ALCIBIADES I

Persons of the Dialogue : SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES:
Son of Cleinias, I think it must surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers, am the only one of them who has not given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas they have all pestered you with their conversation I have not spoken one word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain spiritual opposition, of whose power you shall be informed at some later time. However, it now opposes me no longer, [103b] so I have accordingly come to you ; and I am in good hopes that it will not oppose me again in the future. Now I have been observing you all this time, and have formed a pretty good notion of your behavior to your lovers : for although they were many and high-spirited, everyone of them has found your spirit too strong for him and has run away. [104a] Let me explain the reason of your spirit being too much for them. You say you have no need of any man in any matter ; for your resources are so great, beginning with the body and ending with the soul, that you lack nothing. You think, in the first place, that you are foremost in beauty and stature — and you are not mistaken in this, as is plain for all to see — and in the second place, that you are of the most gallant family in your city, the greatest city in Greece, and [104b] that there you have, through your father, very many of the best people as your friends and kinsmen, who would assist you in case of need, and other connections also, through your mother, who are not a whit inferior to these, nor fewer. And you reckon upon a stronger power than all those that I have mentioned, in Pericles, son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian of you and your brother when he died, and who is able to do whatever he likes not only in this city but all over Greece and among many great nations of the barbarians. [104c] And I will add besides the wealth of your house : but on this, I observe, you presume least of all. Well, you puff yourself up on all these advantages, and have overcome your lovers, while they in their inferiority have yielded to your might, and all this has not escaped you ; so I am very sure that you wonder what on earth I mean by not getting rid of my passion, and what can be my hope in remaining when the rest have fled.

ALCIBIADES:
Perhaps also, Socrates, you are not aware that [104d] you have only just anticipated me. For I, in fact, had the intention of coming and asking you first that very same question — what is your aim and expectation in bothering me by making a particular point of always turning up wherever I may be. For I really do wonder what can be your object, and should be very glad if you would tell me.

SOCRATES:
Then you will listen to me, presumably, with keen attention if, as you say, you long to know what I mean, and I have in you a listener who will stay to hear me out.

ALCIBIADES:
Why, to be sure : only speak.

[104e] SOCRATES:
Look to it, then ; for it would be no wonder if I should make as much difficulty about stopping as I have made about starting.

ALCIBIADES:
My good sir, speak ; for I will listen.

SOCRATES:
Speak I must, I suppose. Now, although it is hard for a lover to parley with a man who does not yield to lovers, I must make bold nevertheless to put my meaning into words. For if I saw you, Alcibiades, content with the things I set forth just now, and minded to pass your life in enjoying them, I should long ago have put away my love, [105a] so at least I persuade myself : but as it is, I shall propound to your face quite another set of your thoughts, whereby you will understand that I have had you continually before my mind. For I believe, if some god should ask you : “Alcibiades, do you prefer to live with your present possessions, or to die immediately if you are not to have the chance of acquiring greater things ?” I believe you would choose to die. But let me tell you what I imagine must be the present hope of your life. You think that if you come shortly before the Athenian Assembly — which [105b] you expect to occur in a very few days — you will stand forth and prove to the people that you are more worthy of honor than either Pericles or anyone else who has ever existed, and that having proved this you will have the greatest power in the state ; and that if you are the greatest here, you will be the same among all the other Greeks, and not only Greeks, but all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if that same god should say to you again, that you are to hold sway here in Europe, [105c] but are not to be allowed to cross over into Asia and to interfere with the affairs of that region, I believe you would be equally loth to live on those sole conditions either — if you are not to fill, one may say, the whole world with your name and your power ; and I fancy that, except Cyrus and Xerxes, you think there has never existed a single man who was of any account. So then that this is your hope, I know well enough ; I am not merely guessing. And I daresay you will reply, since you know that what I say is true : “Well, [105d] Socrates, and what has that to do with your point ?” I am going to tell you, dear son of Cleinias and Deinomache. Without me it is impossible for all those designs of yours to be crowned with achievement ; so great is the power I conceive myself to have over your affairs and over you, and it is for this very reason, I believe, that the god has so long prevented me from talking with you, and I was waiting to see when he would allow me. For as [105e] you have hopes of proving yourself in public to be invaluable to the state and, having proved it, of winning forthwith unlimited power, so do I hope to win supreme power over you by proving that I am invaluable to you, and that neither guardian nor kinsman nor anyone else is competent to transmit to you the power that you long for except me, with the god’s help, however. In your younger days, to be sure, before you had built such high hopes, the god, as I believe, prevented me from talking with you, in order that I might not waste my words : but now he has set me on ; [106a] for now you will listen to me.

ALCIBIADES:
You seem to me far more extraordinary, Socrates, now that you have begun to speak, than before, when you followed me about in silence ; though even then you looked strange enough. Well, as to my intending all this or not, you have apparently made your decision, and any denial of mine will not avail me to persuade you. Very good : but supposing I have intended ever so much what you say, how are you the sole means through which I can hope to attain it ? Can you tell me ?

[106b] SOCRATES:
Are you asking whether I can make a long speech, such as you are used to hearing ? No, my gift is not of that sort. But I fancy I could prove to you that the case is so, if you will consent to do me just one little service.

ALCIBIADES:
Why, if you mean a service that is not troublesome, I consent.

SOCRATES:
Do you consider it troublesome to answer questions put to you ?

ALCIBIADES:
No, I do not.

SOCRATES:
Then answer.

ALCIBIADES:
Ask.

SOCRATES:
Well, you have the intentions [106c] which I say you have, I suppose ?

ALCIBIADES:
Be it so, if you like, in order that I may know what you will say next.

SOCRATES:
Now then : you intend, as I say, to come forward as adviser to the Athenians in no great space of time ; well, suppose I were to take hold of you as you were about to ascend the platform, and were to ask you : “Alcibiades, on what subject do the Athenians propose to take advice, that you should stand up to advise them ? Is it something about which you have better knowledge than they ?” What would be your reply ?

[106d] ALCIBIADES:
I should say, I suppose, it was something about which I knew better than they.

SOCRATES:
Then you are a good adviser on things about which you actually know.

ALCIBIADES:
To be sure.

SOCRATES:
And you know only the things you have learnt from others or discovered yourself ?

ALCIBIADES:
What could I know besides ?

SOCRATES:
And can it be that you would ever have learnt or discovered anything without being willing either to learn it or to inquire into it yourself ?

ALCIBIADES:
No.

SOCRATES:
Well then, would you have been willing to inquire into or learn what you thought you knew ?

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

[106e] SOCRATES:
So there was a time when you did not think that you knew what you now actually know.

ALCIBIADES:
There must have been.

SOCRATES:
Well, but I know pretty nearly the things that you have learnt : tell me if anything has escaped me. You learnt, if I recollect, writing and harping and wrestling ; as for fluting, you refused to learn it. These are the things that you know, unless perhaps there is something you have been learning unobserved by me ; and this you were not, I believe, if you so much as stepped out of doors either by night or by day.

ALCIBIADES:
No, I have taken no other lessons than those.

[107a] SOCRATES:
Then tell me, will it be when the Athenians are taking advice how they are to do their writing correctly that you are to stand up and advise them ?

ALCIBIADES:
Upon my word, not I.

SOCRATES:
Well, about strokes on the lyre ?

ALCIBIADES:
Not at all.

SOCRATES:
Nor in fact are they accustomed to deliberate on throws in wrestling either at the Assembly.

ALCIBIADES:
No, to be sure.

SOCRATES:
Then what will be the subject of the advice ? For I presume it will not be about building.

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

[107b] SOCRATES:
For a builder will give better advice than you in that matter.

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
Nor yet will it be about divination ?

ALCIBIADES:
No.

SOCRATES:
For there again a diviner will serve better than you.

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
Whether he be short or tall, handsome or ugly, nay, noble or ignoble.

ALCIBIADES:
Of course.

SOCRATES:
For on each subject the advice comes from one who knows, not one who has riches.

ALCIBIADES:
Of course.

SOCRATES:
And whether their mentor be poor or rich will make no difference to the Athenians when they deliberate [107c] for the health of the citizens ; all that they require of their counsellor is that he be a physician.

ALCIBIADES:
Naturally.

SOCRATES:
Then what will they have under consideration if you are to be right in standing up, when you do so, as their counsellor ?

ALCIBIADES:
Their own affairs, Socrates.

SOCRATES:
Do you mean with regard to shipbuilding, and the question as to what sort of ships they ought to get built ?

ALCIBIADES:
No, I do not, Socrates.

SOCRATES:
Because, I imagine, you do not understand shipbuilding. Is that, and that alone, the reason ?

ALCIBIADES:
That is just the reason.

[107d] SOCRATES:
Well, on what sort of affairs of their own do you mean that they will be deliberating ?

ALCIBIADES:
On war, Socrates, or on peace, or on any other of the state’s affairs.

SOCRATES:
Do you mean that they will be deliberating with whom they ought to make peace, and on whom they ought to make war, and in what manner ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And on whom it is better to do so, ought they not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

[107e] SOCRATES:
And at such time as it is better ?

ALCIBIADES:
Certainly.

SOCRATES:
And for so long as they had better ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
Now if the Athenians should deliberate with whom they should wrestle close, and with whom only at arm’s length, and in what manner, would you or the wrestling-master be the better adviser ?

ALCIBIADES:
The wrestling-master, I presume.

SOCRATES:
And can you tell me what the wrestling-master would have in view when he advised as to the persons with whom they ought or ought not to wrestle close, and when and in what manner ? What I mean is something like this : ought they not to wrestle close with those with whom it is better to do so ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

[108a] SOCRATES:
And so far as is better, too ?

ALCIBIADES:
So far.

SOCRATES:
And at such time also as is better ?

ALCIBIADES:
Certainly.

SOCRATES:
But again, when one sings, one has sometimes to accompany the song with harping and stepping ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes, one has.

SOCRATES:
And at such time as is better ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And so far as is better ?

ALCIBIADES:
I agree.

SOCRATES:
Well now, since you applied the term “better” to the two cases [108b] of harping for accompaniment of a song and close wrestling, what do you call the “better” in the case of harping, to correspond with what in the case of wrestling I call gymnastic ? What do you call the other ?

ALCIBIADES:
I do not understand.

SOCRATES:
Well, try to copy me : for my answer gave you, I think, what is correct in every instance ; and that is correct, I presume, which proceeds by rule of the art, is it not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And was not the art here gymnastic ?

ALCIBIADES:
To be sure.

[108c] SOCRATES:
And I said that the better in the case of wrestling was gymnastic.

ALCIBIADES:
You did.

SOCRATES:
And I was quite fair ?

ALCIBIADES:
I think so.

SOCRATES:
Come then, in your turn — for it would befit you also, I fancy, to argue fairly — tell me, first, what is the art which includes harping and singing and treading the measure correctly ? What is it called as a whole ? You cannot yet tell me ?

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

SOCRATES:
Well, try another way : who are the goddesses that foster the art ?

ALCIBIADES:
The Muses, you mean, Socrates ?

[108d] SOCRATES:
I do. Now, just think, and say by what name the art is called after them.

ALCIBIADES:
Music, I suppose you mean.

SOCRATES:
Yes, I do. And what is that which proceeds correctly by its rule ? As in the other case I was correct in mentioning to you gymnastic as that which goes by the art, so I ask you, accordingly, what you say in this case. What manner of proceeding is required ?

ALCIBIADES:
A musical one, I suppose.

SOCRATES:
You are right. Come then, what is it that you term “better,” in respect of what is better in waging war and being at peace ? [108e] Just as in our other instances you said that the “better” implied the more musical and again, in the parallel case, the more gymnastical, try now if you can tell me what is the “better” in this case.

ALCIBIADES:
But I am quite unable.

SOCRATES:
But surely that is disgraceful ; for if you should speak to somebody as his adviser on food, and say that one sort was better than another, at this time and in this quantity, and he then asked you — What do you mean by the “better,” Alcibiades ? — in a matter like that you could tell him you meant the more wholesome, although you do not set up to be a physician ; yet in a case where you set up [109a] to have knowledge and are ready to stand up and advise as though you knew, are you not ashamed to be unable, as appears, to answer a question upon it ? Does it not seem disgraceful ?

ALCIBIADES:
Very.

SOCRATES:
Then consider and do your best to tell me the connection of “better” in being at peace or at war with those to whom we ought to be so disposed.

ALCIBIADES:
Well, I am considering, but I fail to perceive it.

SOCRATES:
But you must know what treatment it is that we allege against each other when we enter upon a war, [109b] and what name we give it when we do so ?

ALCIBIADES:
I do : we say we are victims of deceit or violence or spoliation.

SOCRATES:
Enough : how do we suffer each of these things ? Try and tell me what difference there is between one way and another.

ALCIBIADES:
Do you mean by that, Socrates, whether it is in a just way or an unjust way ?

SOCRATES:
Precisely.

ALCIBIADES:
Why, there you have all the difference in the world.

SOCRATES:
Well then, on which sort are you going to advise the Athenians to make war — those who are acting unjustly, or those who are doing what is just ?

[109c] ALCIBIADES:
That is a hard question : for even if someone decides that he must go to war with those who are doing what is just, he would not admit that they were doing so.

SOCRATES:
For that would not be lawful, I suppose ?

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed ; nor is it considered honorable either.

SOCRATES:
So you too will appeal to these things in making your speeches ?

ALCIBIADES:
Necessarily.

SOCRATES:
Then must not that “better” about which I was asking in reference to making or not making war, on those on whom we ought to or not, and when we ought to or not, be simply and solely the juster ?

ALCIBIADES:
Apparently it is.

[109d] SOCRATES:
How now, friend Alcibiades ? Have you overlooked your own ignorance of this matter, or have I overlooked your learning it and taking lessons of a master who taught you to distinguish the more just and the more unjust ? And who is he ? Inform me in my turn, in order that you may introduce me to him as another pupil.

ALCIBIADES:
You are joking, Socrates.

SOCRATES:
No, I swear by our common God of Friendship, whose name [109e] I would by no means take in vain. Come, if you can, tell me who the man is.

ALCIBIADES:
But what if I cannot ? Do you think I could not know about what is just and unjust in any other way ?

SOCRATES:
Yes, you might, supposing you discovered it.

ALCIBIADES:
But do you not think I might discover it ?

SOCRATES:
Yes, quite so, if you inquired.

ALCIBIADES:
And do you not think I might inquire ?

SOCRATES:
I do, if you thought you did not know.

ALCIBIADES:
And was there not a time when I held that view ?

SOCRATES:
Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was [110a] that you thought you did not know what is just and unjust ? Pray, was it a year ago that you were inquiring, and thought you did not know ? Or did you think you knew ? Please answer truly, that our debates may not be futile.

ALCIBIADES:
Well, I thought I knew.

SOCRATES:
And two years, and three years, and four years back, were you not of the same mind ?

ALCIBIADES:
I was.

SOCRATES:
But, you see, before that time you were a child, were you not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
So I know well enough that then you thought you knew.

ALCIBIADES:
How do you know it so well ?

[110b] SOCRATES:
Many a time I heard you, when as a child you were dicing or playing some other game at your teacher’s or elsewhere, instead of showing hesitation about what was just and unjust, speak in very loud and confident tones about one or other of your playmates, saying he was a rascal and a cheat who played unfairly. Is not this a true account ?

ALCIBIADES:
But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me ?

SOCRATES:
Yet if you were ignorant then whether you were being unfairly treated or not, how can you ask — ”What are you to do ?”

[110c] ALCIBIADES:
Well, but on my word, I was not ignorant : no, I clearly understood that I was being wronged.

SOCRATES:
So you thought you knew, even as a child, it seems, what was just and unjust.

ALCIBIADES:
I did ; and I knew too.

SOCRATES:
At what sort of time did you discover it ? For surely it was not while you thought you knew.

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

SOCRATES:
Then when did you think you were ignorant ? Consider ; I believe you will fail to find such a time.

ALCIBIADES:
Upon my word, Socrates, I really cannot say.

[110d] SOCRATES:
So you do not know it by discovery.

ALCIBIADES:
Not at all, apparently.

SOCRATES:
But you said just now that you did not know it by learning either ; and if you neither discovered nor learnt it, how do you come to know it, and whence ?

ALCIBIADES:
Well, perhaps that answer I gave you was not correct, that I knew it by my own discovery.

SOCRATES:
Then how was it done ?

ALCIBIADES:
I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as everyone else.

SOCRATES:
Back we come to the same argument. From whom ? Please tell me.

[110e] ALCIBIADES:
From the many.

SOCRATES:
They are no very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many !

ALCIBIADES:
Why, are they not competent to teach ?

SOCRATES:
Not how to play, or not to play, draughts ; and yet that, I imagine, is a slight matter compared with justice. What ? Do you not think so ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
Then if they are unable to teach the slighter, can they teach the more serious matter ?

ALCIBIADES:
I think so : at any rate, there are many other things that they are able to teach, more serious than draughts.

SOCRATES:
What sort of things ?

[111a] ALCIBIADES:
For instance, it was from them that I learnt to speak Greek, and I could not say who was my teacher, but can only ascribe it to the same people who, you say, are not serious teachers.

SOCRATES:
Ah, gallant sir, the many may be good teachers of that, and they can justly be praised for their teaching of such subjects.

ALCIBIADES:
And why ?

SOCRATES:
Because in those subjects they have the equipment proper to good teachers.

ALCIBIADES:
What do you mean by that ?

SOCRATES:
You know that those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves, do you not ?

[111b] ALCIBIADES:
Of course.

SOCRATES:
And that those who know should agree with each other and not differ ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
But if they differ upon anything, will you say that they know it ?

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

SOCRATES:
Then how can they be teachers of it ?

ALCIBIADES:
By no means.

SOCRATES:
Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood ? If you ask one of them, [111c] do they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood ? It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort : for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And on these matters, as we stated, they not only agree with each other and with themselves in private, but states also use in public the same terms about them to each other, without any dispute ?

ALCIBIADES:
They do.

[111d] SOCRATES:
Then naturally they will be good teachers of these matters.

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And if we should wish to provide anyone with knowledge of them, we should be right in sending him to be taught by “the many” that you speak of ?

ALCIBIADES:
Certainly.

SOCRATES:
But what if we wished to know not only what men were like or what horses were like, but which of them were good runners or not ? Would the many still suffice to teach us this ?

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

SOCRATES:
And you have ample proof that they do not know this, [111e] and are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves ?

ALCIBIADES:
I have.

SOCRATES:
And what if we wished to know not only what men were like, but what healthy or diseased men were like ? Would the many suffice to teach us ?

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

SOCRATES:
And you would have proof of their being bad teachers of that, if you saw them differing about it ?

ALCIBIADES:
I should.

SOCRATES:
Well then, do you now find that the many agree with themselves or each other [112a] about just and unjust men or things ?

ALCIBIADES:
Far from it, on my word, Socrates.

SOCRATES:
In fact, they differ most especially on these points ?

ALCIBIADES:
Very much so.

SOCRATES:
And I suppose you never yet saw or heard of people differing so sharply on questions of health or the opposite as to fight and kill one another in battle because of them.

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

SOCRATES:
But on questions of justice or injustice I am sure you have ; [112b] and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people, especially Homer. For you have heard the Odyssey and the Iliad ?

ALCIBIADES:
I certainly have, I suppose, Socrates.

SOCRATES:
And these poems are about a difference of just and unjust ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And from this difference arose the fights and deaths of the Achaeans, and of the Trojans as well, and of the suitors of Penelope in their strife with Odysseus.

[112c] ALCIBIADES:
That is true.

SOCRATES:
And I imagine that when the Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians lost their men at Tanagra, and later at Coronea, among whom your own father perished, the difference that caused their deaths and fights was solely on a question of just and unjust, was it not ?

ALCIBIADES:
That is true.

SOCRATES:
Then are we to say that these people understand those questions, on which [112d] they differ so sharply that they are led by their mutual disputes to take these extreme measures against each other ?

ALCIBIADES:
Apparently not.

SOCRATES:
And you refer me to teachers of that sort, whom you admit yourself to be without knowledge ?

ALCIBIADES:
It seems I do.

SOCRATES:
Then how is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust, when you are so bewildered about these matters and are shown to have neither learnt them from anyone nor discovered them for yourself ?.

ALCIBIADES:
By what you say, it is not likely.

[112e] SOCRATES:
There again, Alcibiades, do you see how unfairly you speak ?

ALCIBIADES:
In what ?

SOCRATES:
In stating that I say so.

ALCIBIADES:
Why, do you not say that l do not know about the just and unjust ?

SOCRATES:
Not at all.

ALCIBIADES:
Well, do I say it ?

SOCRATES:
Yes.

ALCIBIADES:
How, pray ?

SOCRATES:
I will show you, in the following way. If I ask you which is the greater number, one or two, you will answer “two” ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes, I shall.

SOCRATES:
How much greater ?

ALCIBIADES:
By one.

SOCRATES:
Then which of us says that two are one more than one ?

ALCIBIADES:
I.

SOCRATES:
And I was asking, and you were answering ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

[113a] SOCRATES:
Then is it I, the questioner, or you the answerer, that are found to be speaking about these things ?

ALCIBIADES:
I.

SOCRATES:
And what if I ask what are the letters in “Socrates,” and you tell me ? Which will be the speaker ?

ALCIBIADES:
I.

SOCRATES:
Come then, tell me, as a principle, when we have question and answer, which is the speaker — the questioner, or the answerer ?

ALCIBIADES:
The answerer, I should say, Socrates.

[113b] SOCRATES:
And throughout the argument so far, I was the questioner ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And you the answerer ?

ALCIBIADES:
Quite so.

SOCRATES:
Well then, which of us has spoken what has been said ?

ALCIBIADES:
Apparently, Socrates, from what we have admitted, it was I.

SOCRATES:
And it was said that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, did not know about just and unjust, but thought he did, and intended to go to the Assembly as adviser to the Athenians on what he knows nothing about ; is not that so ?

[113c] ALCIBIADES:
Apparently.

SOCRATES:
Then, to quote Euripides, the result is, Alcibiades, that you may be said to have

heard it from yourself, not me,

and it is not I who say it, but you, and you tax me with it in vain. And indeed what you say is quite true. For it is a mad scheme this, that you meditate, my excellent friend — of teaching things that you do not know, since you have taken no care to learn them.

[113d] ALCIBIADES:
I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course : for they regard questions of this sort as obvious ; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right.

SOCRATES:
What then ? Granting that the just and the expedient [113e] are in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so ?

ALCIBIADES:
Well, what is the obstacle, Socrates, — unless you are going to ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it for myself ?

SOCRATES:
What a way of going on ! If your answer is incorrect, and a previous argument can be used to prove it so, you claim to be told something new, and a different line of proof, as though the previous one were like a poor worn-out coat which you refuse to wear any longer ; you must be provided instead with something clean and unsoiled in the way of evidence. [114a] But I shall ignore your sallies in debate, and shall none the less ask you once more, where you learnt your knowledge of what is expedient, and who is your teacher, asking in one question all the things I asked before ; and now you will clearly find yourself in the same plight, and will be unable to prove that you know the expedient either through discovery or through learning. But as you are dainty, and would dislike a repeated taste of the same argument, I pass over this question of whether you know or do not know [114b] what is expedient for the Athenians : but why have you not made it clear whether the just and the expedient are the same or different ? If you like, question me as I did you, or if you prefer, argue out the matter in your own way.

ALCIBIADES:
But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you.

SOCRATES:
Well, my good sir, imagine I am the people in Assembly ; even there, you know, you will have to persuade each man singly, will you not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And the same man may well persuade one person singly, [114c] and many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And again, will not the same man persuade either one or many about number ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And this will be the man who knows — the arithmetician ?

ALCIBIADES:
Quite so.

SOCRATES:
And you too can persuade a single man about things of which you can persuade many ?

ALCIBIADES:
Presumably.

SOCRATES:
And these are clearly things that you know.

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And the only difference between the orator [114d] speaking before the people and one who speaks in a conversation like ours is that the former persuades men in a number together of the same things, and the latter persuades them one at a time ?

ALCIBIADES:
It looks like it.

SOCRATES:
Come now, since we see that the same man may persuade either many or one, try your unpracticed hand on me, and endeavor to show that the just is sometimes not expedient.

ALCIBIADES:
You are insolent, Socrates !

SOCRATES:
This time, at any rate, I am going to have the insolence to persuade you of the opposite of that which you decline to prove to me.

ALCIBIADES:
Speak, then.

SOCRATES:
Just answer my questions.

[114e] ALCIBIADES:
No, you yourself must be the speaker.

SOCRATES:
What ? Do you not wish above all things to be persuaded ?

ALCIBIADES:
By all means, to be sure.

SOCRATES:
And you would best be persuaded if you should say “the case is so” ?

ALCIBIADES:
I agree.

SOCRATES:
Then answer ; and if you do not hear your own self say that the just is expedient, put no trust in the words of anyone again.

ALCIBIADES:
I will not : but I may as well answer ; for I do not think I shall come to any harm.

[115a] SOCRATES:
You are quite a prophet ! Now tell me, do you consider some just things to be expedient, and others not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And again, some noble, and some not ?

ALCIBIADES:
What do you mean by that question ?

SOCRATES:
I would ask whether anyone ever seemed to you to be doing what was base and yet just.

ALCIBIADES:
Never.

SOCRATES:
Well, are all just things noble ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And what of noble things, in their turn ? Are they all good, or some only, while others are not ?

ALCIBIADES:
In my opinion, Socrates, some noble things are evil.

SOCRATES:
And some base things are good ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

[115b] SOCRATES:
Do you mean as in one of the many cases where men have gone to rescue a comrade or kinsman in battle, and have been either wounded or killed, while those who did not go to the rescue, as duty bade, have got off safe and sound ?

ALCIBIADES:
Precisely.

SOCRATES:
And such a rescue you call noble, in respect of the endeavor to save those whom it was one’s duty to save ; and this is courage, is it not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
But you call it evil, in respect of the deaths and wounds ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

[115c] SOCRATES:
And is not the courage one thing, and the death another ?

ALCIBIADES:
Certainly.

SOCRATES:
Then it is not in the same respect that rescuing one’s friends is noble and evil ?

ALCIBIADES:
Apparently not.

SOCRATES:
Then see if, inasmuch as it is noble, it is also good ; for in the present case you were admitting that the rescue was noble in respect of its courage : now consider this very thing, courage, and say whether it is good or bad. Consider it in this way : which would you choose to have, good things or evil ?

ALCIBIADES:
Good.

[115d] SOCRATES:
And most of all, the greatest goods, and of such things you would least allow yourself to be deprived ?

ALCIBIADES:
To be sure.

SOCRATES:
Then what do you say of courage ? At what price would you allow yourself to be deprived of it ?

ALCIBIADES:
I would give up life itself if I had to be a coward.

SOCRATES:
Then you regard cowardice as the uttermost evil.

ALCIBIADES:
I do.

SOCRATES:
On a par with death, it seems.

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

[115e] SOCRATES:
And you would most desire to have the former, and least the latter ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
Is that because you think the former best, and the latter worst ?

ALCIBIADES:
To be sure.

SOCRATES:
So you reckon courage among the best things, and death among the worst.

ALCIBIADES:
I do.

SOCRATES:
Then the rescue of one’s friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble ?

ALCIBIADES:
Apparently.

SOCRATES:
But evil, in respect of the working of evil by death ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows : as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, [116a] so you must call it good because of the good it produces.

ALCIBIADES:
I believe that is so.

SOCRATES:
And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
Then in saying that the rescue of one’s friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.

ALCIBIADES:
I believe what you say is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES:
So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is good.

[116b] ALCIBIADES:
Apparently.

SOCRATES:
Now then, consider it again in this way : whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And are not those who do well happy ?

ALCIBIADES:
Of course.

SOCRATES:
And they are happy because of the acquisition of good things ?

ALCIBIADES:
Certainly.

SOCRATES:
And they acquire these by doing well and nobly ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
So doing well is good ?

ALCIBIADES:
Of course.

SOCRATES:
And welfare is noble ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

[116c] SOCRATES:
Hence we have seen again that noble and good are the same thing.

ALCIBIADES:
Apparently.

SOCRATES:
Then whatever we find to be noble we shall find also to be good, by this argument at least.

ALCIBIADES:
We must.

SOCRATES:
Well then, are good things expedient or not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Expedient.

SOCRATES:
And do you remember what our admissions were about just things ?

ALCIBIADES:
I think we said that those who do just things must do noble things.

SOCRATES:
And that those who do noble things must do good things ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

[116d] SOCRATES:
And that good things are expedient ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient.

ALCIBIADES:
So it seems.

SOCRATES:
Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner ?

ALCIBIADES:
I seem to be, apparently.

SOCRATES:
So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that [116e] just and expedient are the same ?

ALCIBIADES:
But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state ! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning.

SOCRATES:
And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is ?

ALCIBIADES:
I am, quite.

SOCRATES:
Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing ?

[117a] ALCIBIADES:
I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer.

SOCRATES:
And the reason would be, because you know ?

ALCIBIADES:
I think so.

SOCRATES:
Then if you involuntarily give contradictory answers, clearly it must be about things of which you are ignorant.

ALCIBIADES:
Very likely.

SOCRATES:
And you say you are bewildered in answering about just and unjust, noble and base, evil and good, expedient and inexpedient ? Now, is it not obvious that your bewilderment is caused by your ignorance of these things ?

[117b] ALCIBIADES:
I agree.

SOCRATES:
Then is it the case that when a man does not know a thing he must needs be bewildered in spirit regarding that thing ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes, of course.

SOCRATES:
Well now, do you know in what way you can ascend to heaven ?

ALCIBIADES:
On my word, not I.

SOCRATES:
Is that too a kind of question about which your judgement is bewildered ?

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

SOCRATES:
Do you know the reason, or shall I state it ?

ALCIBIADES:
State it.

SOCRATES:
It is, my friend, that while not knowing the matter you do not suppose that you know it.

[117c] ALCIBIADES:
Here again, how do you mean ?

SOCRATES:
Do your share, in seeing for yourself. Are you bewildered about the kind of thing that you do not know and are aware of not knowing ? For instance, you know, I suppose, that you do not know about the preparation of a tasty dish ?

ALCIBIADES:
Quite so.

SOCRATES:
Then do you think for yourself how you are to prepare it, and get bewildered, or do you entrust it to the person who knows ?

ALCIBIADES:
I do the latter.

SOCRATES:
And what if you should be on a ship at sea ? Would you think [117d] whether the tiller should be moved inwards or outwards, and in your ignorance bewilder yourself, or would you entrust it to the helmsman, and be quiet ?

ALCIBIADES:
I would leave it to him.

SOCRATES:
So you are not bewildered about what you do not know, so long as you know that you do not know ?

ALCIBIADES:
It seems I am not,

SOCRATES:
Then do you note that mistakes in action also are due to this ignorance of thinking one knows when one does not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Here again, how do you mean ?

SOCRATES:
We set about acting, I suppose, when we think we know what we are doing ?

[117e] ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
But when people think they do not know, I suppose they hand it over to others ?

ALCIBIADES:
To be sure.

SOCRATES:
And so that kind of ignorant person makes no mistakes in life, because they entrust such matters to others ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
Who then are those who make mistakes ? For, I take it, they cannot be those who know.

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

SOCRATES:
But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant [118a] who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes, only those.

SOCRATES:
Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
And when it is about the greatest matters, it is most injurious and base ?

ALCIBIADES:
By far.

SOCRATES:
Well then, can you mention any greater things than the just, the noble, the good, and the expedient ?

ALCIBIADES:
No, indeed.

SOCRATES:
And it is about these, you say, that you are bewildered ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

SOCRATES:
But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before [118b] that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do ?

ALCIBIADES:
I am afraid so.

SOCRATES:
Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in ! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind ; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth ; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city’s affairs, [118c] except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.

ALCIBIADES:
Yes, you know, Socrates, they say he did not get his wisdom independently, but consorted with many wise men, such as Pythocleides and Anaxagoras ; and now, old as he is, he still confers with Damon for that very purpose.

SOCRATES:
Well, but did you ever find a man who was wise in anything and yet unable to make another man wise in the same things as himself ? For instance, the man who taught you letters was wise himself, and also made you wise, and anyone else he wished to, did he not ?

ALCIBIADES:
Yes.

[118d] SOCRATES:
And you too, who learnt from him, will be able to make another man wise ?