidegger amounts to making each
man ask that question with maximum involvement.
Whether he will ever arrive at any definite
answer or not is, in the present crisis of
mankind, of secondary importance.
This crisis, according to Heidegger, stems
from a deep fall (Verfall) that Western thought
has undergone, owing to a one-sided technical
development, a development that results in
alienation (Entfremdung), or, as expressed
in terms more central to Heidegger's thought,
in a "highly inauthentic way of being."
Fallenness, or inauthenticity, belongs to
the inescapable way of human existence; i.
e., it is an existential, an essential, potentiality
(Möglichkeit), but epochs and individuals
may be coloured by it in different degrees.
This somewhat stern outlook was mitigated,
however, in Heidegger's later writings, in
which he suggests that there are possibilities
of redemption by "thinking of Being"
and, thus, again coming closer to Being--a
process in which, he believes, continental
European rather than Eastern or other Western
countries are to lead the way. (see also
Index: authentic existence)
The wealth of ideas contained in Being and
Time is best discussed, however, in conjunction
with those developed in another, short work,
Was ist physik? (1929; What Is physics?,
1949). At the time of publishing Being and
Time, Heidegger had been a professor ordinarius
at Marburg for several years (since 1923).
He resigned that post and, in 1928, returned
to Freiburg, this time as Husserl's successor.
What Is physics? was Heidegger's inaugural
lecture; it elaborates one of his favourite
themes, das Nichts ("nothing");
i. e., the no-thing. As Heidegger learned
from Husserl, it is the phenomenological
and not the scientific method that unveils
man's ways of Being. Thus, in pursuing this
method, Heidegger comes into conflict with
the dichotomy of the subject-object relation,
which has traditionally implied that man,
as knower, is something (some-thing) within
an environment that is against him. This
relation, however, must be transcended. The
deepest knowing, on the contrary, is a matter
of phainesthai (Greek: "to show itself"
or "to be in the light"), the word
from which phenomenology, as a method, is
derived. Something is just "there"
in the light. Thus, the distinction between
subject and object is not immediate but comes
only later through conceptualization, as
in the sciences.
As an aid in the effort to get back to "Thinking
of Being" and its redemptive effects,
Heidegger employs linguistic or hermeneutical
techniques. He develops his own German, his
own Greek, and his own kind of etymologies.
He coins, for example, about 100 new complex
words ending with "-being." In
reading his works one must, thus, translate
many of its key terms back into Greek words
and then consider his free, often special
(but never uninteresting), interpretations
and etymologies. (see also Index: language)
Man stands out (ex-sists, not merely ex-ists)
from things, says Heidegger in Being and
Time, never being completely absorbed by
them, but nevertheless being nothing
(no-thing) apart from them. Man dwells in
a world that he has been, and continues to
be, thrown into until death. Being thrown
into things, being-there (Da-sein), he falls
away (Verfall) and is on the point of being
submerged into things. He is continually
a pro-ject (Ent-wurf); but periodically,
or even normally, he may be submerged in
things to such a degree that he is temporarily
absorbed (Aufgehen in). He is then nobody
in particular; and a structure that Heidegger
calls das Man ("the they") is revealed,
which recalls certain Anglo-American sociological
criticisms of modern industrial society that
stress man's "other-directedness,"
his tendency to measure himself in terms
of his peers. But Heidegger's phenomenological
metaphors avoid social science terms as much
as possible in favour of ontological one.
Characteristic of das Man are idle talk
(Gerede) and curiosity (Neugier). In Gerede,
talker and listener do not stand in any genuine
personal relation or in any intimate relation
to what is talked about; hence, it leads
to shallowness. Curiosity is a form of distraction,
a need for the "new," a need for
something "different," without
real interest or capability of wonder. (see
also Index: Dasein)
But there is a mood, anxiety or dread (Angst),
that functions to disclose (dis-close) authentic
being, freedom (Frei-sein), as a potentiality.
It manifests the freedom of man to choose
himself and take hold of himself. The relevance
of time, of the finiteness of human existence,
is then experienced as a freedom to meet
his own death (das Freisein für den Tod),
a preparedness for and continuous relatedness
to his own death (Sein zum Tode). In anxiety,
all entities (Seiendes) sink away into a
"nothing and nowhere," man hovers
in himself as ex-sisting, being nowhere at
home (Un-heimlichkeit, Un-zu-hause). He faces
no-thing-ness (das Nichts); and all average,
obvious everydayness disappears--and this
is good, since he now faces the potentiality
of authentic being. (see also Index: nothingness)
Thus, the "sober" (nüchtern) anxiety
and the implied confrontation with death
are for Heidegger primarily of methodological
importance: fundamentals are revealed. Among
the structures revealed are potentialities
for being joyfully active (". . . knowing
joy [die wissende Heiterkeit] is a door to
the eternal"). Anxiety opens man up
to Being. This does not imply that Being
partakes in the dark aspect of dread, however;
Being is associated with "light"
and with "the joyful" (das Heitere).
Being "calls the tune"; "to
think Being" is to arrive at one's (true)
home. Though Heideggerian students are often
baffled by just what Being and thinking stand
for, it is clear that Heidegger opposes a
cult of mankind and wishes to call attention
to something greater.
Later life.
In the early 1930s there occurred an event
in the thought of Heidegger that scholars
call his Kehre ("turning around"),
which is said by some specialists to involve
a turning away from the problem of Being
and Time. This was denied by Heidegger himself,
who insisted that he had been asking the
same basic question since his youth, but
in his later years he clearly became more
reluctant to offer any answer. He did not
even indicate a way in which to reach an
answer to the basic problem of Being and
Time. At about the time of the Kehre, there
also occurred Heidegger's short but eloquent
pro-Nazi participation in the cultural politics
of the Third Reich, which became a matter
of considerable controversy. Even before
Adolf Hitler assumed power in November 1933,
German universities were exposed to heavy
pressures. They were supposed to support
the "national revolution" and eliminate
Jewish scholars and doctrines (such as relativity).
The anti-Nazi scientist who had been the
rector at Freiburg resigned in protest, and
the teaching staff unanimously elected Heidegger
as his successor. (see also Index: National
Socialism)
An Affirmation of Nazism
Heidegger's inauguration speech ("The
German University's Self-Affirmation")
was widely declared to be an affirmation
of Nazism. To be sure, he divided studenasks
into work service, military service, and
scientific service; but this fell within
the area of the authoritarian educational
policy of Plato, and the speech ended not
with a "Heil, Hitler!" but with
a quotation from Plato's Republic: "All
greahings stand in peril." The speech
turned against scientific specialization;
it urged the asking of the question "What
is it to be?"; and it warned against
losing oneself in "things" (Seiendes;
opposite das Sein). On other occasions, however,
Heidegger gave solidly pro-Hitler speeches.
"The Führer himself," he said,
"and he alone is the German reality,
present and future, and its law." In
short, Heidegger succumbed to Hitlerism but
not to Nazi cultural policy or philosophy.
Under some pressure, Heidegger joined the
Nazi Party and did not try to leave it. His
relations to the party, however, and to the
whole Nazi environment rapidly deteriorated.
He resigned as rector as early as the beginning
of 1934. After World War II, Heidegger characterized
Hitlerism as the historical explosion of
a structural sickness in mankind as a whole
and expressed concern that it would take
time to get rid of the poison.
In November 1944 Heidegger terminated his
university lectures, and in 1945 the occupying
powers forbade him to take up official lecturing
again. He was "investigated"; but
his support of Hitler in 1933-34 was not
found to be of the serious, "active"
kind, and he did not lose his professional
rights. His status remained a matter of controversy,
however, until he reached the age of retirement
in 1959. Nevertheless, he gave influential
regular lectures in the years 1951-58, and
his attitude in 1933-34 did not affect his
strong position within the international
Phenomenological movement.
Assessment. Perhaps the specific pretension
of Heidegger's phenomenological method rests
on a grandiose illusion, and perhaps the
search for thinking Being is merely a disguised
quest for a kind of belief in God; perhaps
his abstruse terminology is only a mask covering
and mystifying a more traditional approach.
Such irreverent evaluations would scarcely
be unsympathetic to Heidegger, if joined
with the inteno verify or falsify it by genuinely
following his own path through his writings.
After all, he asks, or rather, provokes,
us to question, not to listen to answers.
It is, therefore, misleading to present Heidegger's
philosophy as a set of clearly understandable
results. His metaphors must remain, rather
than be translated into a usual philosophical
terminology that he rejected. ( A. D. N.)
MAJOR WORKS.
"Das Realitätsproblem in der modernen
Philosophie," Philosophisches Jahrbuch
der Görresgesellschaft, 25 (1912); Die Lehre
vom Urteil im Psychologismus: Ein kritisch-positiver
Beitrag zur Logik (1914); Die Kategorien-
und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (1916);
"Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft,"
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische
Kritik, 161 (1916); Sein und Zeit: Erste
Hälfte, first as a contribution to the Jahrbuch
für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung,
8
(1927), then as a separate book (1927; 11th
ed., 1967; Being and Time, 1962); Kant und
das Problem der physik (1929; Eng. trans.
by James Churchill, Kant and the Problem
of physics, 1962); Vom Wesen des Grundes
(1929; The Essence of Reasons, 1969); Was
ist physik? (1929; 10th ed., 1969; "What
Is physics?" in the selective volume
Existence and Being, ed. by W. Brock, 1949);
Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität
(1933); Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung
(lecture of 1936, printed 1937; Eng. trans.
in Existence and Being); Platons Lehre von
der Wahrheit, first as a contribution to
Geistige Überlieferung (1942), then in book
form (1947), Eng. trans. in William Barrett
and H. D. Aiken (eds.), Philosophy in the
Twentieth Century, vol. 2 (1962); Vom Wesen
der Wahrheit (1943, from lectures given 1930-32;
4th ed.,
1961; Eng. trans. in Existence and Being);
Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (1944;
3rd ed., 1963); Brief über den "Humanismus,"
first with Platons Lehre . . . (1947), then
separately (1949), Eng. trans. in Philosophy
in the Twentieth Century; Holzwege (1950;
4th ed., 1963); Einführung in die physik
(1953; 3rd ed., 1967; An Introduction to
physics, 1959); Der Feldweg (1953; 4th ed.,
1969); Voträge und Aufsätze (1954; 3rd ed.,
1967); Was heisst Denken? (1954; What Is
Called Thinking?, 1968); Aus der Erfahrung
des Denkens (1954); Was ist das--die Philosophie?
(1956; What Is Philosophy?, 1958); Zur Seinsfrage
(1956; The Question of Being, 1958); Der
Satz vom Grund
(1957); Identität und Differenz (1957; Essays
in physics: Identity and Difference; 1960);
Unterwegs zur Sprache (1959; On the Way to
Language, 1971); Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,
(1960; Eng. trans. in A. Hofstadter and R.
Kuhns [eds.], Philosophies of Art and Beauty,
1964); Nietzsche, 2 vol. (1961); Die Frage
nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen
Grundsätzen (1962; What Is a Thing?, 1967);
Kants These über das Sein (1962).
BIBLIOGRAPHY. H. Albert, Traktat über kritische
Vernunft (1968), a critique of Heidegger's
conception of cognition as revelation; A.
De Waelhens, La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger,
7th ed. (1971); H. Feick, Index zu Heideggers
Sein und Zeit (1961), a useful collection
of definitions and a survey of occurrences
of key terms; M. Grene, "Heidegger,
Martin," in P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, vol. 3 (1967), an attempt
to furnish an understandable translation
and a concentrated survey of Heideggerian
conceptions; H. Lübbe, "Bibliographie
der Heidegger-Litteratur 1917-1955,"
Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung,
vol. 11 (1957), excellent; G. Lukács, "Heidegger
redivivus," in Sinn und Form, 1:37-62
(1949), an influential philosophical and
Marxist evaluation of the work and influence
of Heidegger; J. Macquarrie, An Existentialisheology:
A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann (1955);
A. Naess, "Heidegger," in Four
Modern Philosophers: Carnap, Wittgenstein,
Heidegger, Sartre (1968); O. Pöggeler, Der
Denkweg Martin Heideggers (1963), and Philosophie
und Politik bei Heidegger (1972); George
Steiner, Heidegger (1978; U. S. title, Martin
Heidegger, 1979). Later studies include Paul
A. Bové, Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and
Modern American Poetry (1980); Steven L.
Bindeman, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, The
Politics of Silence (1981); Henry G. Wolz,
Plato and Heidegger: In Search of Selfhood
(1981); David R. Mason, Time and Providence
(1982).
Perhaps the specific pretension of Heidegger's
phenomenological method rests on a grandiose
illusion, and perhaps the search for thinking
Being is merely a disguised quest for a kind
of belief in God; perhaps his abstruse terminology
is only a mask covering and mystifying a
more traditional approach. Such irreverent
evaluations would scarcely be unsympathetic
to Heidegger, if joined with the inteno verify
or falsify it by genuinely following his
own path through his writings. After all,
he asks, or rather, provokes, us to question,
not to listen to answers. It is, therefore,
misleading to present Heidegger's philosophy
as a set of clearly understandable results.
His metaphors must remain, rather than be
translated into a usual philosophical terminology
that he rejected. ( A.D.N.)
MAJOR WORKS.
"Das Realitätsproblem in der modernen
Philosophie," Philosophisches Jahrbuch
der Görresgesellschaft, 25 (1912); Die Lehre
vom Urteil im Psychologismus: Ein kritisch-positiver
Beitrag zur Logik (1914); Die Kategorien-
und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (1916);
"Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft,"
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische
Kritik, 161 (1916); Sein und Zeit: Erste
Hälfte, first as a contribution to the Jahrbuch
für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung,
8 (1927), then as a separate book (1927;
11th ed., 1967; Being and Time, 1962); Kant
und das Problem der physik (1929; Eng. trans.
by James Churchill, Kant and the Problem
of physics, 1962); Vom Wesen des Grundes
(1929; The Essence of Reasons, 1969); Was
ist physik? (1929; 10th ed., 1969; "What
Is physics?" in the selective volume
Existence and Being, ed. by W. Brock, 1949);
Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität
(1933); Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung
(lecture of 1936, printed 1937; Eng. trans.
in Existence and Being); Platons Lehre von
der Wahrheit, first as a contribution to
Geistige Überlieferung (1942), then in book
form (1947), Eng. trans. in William Barrett
and H.D. Aiken (eds.), Philosophy in the
Twentieth Century, vol. 2 (1962); Vom Wesen
der Wahrheit (1943, from lectures given 1930-32;
4th ed., 1961; Eng. trans. in Existence and
Being); Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung
(1944; 3rd ed., 1963); Brief über den "Humanismus,"
first with Platons Lehre . . . (1947), then
separately (1949), Eng. trans. in Philosophy
in the Twentieth Century; Holzwege (1950;
4th ed., 1963); Einführung in die physik
(1953; 3rd ed., 1967; An Introduction to
physics, 1959); Der Feldweg (1953; 4th ed.,
1969); Voträge und Aufsätze (1954; 3rd ed.,
1967); Was heisst Denken? (1954; What Is
Called Thinking?, 1968); Aus der Erfahrung
des Denkens (1954); Was ist das--die Philosophie?
(1956; What Is Philosophy?, 1958); Zur Seinsfrage
(1956; The Question of Being, 1958); Der
Satz vom Grund (1957); Identität und Differenz
(1957; Essays in physics: Identity and Difference;
1960); Unterwegs zur Sprache (1959; On the
Way to Language, 1971); Der Ursprung des
Kunstwerkes, (1960; Eng. trans. in A. Hofstadter
and R. Kuhns [eds.], Philosophies of Art
and Beauty, 1964); Nietzsche, 2 vol. (1961);
Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von
den transzendentalen Grundsätzen (1962; What
Is a Thing?, 1967); Kants These über das
Sein (1962).
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
H. Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft
(1968), a critique of Heidegger's conception
of cognition as revelation; A. De Waelhens,
La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger, 7th ed.
(1971); H. Feick, Index zu Heideggers Sein
und Zeit (1961), a useful collection of definitions
and a survey of occurrences of key terms;
M. Grene, "Heidegger, Martin,"
in P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
vol. 3 (1967), an attempt to furnish an understandable
translation and a concentrated survey of
Heideggerian conceptions; H. Lübbe, "Bibliographie
der Heidegger-Litteratur 1917-1955,"
Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung,
vol. 11 (1957), excellent; G. Lukács, "Heidegger
redivivus," in Sinn und Form, 1:37-62
(1949), an influential philosophical and
Marxist evaluation of the work and influence
of Heidegger; J. Macquarrie, An Existentialisheology:
A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann (1955);
A. Naess, "Heidegger," in Four
Modern Philosophers: Carnap, Wittgenstein,
Heidegger, Sartre (1968); O. Pöggeler, Der
Denkweg Martin Heideggers (1963), and Philosophie
und Politik bei Heidegger (1972); George
Steiner, Heidegger (1978; U.S. title, Martin
Heidegger, 1979). Later studies include Paul
A. Bové, Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and
Modern American Poetry (1980); Steven L.
Bindeman, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, The
Politics of Silence (1981); Henry G. Wolz,
Plato and Heidegger: In Search of Selfhood
(1981); David R. Mason, Time and Providence
(1982).
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