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Can the Nominalist Explain Metaphor?
Prof. Jesse Prinz
December 12, 1993
In his recent paper, "Nominalism and
Transference: Meditations on Goodman's Theory
of Metaphor", Jonathan Cohen concludes
that Goodman's metaphysical commitment to
nominalism prevents him from giving a plausible
account of metaphor. This conclusion is drawn
from two arguments. According to the first,
Goodman equivocates between two conceptions
of nominalism, and only one of them is compatible
with his account of metaphor. Unfortunately,
that conception of nominalism suffers from
two drawbacks: it is incompatible with Goodman's
conventionalism and it does not cogently
explain how words get their meanings. In
his second argument, Cohen points to a more
general explanatory deficiency affecting
any nominalist program. He suggests that
an aversion to non-extensional elements of
meaning deprives the nominalist of the resources
necessary for a complete 'hermeneutics' of
metaphorical meaning. I will examine these
two arguments in turn.
Section 1: Nominalism and Convention According
to Cohen,
Goodman equivocates
between two conceptions of nominalism in
Languages of Art.{1} The first Cohen calls
'stipulative nominalism' according to which
rules associating labels with objects are
precepts handed down from an unspecified
source. The second he calls 'conventional
nominalism' according to which rules of association
are determined by the practices of language
users. As Cohen persuasively demonstrates,
the second form of nominalism is baldly incompatible
with Goodman's account of metaphor. According
to Goodman, a metaphorical application of
a predicate can be right or wrong, and, more
importantly, its applicability will be a
matter of fact established independently
of and prior to its actual use. In other
words, conventional practice does not determine
a predicate's rules of association. Consequently,
Goodman is forced to adopt stipulative nominalism.
At first blush, this is not an unhappy position
for Goodman; stipulative nominalism is perfectly
compatible with his account of metaphor.
Nevertheless, Cohen
tells us, there is a deeper tension between
stipulative nominalism and Goodman's general
approach to symbols. Goodman vigorously endorses
a conventionalist line on symbolic content.
Thus, he is confronted with a dilemma: if
he retains his account of metaphor, he must
adopt stipulative nominalism and, consequently,
he must abandon conventionalism; if he retains
his conventionalism, he must abandon his
views on metaphorical truth. Cohen is correct
detecting an equivocation in Goodman's account,
and he is correct in saying it involves a
blurred distinction between precept and practice.
But, I think this equivocation does not involve
two conceptions of nominalism. For Goodman,
nominalism is an ontological position about
the existential status of abstract objects
and non-individuals. This ontological position
compels a certain conception of the relationship
between words and things, but it does not
entail any position about how words come
to be related to their extensions. In that
sense, Cohen is right in saying that a nominalist
can believe either that symbolic association
comes through precept or that association
comes through practice. But this choice is
equally available to philosophers with more
lenient ontologies. The precept/practice
equivocation is not rooted in or dependent
on Goodman's ontology. Instead, the equivocation
infects his conception of convention.
Goodman recognizes
that convention is a "dangerously ambiguous"
term.{2} When we say that something is conventional
we can mean one of two things: first, we
might mean that it is ordinary, usual or
consonant with common practice; second, we
might mean that that it is artificial, arbitrary,
optional or invented. Taking some liberties,
we can call these two meanings, 'normal-convention'
and 'norm-convention' respectively. The difference
between normal- and norm-convention can be
detected in the conflicting implications
of the phrases 'very conventional' and 'highly
conventional.'. But the conflict is not absolute.
Something which is norm-conventional can
become normal-conventional. For example our
practice of going on green and stopping on
red reflects an arbitrarily stipulated rule
which we all learn at a very young age. But
our adherence to this rule has become a matter
of normal practice. It is a regrettable consequence
of this overlap that we can never get a full
grasp on what Goodman means when he calls
something conventional.{3}
Cohen's argument
is helpful in this regard. The distinction
between norm-convention and normal-convention
seems to parallel the distinction between
precept and practice. A rule of association
is norm- conventional if it is stipulated
or handed down in the form of a precept,
while a rule is normal-conventional if it
is determined by practice. When Goodman espouses
his conventionalism, he seems to have both
of these things in mind. But, Cohen's argument
raises some difficulties for Goodman. If
a conventional rule of association is determined
by practice (i. e., by normal-convention)
alone, then the label governed by that rule
cannot be said to apply to an object prior
to its being used to apply to that object.
There is no matter of fact, independent of
practice, which determines applicability
for expressions whose meanings are normal-conventional.
Thus, Goodman cannot say that a novel metaphorical
application of a predicate is metaphorically
true or false if the association rule of
that predicate is normal-conventional. He
cannot say it is both novel and familiar,
surprising and correct. Consequently, Goodman
cannot concurrently claim that a predicate's
association rules are normal-convention and
that the predicate has a relationship of
fit when it is inventively applied. Cohen's
critique shows us that Goodman is committed
to norm-conventionalism --- the view that
association rules are determined by precepts
extending from an unspecified source.
However, this
conclusion allows Goodman to circumvent the
dilemma implied Cohen's argument. Goodman's
account of metaphor is perfectly compatible
with (one form of) conventionalism. But he
can only circumvent the dilemma if he disavows
his remarks which are sympathetic to normal-conventionalism
and becomes a full-fledged norm-conventionalist.
It is not clear that Goodman is willing to
do this. Thus, Cohen's argument still has
considerable force.
There is one more
consideration which Cohen brings to bear
against Goodman's commitment to a stipulative
account or association rules. He suggests
that such an account leaves the origin of
such rules mysterious. Goodman's never tells
us who stipulates these rules or how they
come to have normative force. Without answering
these questions, the stipulative account
seems less plausible than an account which
explains content in terms of practice. These
considerations intimate a second dilemma.
If Goodman retains his theory of metaphor,
he must adopt a norm-conventionalism; but,
if he adopts norm- conventionalism, he cannot
successfully explain the way words get their
meanings. Fortunately for Goodman, this explanatory
gap can be filled.
Meaning theories which
emphasize linguistic practice are commonly
called use-theories. Use-theories offer a
cogent explanation of how expressions acquire
content, but they have recently come under
attack. Opponents of use-theories typically
admit that practice can affect meaning, but
they insist that meaning is not a statistical
measure. A word can be misapplied more often
than it is applied correctly. But if linguistic
practice is not the primary determiner of
content, what is? The most popular answer
is that many expressions are causally related
to their extensions. Two causal theories
of meaning are in vogue. On the first, the
causal link between an expression and its
extension is established in an initial baptism
in which a semantic relation is stipulated
by the person or people coining the expression.{4}
On the second, the causal link is established
by a nomological covariance between tokenings
of an expression and appearances of members
of its extension.{5}
Both of these
theories of meaning are compatible with Goodman's
account in three important ways. First, they
hold that the applicability of a predicate
to an object is a fact established independently
of the day- to-day use of that predicate.
Second, both theories qualify as conventional
in one sense of that term. Third, neither
theory is incompatible with nominalism. The
availability of these two theories of meaning
bolsters Goodman's account. They provide
an answer to the questions of origin which
ostensibly jeopardize norm-conventionalism.
As Cohen points out, Goodman wants to have
it both ways. He appeals to both precept
and practice. But his appeal to practice
is at odds with his realism about rules of
association. Recent work in the theory in
causal semantics provides a way of substantially
weakening the role of practice in the determination
of meaning. With these tools, Goodman could
skirt Cohen's second dilemma.
Section 2: Nominalism
and Metaphor Cohen's second line against
Goodman is more persuasive. It questions
whether any species of nominalism has the
resources to provide a complete account of
metaphor. Cohen's complaint builds on an
incisive observation about metaphor. The
meaning of a metaphorical application of
a predicate seems to be parasitic on the
meaning of literal applications of that predicate.
There is an asymmetry between the metaphorical
and the literal. In order to understand a
metaphorical application, we must first understand
a literal application. This distinguishes
metaphor from ambiguity; in the latter, the
meanings of an expression are independent.
Nominalists, Cohen insists, are not equipped
to explain the asymmetric dependence of metaphorical
applications. The reason seems to be this.
In order to explain the asymmetric dependence,
we will have to appeal to abstract objects.
In particular, we can only explain successful
metaphor in terms of the properties which
members of a predicate's literal extension
have in common with its metaphorical extension.
This line of explanation is unavailable to
the nominalist, because nominalists repudiate
abstract objects including properties.
Without an appeal
to properties, they cannot offer a complete
account of how metaphors work. Of course,
nominalists can give a partial explanation
of asymmetric dependence. As Cohen points
out, Goodman offers a detailed account of
how metaphors work. He conceives metaphor
as a way of transferring one schema of labels
to a foreign realm of objects. This transference
imposes certain structural relations within
the schema onto its new realm. Goodman acknowledges
parallels between his view and the account
of metaphor defended by Max Black.{6} According
to that account, metaphor involves an interaction
between a predicate and an object of predication.
The properties associated with the object
are reorganized in terms of the properties
associated with the predicate (and vice versa).
Of course, Goodman cannot talk of properties.
But he can talk about the ordering or structure
of a schema.{7} For example, in the schema
containing temperature words, there is a
polarity between 'hot' and 'cold'. When we
transfer the temperature schema to a foreign
realm, we must preserve this structure.
Applying the expressions
'hot' and 'cold' to two objects in that realm
will imply a polar relationship between those
two objects. In this way metaphor imposes
and is constrained by structural features
of schemata and realms. If a metaphor cannot
establish a structural isomorphism between
a schema and a realm, that metaphor will
be infelicitous. Thus, Goodman can describe
metaphors as successful and unsuccessful
without appealing to a comparison of properties.
He can say that a painting is sad without
saying it has any properties in common with
a sad person. He only commits to a structural
relationship between sad and happy paintings
which parallels the relationship between
happy and sad people. Ostensibly, this account
answers Cohen's objection. But, I think the
answer is insufficient.
Metaphors do not
merely reorganize alien realms. If this was
all they did, then structurally similar schemata
would have the same metaphorical force. For
example, the temperature schema (hot/cold),
the size schema (big/small), and the height
schema (tall/short) seem to be organized
in similar ways. But metaphorical applications
of labels within these schemata (e. g., 'a
hot idea', 'a big idea', and 'a tall idea')
convey very different information. It is
not clear how the nominalist can explain
this fact without appealing to properties.
I am not sure whether this is the point that
Cohen wants to make, but I think the moral
is similar. In order to explain the meaning
of a metaphor, it is advantageous to have
a relatively rich ontology.
Goodman gives us a method of identifying
metaphors and some insight into how metaphors
work, but he does not tell us why metaphors
are useful in language or what particular
metaphors mean. He explains how the mechanisms
of transference allow us to call a picture
sad, and he gives us a rough idea of what
kinds of structural constraints that metaphor
places on further applications of emotive
labels to the realm of pictures. But he does
not explain what makes a sad picture sad,
or what a sad picture has in common with
a sad person, or what the act calling a picture
'sad' conveys. It seems that all Goodman
can tell us is that sad pictures and sad
people both exemplify a label coextensive
with 'sad' and that they can be contrasted
with happy pictures and happy people respectively.
Clearly, this is an impoverished account.
Consequently, I am inclined to share Cohen's
suspicion that nominalists forsake the most
promising avenues towards an full account
of metaphorical meaning.
NEXT - JONATHAN COHEN'S ORIGINAL PAPER
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