There is an infinite difference between "there is usually" and "it is certain." Now, the power of "custom" that resides in "usually" is fully acknowledged in Hume and is said to be an, in a -- I think -- proper sense of the term -- Absolute necessity in the practical machinations of the everyday in our minds. For one important point, the destruction of "certain" truth, as opposed to mere "belief" solidly supported by "custom" and experience, destroys the imposition of any way of behaviour upon other people when their behaviour does not cause physical harm of any sort to others. "One can be all that one can be" as long as it does not physically interfere with others no matter how distasteful that 'being' is. Of course there will be many border line cases like spam of phone-call advertisements that amount to harassment, but there one gets into pragmatic cause-and-effect behaviour and also understanding one's own responses to such situations. How one responds may have worse consequences than doing nothing at all. But this is a situation of "maybe." That something, anything at all, WILL inevitably happen is dependent upon something that does not exist and is a pure figment of our imagination -- the future. That the "future" is important to us as conscious, thinking being may even be stated as an axiom and Absolute. That any relation to the future has "certain truth" value, however, is meaningless.

Let us consider the project of Bertrand Russell to get rid of the "is" word. Hume repeatedly says adding "existence" to the "impression" of a present-at-hand object adds absolutely nothing more to it. It is either a fact or it is not a fact. That is all that matters. But "usually" needs an "is," a substratum of "being" independent of facts that simply 'reside' in themselves and 'say' absolutely nothing, nothing whatsoever, about the past, about the present, or about the future. Those are conditions of "existence" one is trying to add to the object. One might express it this way -- simply an experiment on my part -- the only proper expression of certain truth other than tautological is wordless awareness. When one adds words to the situation, one not only adds mere probable speculation, regardless of how much it is probable, and one also adds the necessity of using the "is" word, which Russell so wanted to get away from, because temporality can ONLY exist in words, not in totally boring, bare-assed awareness. We use words, then, because we would be literally bored to death just staring at objects. If we bring temporal tenses into our language, and how can you avoid it without speaking practical nonsence, you bring in "is," the brother of "was" and "will be." All that is "certainly" true, though, is only the pure tenseless present, and that no one can sanely deal with for long. One has to have "was" and "will be" or go mad.

That may possibly be a key to the problem of reflexivity. The statement "I know that I know" is the basis for a great deal of action and judgment of that action, i. e., "The bastard knew what he was doing!" Some . . . people . . . claim it as the primary distinction between animals and human beings. I think Hume would ask, How do 'They' know this? But my point is, "I know that I know," though it borders on experiential nonsense and smells of tautology, makes a great deal of practical sense and is certainly the operational fundament of morality, custom, and law. However, "I know that I know that I know that I know that I know . . . " etc., strikes everyone as mere verbal nonsense. However, again, it is a logical consequence of the all-important "I know that I know." There is no way around it. The only way to judge is merely pragmatic, not strict logic. So is the whole thing nonsense right from the beginning and we totally delude ourselves. I think we need to seriously consider that possibility in a Humean light. Hume would say that the only STRONG determining force here is "vigour and vivacity" and he is, as usual, perfectly right. It is purely an emotional determination, at least right off hand. On the other hand, knowing one has the ability always at-hand to say "I know that I know that I know that I know that I know . . . ' ad infinitum is very reassuring of the enduring sense of one's personal identity, one's 'existence,' through wordy time. Is "the enduring sense of one's personal identity" in any possible way, other than desire and avoidance of insecurity, justified though? Common sense tells us we change every second, and it says we change fundamentally in each day several times. Insecurity and fright tells us we are always the same person. The law holds us to account that we are always the same person from day to day. Is this justified, justified IN FACT at all? But can you see how the word "being" subtly re-insinuates itself constantly back into one's thinking even when is trying very hard to get rid of it? One can can it by a different name, "inevitability" and "necessary" are two possible examples, but the functionality remains the same however distasteful.